The Year of Rearrangement
The Populist Right and the Far-Right in Contemporary Hungary
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Politics is a dynamic process: the ideological stance of a given political actor, as well as the position they occupy, can change. A shift by radical forces closer to the political centre is a well-known practice, although these forces do not necessarily retain their new position permanently. Centre-right political forces may sometimes become radicalised, too.

In Hungary, the government’s shift towards the far-right accelerated this year, as did the apparent moderation of what may be considered the largest opposition party, Jobbik – Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). The latter’s leadership claims Jobbik is becoming a “people’s party”. These two contradictory trends define the whole of the Hungarian political space, considering the fact that these are the two most popular political parties in the country, and their strategies are not independent of one other.

Jobbik’s strategy of “moderation” started in 2013 in response to the recognition that Fidesz started to occupy its position: the government took pages of Jobbik’s programme and began to implement them (see the table in the annexes). Fidesz, in part, made Jobbik’s ideology and rhetoric its own, and even took the far-right party’s place in idealising Eastern regimes, including the Russian and Turkish political models of power. At the same time, Fidesz’s manoeuvring room is not independent of Jobbik’s, which bears a great deal of responsibility for strengthening prejudices and anti-establishment social attitudes.
As a result of this dynamic, it is difficult to define the positions of the two parties. There are a number of organisations which clearly belong to the far-right in Hungary (we will address these in detail below). However, in some aspects, Jobbik may still be considered a far-right party, with ambivalent attitudes towards democratic institutions (e.g. aiming to limit voting rights of the least educated). At the same time, in some instances, Fidesz also represents a genuinely far-right ideology and uses far-right rhetoric, especially since the refugee crisis, underpinned by and based on a nativist, exclusionist worldview, authoritarian tendencies and conspiracy theories.

Nevertheless, our goal is not to examine the problems related to the definition of the far-right. Similarly to our previous studies, we maintain that the concept of extremism cannot be tied only to certain parties or individuals. This may be a characteristic of the entire political system. And it is clear that the ideas and practices of what we regard as populist radical right politics have become mainstream in Hungary.

It is our conviction that public discourse today should focus on what is acceptable in a democratic society and what is not. This debate would lead to the bolstering of norms which provide protection against extremism. This report, covering the year 2017, wishes to contribute to strengthening this approach.

Disclaimer | Since this study does not intend to give more space to, or propagate, extreme and/or illegal views and sites, the authors have decided upon a certain referencing principle regarding far-right sites and materials used in the analysis. Links are only provided to expert analyses, databases, mainstream press articles and content on the official websites of parties represented in the Hungarian Parliament. All other far-right, extreme or illegal content and sites mentioned or quoted in the study are referred to without links. The specific references, with screenshots for the latter sources, are stored in a separate document at author institutes, Social Development Institute and Political Capital, and may be requested for academic use.

Executive Summary

- In Hungary in 2017, xenophobia was the primary layer for the presence of the far-right ideology. Fidesz was leading the charge in this regard. The party’s narrative, matching the rhetoric of far-right actors, is based on the securitisation of migration; the conflict of civilisations, ethnic groups, religions and cultures; and on views of the world based on conspiracy theories. Its goal is to polarise and mobilise society by presenting enemies and amplifying fears.

- The Orbán regime made the political system even more authoritarian under the pretext of defending the nation from asylum-seekers. It used this topic to legitimise the – otherwise legal – stigmatisation of civil society organisations, and to label independent media and political opponents foreign agents.

- The artificially incited anti-immigration position has relegated all other enemies to the back row. While the government’s campaign against George Soros has clearly induced anti-Semitic sentiments, the government has attempted to present itself as the protector of Hungarian and European Jews. And while anti-Roma sentiments may have “frozen” on the national level as a result of the short-term interests of radical actors, they are still very much present on the local level, and emotions may easily be stirred up again.
Jobbik, which entered a fierce battle with Fidesz and was neither able nor ready to compete with the government in terms of anti-migration positions, has outsourced the communication of this issue to the party’s deputy chair, László Toroczkai, who is also the mayor of Asotthalom, a village on the Hungarian-Serbian border. As Jobbik attempts to tone down its communication in an effort to present itself as a party capable of taking over after Fidesz, it seemed to follow this apparent division of labour: while party chair Gábor Vona served as the face of the party towards left-leaning voters, demonstrating Jobbik’s transformation into a “people’s party”, Toroczkai has remained the most prominent representative of the far-right wing. The majority of radical politicians featured in the first tier of the party have been disciplined and have demonstrated a reserved style of communication.

Jobbik did not always refrain from extremist political practices at the local level. While Fidesz and left wing opposition parties often try to discredit Jobbik’s strategy of moderation by recalling events from its past, they for the most part do not take into account the fact that there are present-day examples which could be brought up against the party, showing how it is definitely moving towards the political centre while also trying to retain its extremist voters.

Far-right organisations are practically on the same platform as the governing party regarding migration. Fidesz has attempted to use them to discredit Jobbik through two narratives in contradiction with one another. On the one hand, they attempt to emphasise the radical character of Jobbik through its (prior) close connections to these organisations and the anti-Semitism of Jobbik’s politicians; and on the other hand, they portray the criticism these organisations express vis-à-vis Jobbik as evidence that Jobbik is in fact a party lacking principles and one that has turned away from radical views and voters. The pro-government media has seemed to intentionally elevate certain far-right organisations by carrying interviews with their leaders in order to amplify their anti-Jobbik messages.

The year saw a continuation of the cooperation and network building among far-right organisations begun in 2016. Since the decline of the Guard movement, 2017 was the first year when the far-right scene has appeared to undergo a revitalisation. In addition to criticism of the shift to the centre represented by Vona, the organisations have continued to maintain a close relationship with certain Jobbik politicians.

This is the continuation of a previous tradition in terms of the approach towards the far-right. Namely: incumbent political forces in Hungary have generally approached the far-right not based on principles but in the framework of contemporary political interests. The result of this is that the norms providing long-term protection against radicalisation and extremist ideologies have not become more entrenched in public life and society. Just as the pre-2010 government was responsible for the strengthening of the far-right, the current government is also failing to serve as a guarantee against extremists.

A good indication of this lack of guarantee is that the government has not done much to prevent Hungary becoming a hub of the international far-right network. The leaders of the international far-right organisation Knights Templar International (KTI), James Dowson and Nick Griffin, were eventually banned from the country, but the organisation itself is able to continue its local operations, and serves as an important catalyst in the cooperation and activities of Hungarian extreme-right organisations. On the other hand, individuals affiliated with the pro-Kremlin Arktos Media and AltRight.com do not tend to become involved in Hungarian domestic politics. Their views, however, match those of the current government on numerous points, praising Orbán’s anti-EU, anti-liberal and anti-immigration politics.

Russian influence is not decreasing, either. While Jobbik has partially abandoned its previous openly pro-Russian orientation in the context of its efforts to reposition itself, in the case of the governing Fidesz, this is becoming stronger and stronger; the majority of far-right organisations also maintain their pro-Kremlin views, and they serve as important channels of Russian influence.
Fidesz and Jobbik switching places did not, naturally enough, come completely out of the blue. The turning point was the fall of 2016, when an unprecedented conflict erupted between Fidesz and Jobbik, turning the political playing field into an essentially bipolar one. Jobbik did not mobilise its voters in the quota campaign initiated by Fidesz, and Gábor Vona later set a prerequisite for Jobbik to support Fidesz’s anti-quota constitutional amendment. This was an approach the prime minister had not been used to. In the end, Jobbik’s MPs did not approve the amendment. Personal insults have come to characterise the debates between the two sides, with Jobbik MPs accusing Fidesz representatives of terrorism and corruption in connection to the Residency Bond Programme. Concurrently, government-organised media launched a smear campaign against members of Jobbik, alleging for instance that Gábor Vona is a homosexual, with even Viktor Orbán frequently making references to that effect in the National Assembly.

Fidesz was also encouraged in its fight against Jobbik by the fact that it saw formerly pro-Fidesz oligarch Lajos Simicska behind each of the latter’s moves after Simicska publicly expressed his sympathy with Jobbik.\(^1\) After Jobbik launched an anti-government billboard campaign in the spring of 2017 on the billboards and other advertising surfaces of a company owned by Lajos Simicska, the conflict got worse. The billboards depicted two sets of two men: Viktor Orbán with his alleged strawman, Felcsút Mayor Lőrinc Mészáros; and informal senior advisor to the government Árpád Habony with Minister for the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister Antal Rogán; both billboards featured the caption, “You Work. They Steal”. From that point on, the conflict became centred on the billboards in 2017, with Fidesz consistently accusing Jobbik of serving Lajos Simicska’s interest. The government threatened the opposition party using legal and official tools, attempting to restrict or at least make billboard ads more expensive through the re-regulation of advertising on public spaces. Billboard already erected were painted over by Fidesz activists. At the same time, this offered Jobbik a chance to reposition itself, and open towards non-Jobbik opposition voters by depicting itself as a victim of the government.

The year 2017 brought about realignment on the right. The strategies of political actors changed, as did the relationships between them. The same degree, Jobbik and Fidesz switched places: while the former moved towards the political centre in what Gábor Vona has referred to as a “moderation” strategy, the governing party has become radicalised. Fidesz has made the topic of international migration its main focus since 2015, and by 2017, it has pushed xenophobia to its peak – in a country with a very low number of immigrants – relying on the use of a generous state propaganda budget to generate enemies in political life. At the same time, by expanding the topic of international immigration through flooding public discourse with conspiracy theories referring to the threats migration poses to Hungary, the governing party has made George Soros, human rights watchdogs and the European Union the country’s main enemies. Therefore, Fidesz – similarly to the rhetoric of the American “alt-right” and the European “new right” – has framed migration as an international ethnic, religious and cultural war. In Fidesz’s interpretation, Muslim “invaders” and the global elite – the European/Western nations connected to or even organising them – are purported to attack traditional values and (white) culture based on Christianity, and the actions of the latter constitute nothing but “rightful self-defence”. This is undoubtedly a far-right solution, and one which was pursued even by Jobbik only partially, through certain actors within the party.

Jobbik later announced that it has purchased 1100 billboards to remove itself from under the scope of the new billboard law, and continued its campaign. It also emerged that the private individual behind billboard ads eerily similar to those of Jobbik had ties to Lajos Simicska. The government reacted to this by attempting to use county government offices to remove these anonymous ads on Lajos Simicska’s billboards and Jobbik’s own surfaces, citing administrative reasons. On orders of Minister for the Office of the Prime Minister János Lázár, “billboard SWAT teams” were formed within county government offices, proceeding to survey anonymous billboards resembling those of Jobbik. These were then declared illegal because of their similarity to Jobbik’s ads, and the teams started to remove them with the aid of the police. Moreover, at the same time, they began to remove ads with Jobbik’s own logo, placed on the advertising surfaces bought recently by the opposition party, referring to the fact that they are illegal because the party had not told the government office about the change of ownership, and the billboards could thus be considered to be owned by an advertisement surface provider company. Meanwhile, the governing party went on to describe Jobbik as the accomplice of the left wing when it joined an all-opposition demonstration against the billboard law and the “lex-NGO”. This logic went as far as to accuse Jobbik of representing George Soros.

In 2017, Fidesz, on the one hand, accused Jobbik of moving to the left and betraying its “national radical” voters, while, on the other hand, it said that the “moderation” strategy is dishonest, and Jobbik remains racist and anti-Semitic. The pro-government media regularly referred to Jobbik as such, recalling the past scandals of the party. At the same time, it gave space to criticism directed towards Jobbik from the far-right. The pro-government media also likes to direct attention to new far-right movements. After the formation of Strength and Resolve (EE), pro-government media such as PestiSrácok.hu or Magyar Idők (Hungarian Times) published interviews with EE’s leaders. The articles and interviews in the (EE), pro-government media such as PestiSrácok.hu or Magyar Idők (Hungarian Times) published interviews with EE’s leaders. The articles and interviews in the pro-government media empire discussed the lack of credible representation for far-right values, which was traced back to Jobbik’s turn to the left. On the 10th anniversary of the formation of the Hungarian Guard on 25 August, only a few dozen people gathered at the Turul statue. The portal PestiSrácok.hu produced a video of the participants, calling them “disillusioned members”, and noting that “some […] told us juicy stories about the period when Gábor Vona was parading as their committed leader”. It was also PestiSrácok (PS) which published a video interview with György Budaházy, who in addition to discussing why his conviction for terrorism is unacceptable, said that he believes the right wing conflict between Jobbik and Fidesz is harmful, and praised the migration policy of the governing party. Budaházy also told PS that Jobbik is following a flawed strategy, which has emptied out the radical block. Additionally, the pro-government media wrote about “one of the most serious corruption scandals” in connection with Jobbik’s rented billboards, and has used every opportunity to discredit Jobbik.

One defining element of the Fidesz-Jobbik conflict was the alleged clash between Jobbik (and Gábor Vona) and pensioners, which the pro-government media built up and kept on the agenda over the summer and fall. The strife started with a Facebook post by Gábor Vona, in which he complained about the aggression of, and hatred in, certain pensioners who support Fidesz. Fidesz quickly pounced on this, attempting to make it look like Vona’s post was directed at all pensioners, and warned the party chair to apologise to the elderly. The pro-government media produced standardised content about the “anti-pensioner” Gábor Vona, and Fidesz launched a campaign for pensioners via telephone to reach as many members of this demographic as possible. Jobbik, after having been forced into a difficult position where it was left to make excuses, subsequently organised a pensioner roundtable discussion focusing on the main issues affecting retired persons, and formed Jobbik’s Pensioner Department. This constant need to react required a lot of Jobbik’s resources, and forced the party – which was intent to demonstrate that it is a force ready to govern – into a defensive position.

The conflict of the two parties reached its peak at the end of the year, when the State Audit Office of Hungary (SAO) issued an unprecedented fine for Jobbik. The organisation, responsible for monitoring parties’ expenses, announced that Jobbik has to pay more than HUF 330 million into the central budget and will also receive HUF 330 million less in state financing. Jobbik’s total loss thus amounts to HUF 660 million, just a few months prior to the general election in 2018, which could even make it impossible for the party to mount a campaign. According to the SAO, the reason for the fine was that Jobbik did not submit the data necessary for monitoring its expenses in time. The SAO claimed that the opposition party would not cooperate with them, and added that they did not receive the data requested by mail and in person; the SAO thus turned to the Prosecutor’s Office and reported the party. Jobbik, on the contrary, claimed...
that they negotiated with the authority multiple times, but were not told that the SAO would also audit the first half of 2017, which is contradictory to its general practice. The party complied with the first data request, and the SAO informed the party that it would not perform an audit at Jobbik’s headquarters, and will only examine documents sent to the SAO electronically. The electronic surface used for submitting the data was, however, closed by the SAO. Consequently, Jobbik’s representatives had to hand the documents over to the SAO on paper, at the headquarters of the State Audit Office. This was refused by the SAO, claiming it would be illegal to take the documents because they requested them to be sent electronically. Fidesz reacted in a press release by stating that, “in Hungary everyone must adhere to the law, even Jobbik”. Gábor Vona called the case an attack by Fidesz, and said he considers the behaviour of the SAO, which he believes to be controlled by Fidesz, “unworthy”. Afterwards, the head of strategy at the pro-Fidesz Centre for Fundamental Rights (Alapjogokért Központ) noted that if the Prosecutor’s Office finds serious illegailities around Jobbik, they could dissolve the party. The SAO’s investigation is suspicious not simply because the immediate events preceding it, and because of the governing party representatives’ reaction to it, but also due to the fact that the authority had never before taken a single step against any party; it has always referred to its own inability to act. Anti-corruption organisations had been asking the authority for years to compare market prices with campaign accounts submitted by parties. The SAO at the time refused every such request, claiming it had no competence to investigate real expenses. The authority said it could legally only audit the invoices it received. All this indicates that both the Fidesz-Jobbik war and the Orbán regime’s politics restricting opposition actors have reached a new high. Although opportunities for opposition parties and MPs have shrunk significantly since 2010, it is unprecedented that the government would openly try to make the operation of an opposition party impossible using legal and administrative means.

Presumably, the government chose to go down this road because they believed neither domestic opposition parties nor diplomatic representations, international organisations and the foreign press would stand up for Jobbik. This expectation, however, was met only partially, because some opposition parties (LMP, Momentum, Együtt) declared that they stand with Jobbik in solidarity and would take part in a demonstration organised by the far-right party. This show of support has helped Gábor Vona’s strategy of moderation considerably.

In his annual speech assessing the year, Jobbik chair Gábor Vona stated in January 2017 that the party had changed and wants to represent the whole nation and every Hungarian, including left wing voters, against those in power. He emphasised multiple times in 2017 that he believes “there is no right and left wing anymore, there are simply Hungarian people who want to build or not build their nation; we want to represent the former”. In the fall, after the resignation of MSZP’s former prime ministerial candidate László Botka, Vona’s main goal was to reach dissatisfied left wing voters and pensioners. The party chair published an open letter addressed to left wing voters in a Facebook post. He highlighted that after the resignation of MSZP’s prime ministerial candidate – if they want a change of government – their only chance is to vote for Jobbik. He singled out Viktor Orbán and the governing parties as their common enemies, and said he believes the only chance against them is if left wing voters cast their ballot for his party. This is also clearly shown by the fact that Jobbik’s strategy is not primarily about cooperation with opposition parties – which is how many interpret this – but about convincing the voters of other opposition parties, and mainly those of the left wing, which are in serious crisis, to vote for Jobbik. Fidesz’s actions against Jobbik are rooted in the governing party’s concerns regarding this strategy. If the left wing collapsed completely and Jobbik was the beneficiary of this situation, the central field keeping Fidesz in power would fall apart, and Jobbik could go on to assume the role of the challenger.

Based on the same considerations, it is not surprising that the relationship between Jobbik and other opposition parties (mainly MSZP and DK) remains cold regardless of warnings by members of the left-liberal intelligentsia. In 2017, Jobbik and LMP were the only participants of several meetings planned as five-party summits; these were followed every time by Jobbik’s harsh criticism directed at the Socialists. According to a number of studies, voters’ demand for cooperation between Jobbik and more significant left wing parties to beat the government increased considerably. Background information on local-level cooperation was leaked to the press. There was, for example, a background discussion with a local chair of the Socialist Party, who said that party members had already men-

tioned that there could even be implicit agreements with Jobbik for 2018 and 2019, (the latter involving local elections as well). Another local MSZP politician said that his colleagues at local branch meetings are speaking about Jobbik in an increasingly positive tone, and many say they could imagine some form of cooperation between the two sides. At the same time, concerned about the party’s own supporters, MSZP’s leadership has been trying to keep Jobbik away from the Socialists. Party chair Gyula Molnár often mentioned that, “the party of Gyula Horn does not negotiate with the far-right”, effectively rejecting any potential Jobbik-MSZP cooperation. Besides MSZP, DK also rejects this option, and both parties considered it an insult that Jobbik was looking to attract left wing voters and that it claims to consider itself a force that is able to beat the government; MSZP and DK members often evoked the party’s extremist acts.

In contrast, Jobbik’s relationship with what they call parties of the 21st century (LMP and Momentum) seems to be more balanced. Naturally, however, rivalry is a defining factor in this network of relations as well: LMP is Jobbik’s key competitor with regard to voters from the left and the centre. However, Jobbik seems to be much more open towards LMP and Momentum, including in the field of potential cooperation. The most important sign of this is an interview with Gábor Vona in Magyar Nemzet, where the chair said he would be willing to start coalition talks with Momentum and LMP after the election if the situation so required. It is another question that this approach was criticised by Jobbik vice chair László Toroczkai on Facebook, where he made it clear that he would certainly not be a member of a potential Jobbik-LMP-Momentum coalition government.

To summarise, Jobbik found itself in an unprecedented conflict with Fidesz in 2017, and found itself closer than ever to other opposition parties. Granted, the latter development remains the focus more of discussions and speculation by intellectuals and other observers, who continue to hope for broad opposition cooperation, and less of a fact-based observation. In reality, few parties have declared their willingness to cooperate on the political level, and the political environment generally continued to favour the government in 2017.


5 An examination of which voters a party wants to reach reveals a lot about that party’s politics. Most European party families’ voter bases have a unique composition: more women, higher educated and metropolitan voters tend to support the greens almost everywhere. The voter base of right wing populist parties is usually the exact opposite of this group: in Europe, their supporters are generally men, those living in the countryside and those without a degree. Hungary is certainly a special case, because the two populist radical-right parties, Fidesz and Jobbik, are supported by two-thirds of the electorate: outside of Hungary, such right wing dominance is only seen in Poland. This alone suggests that we are not talking about niche parties, but formations that have managed to reach numerous societal groups.

In this chapter, we will examine the composition of the voter bases of Fidesz and Jobbik. The number of respondents – one thousand – in generic monthly public opinion polls is too few in any given demographic group (young voters, those with degrees, etc.) to be able to draw statistically reliable conclusions. We therefore merged Medián’s polls from January, April, June, September and October 2017; the 6000 respondents (1200 multiplied by five) are thus sufficient to draw well-founded conclusions even about certain sub-groups. We used data from 2014 for comparison, which helped us examine how the 2015 migration crisis affected the composition of the two parties’ voter bases. Another important question is whether the self-moderation strategy of Jobbik – in its effort to become a catchall party – has brought about changes in the structure of its voter base, and, if it has, to what extent. Jobbik started this “moderation” process in autumn 2013; we will thus at times supplement the analysis with data from 2013. We will consider these efforts successful if the party has managed to quell differences, and make its supporter base more colourful and more balanced across various societal groups.
In the first chapter, we examine the socio-demographic composition of the two parties’ supporters; in the second, we compare the value choices of their voters (self-identification on left-right, liberal-conservative scale), followed by a look at how the formerly two-party political system was transformed, what secondary preferences and dispreferences the two parties’ supporters have.

Socio-Demographic Composition

First, we will look at gender distribution. Numbers show in all cases the share of a given group within the voter bases of the parties.

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Jobbik</th>
<th>Fidesz</th>
<th>Total population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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While in the case of Jobbik it is clear that male voters are the majority among its supporters — similarly to all European radical right wing parties —, gender distribution within the Fidesz camp is contrary to this, and basically mirrors gender distribution in the total population. There are no meaningful differences between data from 2014 and 2017: in the case of Jobbik, four out of ten voters are women, and five or six out of ten are female in the case of Fidesz. Although at first it may appear that Jobbik’s moderation strategy did not succeed, since the share of women even decreased slightly, the 38% share of female voters in 2017 is still a minimal step forward compared to the 34% measured in 2013 (Róna – Molnár, 2016).

Compared to the total population, Gábor Vona’s party has a significantly younger than average following, while the composition of Fidesz’s supporter base in terms of age is largely similar to the age distribution among all respondents. Fidesz has ceased to be the party of the youth a long time ago. Jobbik’s outstanding support in the 30-39 age group may be considered unique in a Europe-wide comparison; we can observe a similar trend among radical right wing parties only in Austria. While the governing party’s voter base only saw a slight, barely noticeable, transformation, Jobbik’s supporters got somewhat “older”. If we compare the data, it is easy to deduce that Jobbik was mainly able to rely on the 18-29 age group (29%) in the election year, but it has managed to reach more voters over 50 by 2017. Jobbik’s popularity increase among older voters is even more noticeable once we compare data from 2017 to data from 2013, when only 8% supported the radical party in this group (Róna – Molnár, 2016).
In terms of place of residence, the camps of the two parties are largely similar, especially if we look at data from 2017. The majority of both parties’ voter bases live in cities, and it is noticeable that the – generally low – share of Budapest residents in the camps of Jobbik and Fidesz has decreased slightly since the elections in 2014. In the case of the former, the percentage of village residents increased significantly, while in the case of the latter, it was the share of small and medium-sized town residents that rose considerably while the percentage of residents of towns with county rank dropped. Jobbik’s strategy of moderation does not seem to be successful in this area, and the party has failed to increase the proportion of Budapest residents in its voter base even compared to data from 2013 (12%, Róna-Molnár 2016).

In 2017, the governing party’s voter base does not differ substantially from the general population in terms of education; however, in the case of Jobbik, the percentage of those with secondary educations is higher, while that of lower and higher educated people is lower than in the whole sample. Compared to the 2014 data, we can observe a significant rearrangement in the camp of the governing party. Concurrently with the decrease in the proportion of those with elementary education or below, and university degrees or higher, the number of Fidesz voters with vocational certificates and high school degrees has increased. In the case of Jobbik, the change compared to 2014 is even more noticeable: in 2017 Jobbik, had almost two percentage points fewer voters with elementary education. The share of those with high school diplomas among its supporters is also around two percentage point lower; the proportion of voters with university degrees is considerably lower, but the proportion of Jobbik’s electorate with vocational degrees has skyrocketed with a growth of 11 percentage points. The drop in the number of highly educated voters is surprising, and their proportion is even somewhat lower than in 2013 (10%): one of the goals of the strategy of moderation would have been to convince this segment of society to vote for Jobbik (it is, presumably, no coincidence that the latest Jobbik billboard campaign displays the doctoral title of three out of the seven politicians featured in the ad).

The share of blue-collar workers was somewhat higher in Jobbik’s camp even in 2014, and in 2017, this proportion increased even further, amounting to 73% of Jobbik’s voter base. There was no significant discrepancy between Fidesz supporters and the whole sample in either 2014 or 2017 in terms of the form of employment and employment status. What might be noticeable in the governing party’s electorate is that the share of students is slightly below the average, while that of pensioners is minimally above the average. This is of course unsurprising after seeing data on age distribution, but it is an important finding that the governing party is considerably more popular among pensioners than left wing parties. It might be even more interesting that while Jobbik was essentially the party of university students in 2014 (see the Active Youth study from 2015; Szabó et al.), the percentage of university students dropped already in 2015 and 2016 (to 4%, Róna-Molnár 2016), and by 2017 it fell below the levels observed in the whole sample. This might be the result of the party’s former supporters “growing up” since 2014, as full-time employees are vastly overrepresented among Jobbik supporters. In 2013, a considerable segment of the party’s electorate was unemployed (12%, with the voter base smaller at the time), while today, the majority of its supporters are, contrary to popular belief, not from society’s lower layers.
The share of regular churchgoers is higher than average among the supporters of Fidesz, and the proportion of those who do not attend church at all is lower than in the total sample – at the same time, data shows that only around one-tenth of the general population attends church regularly, and this proportion has even decreased slightly in the past three years. Jobbik’s supporters attend church less frequently than members of the entire sample. The main reason for this is, presumably, the low average age of Jobbik’s voter base, as the youth are less active religious practitioners.

To sum up, Fidesz’s voter base does not meaningfully differ from the whole sample, in part due to the size of the party’s camp. The only major discrepancy is in religious commitment. Nevertheless, there have been significant changes since 2014 with regard to the composition of Fidesz’s electoral base. The proportion of those living in Budapest and in villages has decreased somewhat, while the ratio of those living in cities has increased. At the same time, the proportion of those who did not complete elementary school and those who have a university degree has decreased, while the ratio of those with a vocational certificate or a high school diploma has increased. The composition of Jobbik’s voter base has changed slightly since the start of its moderation strategy: compared to 2013, it has become more colourful; and while the majority of changes had taken place by 2014, the party’s further efforts at “moderation” did not cause the party’s popularity to increase in those societal groups it used to be unpopular in (except among pensioners).

By 2018, the proportion of those living in cities and who have a vocational certificate or a high school diploma has increased within Fidesz’s electoral base compared to 2014, while Jobbik’s voter base has become more colourful compared to 2013.

Political Preferences

In the following, we will examine the political self-identification and political preferences of the voter bases of the two right wing parties, and their attitudes towards other parties.
The voters of Fidesz and Jobbik understand their parties’ values: the vast majority of them placed themselves on the right wing of the political scale. However, it is interesting that Jobbik voters were not considerably more oriented to the right even back in 2010 (Bíró-Nagy 2011) and 2014 than supporters of the governing party, and by 2017 the share of those identifying with the political centre or even the left has definitely increased. Thus, the views of the Jobbik community are markedly more leftist than those of the Fidesz camp. Therefore, in this case, Jobbik’s moderation strategy clearly does not seem to be ineffective (the right wing shift of the Hungarian population is indicated by the fact that the average score of the complete population is 60).

It is clearly visible that the voter bases of the two parties identify themselves with the centre to a much greater extent on the conservative-liberal scale than on the left-right scale: the centre often shows uncertainty, and respondents presumably recognised these phrases to a lesser extent. The conservative majority is visible in both cases, but it is notable that in 2017, one-third of Jobbik voters (mainly young supporters) and a quarter of Fidesz supporters defined themselves as liberal – despite Jobbik’s former and Fidesz’s current anti-liberal messages. This is another indicator where Jobbik’s supporters are more centrist (their score almost matches the whole population’s average score of 45) than the governing party’s voters.

In the case of Jobbik, which originally defined itself as nationalist-radical, it is natural that the majority of its voters also place themselves on the radical end of the scale, while Fidesz’s supporters are considerably more moderate. At the same time, this indicator has also seen changes in the past several years: Jobbik’s voters have moved to the centre, towards the moderate pole, while Fidesz supporters have moved to the periphery – although they are still more moderate than the average of the total population (42). Jobbik’s voters, however, follow their party with a significant delay: even in 2017, it was only every fourth Jobbik supporter who said they consider themselves moderate.

Based on the data summarised above, it was difficult to decide whether these findings represent the result of the realignment or an exchange of voters: did Jobbik gain new supporters, or did it rather moderate the ones it already had? No definitive answer can be provided to that question, but, in any case, it is interesting to examine data on retrospective party preferences: these show whom the current supporters of a given party voted for in 2014 – according to the voters themselves.
Memory can of course be selective, but Fidesz voters really are most likely the most loyal: 91% of them voted for the Viktor Orbán-led list in the last parliamentary election, while only 71% of Jobbik voters claimed the same thing about their own party. At the same time, almost every fifth supporter of Jobbik voted for Fidesz in 2014.

It is clear that in the current party system there are few respondents who support two parties at the same time (except for those on the left, such as voters of MSZP and DK) – but even in light of this, it is notable how the supporters of each of the two right wing parties turned away from the other party to an even larger extent than before. In 2014, one in ten Fidesz supporters “approved somewhat” of Jobbik, and almost one in ten Jobbik voter favoured Fidesz to a certain degree. By 2017, however, both indicators fell considerably, but the share of Jobbik voters who also support the left wing has skyrocketed.

The patterns which emerge from the rejection of other parties also point to the same picture: the governing party’s supporters have become more sceptical vis-à-vis Jobbik. This is true the other way around, as well, but it is a fact that the rejection of MSZP (and DK) is still the strongest in the two camps. The decrease in the rejection of LMP and Together in Jobbik’s camp also suggests that tactical voting can be more prevalent in the ranks of the opposition in 2018 than in 2014. At the same time, data also sheds light on the fact that the cleavages (especially between MSZP and Jobbik) continue to be significant; the extent of tactical voting might thus be overestimated in the current discourse in the ranks of the intelligentsia. The fact that 85% of Jobbik’s supporters believe the country is heading in the wrong direction and that 65-70% of them agrees with...
left-liberal parties in the case of the Lex-CEU and the Lex-NGO\(^7\) does not mean that they are ready to vote for the left in large numbers. A Medián survey from September shows that both left wing and Jobbik voters are strongly divided on whether their parties should cooperate with the other opposition block.\(^8\) It also needs to be highlighted that the data describes preferences from January to October 2017. By April 2018, opposition parties could inch even closer to each other: Jobbik for example made serious efforts to realign its own voter base (by coming up with the idea of reaching a coalition agreement with LMP and Momentum, with Vona’s open letter addressed to MSZP voters, or through his participation in an event in Spinoza). The big question is whether the party’s voters can follow these changes in real time and with the necessary commitment.

### Election Chances

Finally, and with the goal of predicting election outcomes, we compared Jobbik’s popularity in the past few months with its support from four years before. We looked at how the party’s popularity stood in the same period of this election campaign and the previous one.

The data shows that Jobbik is currently more popular than it was in the election run-up four years ago, when it stagnated until January, a trend which was followed by a large jump in its popularity. Support for Jobbik currently shows a negative trend. The reasons behind the popularity boost in January 2014 were, first of all, the failure of the opposition alliance, the negative campaigns Fidesz and the left wing started waging against each other, and Jobbik’s “calm” situation; and, second, the success of the strategy of moderation Jobbik had started in autumn 2013.

\(\text{http://ronadaniel.blog.hu/2017/05/24/median_napi_t_rend_a_lex_ceu_tarsadalmi_fogadtatasa}\)

\(\text{https://444.hu/2017/10/12/az-mszp-sek-szeretnenek-a-legjobban-osszefogni-a-jobbikosok-a-legkevesbe}\)
Competition on the Far End:
The Extremist Rhetoric of Fidesz and Jobbik

If there is any topic in Hungarian public discourse which is dominated by far-right ideology, it is international migration. In this regard, the Hungarian government’s rhetoric can be compared to European far-right actors, and Viktor Orbán’s stance on migration has become a point of referral, an example for them. Extreme anti-immigration sentiments have become a social norm, while the questions of anti-Semitism and anti-Gypsyism have been relegated to secondary importance as a result of the moral panic brought about by migration.

Anti-Immigration Sentiments

International migration became a topic of Hungarian political and public life during the migration crisis developing in 2015. This had not been characteristic of the country before: migration was not considered an important socio-political problem because of the low level of migration to the country. The Hungarian public discourse on migration has been shaped mainly by government policies, including several extremely expensive campaigns since 2015, all of which reached a large audience. The topic of migration became a part of the government’s communication after the Paris terror attacks in early 2015. Parallel with the intensification of the migration crisis, a so-called “national consultation” was launched in the spring of that year on immigration and terrorism, which was a manipulative questionnaire with twelve questions sent to all Hungarian households, blurring the terms immigration and terrorism. This was followed by several anti-immigration billboard campaigns. In 2016, the government initiated a referendum against the European Union’s planned mandatory quota system. Although the referendum was invalid, the government succeeded in lining up more than three million voters in support of its viewpoint. Finally, the government organised two more national consultations in 2017. The first claimed that Brussels wants to force Hungary to accept illegal immigrants, and the second insisted that migrants are “settled” in Europe and Hungary according to a “plan” by George Soros, who also influences decision makers in Brussels. The latter conspiracy theory was made the main topic of the governing party in preparation for the 2018 general election campaign. Its effects are amplified by paid media advertisements, billboards and local town hall meetings.

Figure 10: Xenophobes, xenophiles and thinkers, 1992-2017 (%) Source: TÁRKI

The level of xenophobia is practically at an all-time high as a result of the campaigns. According to a series of polls conducted by Tárki since the democratic transition, extreme xenophobia reached its peak in April 2015, when 46% of respondents said they would not allow a single asylum-seeker to enter the country.

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This proportion fell to 36% by November that year, but the drop proved only temporary. A poll in early 2016 revealed that 53% of Hungarians would not allow any refugees to enter Hungary. The most recent studies found that the situation has taken a turn for the worse. In January 2017, 60% of Hungarian society rejected asylum-seekers completely, and only slightly more than one-third would have even considered allowing any asylum-seekers to enter the country.

Based on the regular surveys of Tárki. Researchers ask the following question: “Does Hungary have to accept all asylum-seekers or none of them, or does the country need to decide who to take in on an individual basis?” Xenophobes are those who would not allow any refugees to enter Hungary; xenophiles are those who would allow all refugees to enter. “Thinkers” were ones selecting the answer “it depends”; they would thus require further information to make a decision. They are inclined to consider arguments for and against migration.

In terms of party politics, public opinion polls also show significant changes. The governing Fidesz hit its nadir in early 2015, and was concerned that it may not be able to stop the erosion of its supporter base. The party then started to build campaigns on the refugee crisis affecting all of Europe; it claimed sole ownership of the topic of migration, and it has strived to keep it on the agenda as the most important item ever since. Its efforts have paid off: Fidesz has managed to regain its popularity, while the also anti-immigration Jobbik – the main challenger of the government – was unable to exploit the migration issue.

The main reasons behind the fears in connection with migration are images of the “terrorist threat”, those of “enemies at the gates” and the direct physical threat posed by the unknown “alien”. The government’s answers to these fears can be described by the theory of “securitisation”, which treats the phenomenon of migration entirely as a security policy issue built around the state of being threatened. This approach makes a humanitarian stance and referring to human rights as arguments impossible, and legitimises those policies which place further restrictions on immigration. “The Hungarian approach is that every single migrant poses a terrorist threat” – Viktor Orbán said when setting out the direction to be followed, and the entire communication of the government has adhered to this line ever since. Fidesz politicians believe that “the security threats are growing gradually” in immigrant countries (or what the prime minister also refers to as “mixed-population” states). In June 2017, a month after the European Parliament’s (EP) resolution criticising Hungary for – among others – the case of terrorism-suspect Ahmed H., the Hungarian premier accused “Brussels” of “openly standing on the side of the terrorists.”

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The government’s narrative attempts also to justify fears both through ideology and worldview, using the appropriation of traditional social values and the representation of Christian culture as tools to achieve its goals. The government’s narrative on the migration issue contrasts the West – labelled as nihilistic, decadent and ailing – with its own, self-defined Christian-conservative politics, and thus attempts to place Hungary in the role of a “bastion” against the expansion of Islam. The most extreme interpretation of this role envisions outright war between Christian and Islam civilisations. Viktor Orbán and Minister for the Office of the Prime Minister János Lázár talked about the protection of Hungary’s “ethnic homogeneity” in March 2017, citing it as the reason why immigrants should not be allowed to enter Hungary.17 On 23 October, in his speech at the ceremony commemorating the events of the 1956 revolution, the prime minister said: “Only in an honest fight, with clear and straightforward speech, do we stand a chance of protecting our borders, stopping the migration of peoples and maintaining our national identity. If we want a Hungarian Hungary and a European Europe, we have to talk about it openly. And it is not enough to talk, we must fight, too.”18 The war of civilisations and the rhetoric related to this is only slightly different from the “white Europe of friendly nations” concept propagated by far-right participants at the 2017 Polish independence march.19

The government’s narrative also provides the audience with a complete explanation of the world, interpreting the migration phenomenon in addition to the securitisation of the topic and the creation of ideological frames. Conspiracy theories have proven to be effective all over Europe as a result of a desire to understand the world, as they allow for the simplification of the immensely complex and complicated processes of international migration. The low level of trust in mainstream institutions and traditional media only increases the popularity of secret conspiracy theories, and “uncovering” them, to many people, seems like an “explanation of the truth” the mainstream media remains silent about. The Hungarian government’s narrative has been built on this since the start of the migration crisis by focusing on conspiracy theories about the role played by George Soros in international migration. In its interpretation, the hard-to-understand and complicated migration processes going on for different reasons seem planned, organised and controlled, which is easier to understand than reality. In the government’s propaganda, Brussels is controlled by George Soros,20 who was declared public enemy number one in September 2015. This is the main topic of the government’s anti-immigration and anti-EU rhetoric: Fidesz believes the European Parliament is drafting a “Soros-report” against Hungary, which is being prepared by politicians who “eat from Soros’s palms”.21 The governing party thinks that enemies of Fidesz are trying to execute the “Soros-plan”, the existence of which by them can only corroborate by a few Soros quotes taken out of context.22

The campaign against civil society was launched by Fidesz vice chair Szilárd Németh in January 2017, when he said, “the pseudo-civilians of the Soros-network […] must be repelled with all tools and […] they must be cleaned out of here”.23 The government’s argument initially was built on the notion that civil society “wants to interfere with domestic politics”24 without democratic legitimacy. In the governing party’s rhetoric, George Soros and the “pro-migration Soros-organisations”25 financed by the Open Society Foundations partly connected to him, later became national security threats and criminal organisations. “An absurd coalition seems to be forming […] human rights or civil society organisations are willingly or unwillingly becoming friends and want to cooperate with these terrorist or human trafficking organisations”, government spokesperson Zoltán Kovács said.26 Szilárd Németh later argued that the organisations he calls “pseudo-civilians”...
While the government involves numerous actors in its anti-immigration rhetoric, Jobbik rather tends to outsource extremely xenophobic communication to one of the founders of the paramilitary group Army of Outlaws, the current vice chair of the party and the mayor of Asotthalom, László Toroczkai. Toroczkai has dedicated almost all contents of its Facebook page to the fight against immigration. In February 2017, he discussed his local resolution, which attempted to ban — among others — the burqa and alleged homosexual propaganda, but was annulled by the Constitutional Court (AB). The mayor calls refugees “invaders” on his Facebook page. Toroczkai, after the AB annulled his anti-Muslim resolution, proposed that the government “regulate the [Muslim] issue through legal means as a self-defence reaction to the increasingly virulent migration and Islamisation process.”

The Jobbik vice chair considers the EU’s immigration policy “the murderer of Europe” and stated he is against permanent European “migrant-redistribution.”

While pro-government actors attempt to avoid the issue of refugees residing in Hungary, the current head of Jobbik’s parliamentary caucus has noted in connection with a group of refugees who would have been sent on holiday to Lake Balaton that Jobbik would be happier if they vacationed in Germany. In his post, János Volner summarises the essence of Jobbik’s proposed constitutional amendment submitted to the National Assembly in May 2017, introduced by Ádám Mirkóczki, the party’s spokesperson: they want “neither poor, nor rich; neither young, nor old migrants” in the country. The party’s billboard campaign, launched in September 2017, also emphasised that “we will shut the migrants out.” Jobbik was actually relegated to the background in this field due to Fidesz’s campaigns. The party mainly tried to convince the population that the government is allowing immigrants to enter the country by referring to the Residency Bond Programme, but it failed to take the initiative from the governing party.

However, Jobbik went against the government’s intention in numerous cases related to the anti-Soros campaign: it helped force the AB to examine the constitutionality of both the so-called lex-CEU and lex-NGO. Additionally, the party’s chair called the anti-Soros campaign of Fidesz “a communication...
In 2017, both Fidesz and Jobbik depicted the migration issue as one “above politics”, and posing an existential threat to Hungary, which thus legitimises measures outside of the scope of democratic political systems.

To summarise, in 2017 both Fidesz and Jobbik depicted the migration issue as one “above politics”, and posing an existential threat to Hungary, which thus legitimises measures outside of the scope of democratic political systems.

Anti-Semitism

The Orbán-government has declared zero-tolerance against anti-Semitism. However, in an EP debate, Viktor Orbán referred to George Soros as an “American financial speculator”, a remark over which European Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans accused the prime minister of anti-Semitism, which the government has denied. The most recent billboard campaign and the relevant national consultation the government refers to as a “survey” were deemed anti-Semitic by the Financial Times. János Lázár commented on allegations of anti-Semitism back in July 2017, claiming that Soros is important not because of his origins, but because he wants to settle migrants in Europe. The prime minister had also used this argument earlier, adding that European Jewish communities “do not stand up for their essential interests and say nothing when unjust attacks befall the Hungarians, who are protecting them, as well.” The government has never meaningfully reacted to the
fact that anti-Semitic messages were regularly drawn on billboards bearing the likeness of George Soros, which suggests that the campaigns did indeed generate anti-Semitic feelings. The government’s communication, aiming to avoid this issue, reached its peak in December 2017. At the time, Fidesz MP János Pócs posted a photo on his Facebook page taken at a pig slaughtering event, where the participants carved the message “HE WAS THE SOLROS” [a play on words, meaning it was “his turn this time”, as the word “soros” in Hungarian means “the one going next”] onto the already burnt pig’s back; the post captured the attention of the international press as well. The Fidesz MP in question reacted to the ensuing outcry surrounding the picture by claiming that nobody involved was thinking of George Soros. Viktor Orbán answered said in response to a journalist’s question about the picture that, “slaughtering pigs is not among the competences of the government”.

The topic of anti-Semitism also came up in summer 2017 when Viktor Orbán referred to former Hungarian Governor Miklós Horthy as “an extraordinary statesman”, despite the fact that Horthy had a role in the deportation of Jews from Hungary. Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó later watered down the prime minister’s statement by stating that despite the positive elements of Horthy’s work, “it belongs to the category of historical crime that he did not protect the Jewish-Hungarian minority, which is contrary to the oath he had taken”. Miklós Horthy as a figure had previously been dealt with solely by Jobbik, and the Hungarian government had to retreat in the wake of criticism from both the local Jewish community and Israel – but it is telling that it was Péter Szijjártó who issued an apology for the prime minister’s words instead of Viktor Orbán himself.

After Gábor Vona and Ádám Mirkóczki greeted the Hungarian Jewish community in December 2016 for Chanukah, the volume of anti-Semitic elements decreased considerably in the rhetoric of Jobbik’s leaders. On the local level however, party members did not keep themselves perfectly in line with the “moderation” strategy, and László Toroczkai once again took on the job of reaching out to the party’s radical voters. In 2017, Toroczkai spread conspiracy theories about the Jewry, discussing the existence of a “Jewish background power”. Toroczkai – a vice chair of Jobbik –, for example has said believes the World Jewish Congress (WJC) interferes with democratic elections when in a press release it cautions against including the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in the new Austrian governing coalition. According to the theory of the mayor of Ásotthalom, the WJC had already interfered in Austrian domestic politics in the early 2000s, which led to the falling apart of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition as well as to the weakening of the FPÖ. After the Israeli-V4 summit, Toroczkai discussed on his Facebook page how Israel “can officially control” Visegrád states, and explained that the Middle Eastern country is also “deeply involved” in the “bloody conflicts” in Syria and Libya.

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At this summit, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said the EU must cooperate with Israel or “it will punish itself”, which Alfahír.hu, a portal with ties to Jobbik, evaluated as “the complete submission” of Hungary. Toroczkai sees the plan of the Rothschild family behind French President Emmanuel Macron: the vice president of the Hungarian far-right party believes Macron could never have won

54 http://index.hu/belfold/2017/12/11/orban_reagalt_pocs_janos_sorosos-disznos_posztjara/
59 Toroczkai.
the election “without the backing of the Rothschilds”.61 The Rothschild-backed French president then announced the concept of the two-speed European Union, to the detriment of members who joined after 2004, which would completely ruin Central and Eastern Europe, according to Toroczkai. The Europe reformed by Macron – and through him, the Rothschilds – will allegedly “only care about money, the power of banks and getting rid of nation-states.”62

A July 2017 report of the Act and Protection Foundation (TEV), which investigates hate crimes, notes that the vice chair of Jobbik in Fejér County, Roland Schmidt, had called Tamás Varga-Bíró a Jew, which in this context, was used as a derogatory term.63 Jobbik’s local branch in Budapest’s second district had wanted to collect signatures against the Maccabi games held in Hungary in 2017, which they called the “Jewish Olympics”. Regardless of these isolated events, Jobbik members kept themselves to the re-positioning strategy of Gábor Vona.64 Jobbik, which back in 2012 had campaigned for a Horthy memorial year,65 decided to stay away from symbolic politics connected to the former governor. The one exception is that on 18 November, 2017 Jobbik MP Tamás Sneider, who is also the vice chair of the party and a vice president of the National Assembly, held a speech at an event commemorating the 98th anniversary of Miklós Horthy’s arrival in Budapest in 1919. Other speakers included the representatives of three paramilitary organisations: the head of the New Hungarian Guard, the vice chair of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (HVIM) and the leader of the Hungarian Self-Defence Movement (MÖM).

62 Toroczkai.

Anti-Gypsyism

The Hungarian Roma have been relegated to the background in the government’s rhetoric since the outbreak of the migration crisis, but the situation of the Roma is used as an explanation why the country does not accept asylum-seekers: Péter Szijjártó, the Fidesz-affiliated foreign minister, told the Italian daily Corriere della Sera that Hungarian society “is burdened enough by the unemployment of the Roma community”. Cserdő’s Roma Mayor László Bogdán said about this on Hír TV that since the onset of the migration crisis, “I am worth more than a migrant”.66 The government’s views are indicated well by Minister for Human Capacities Zoltán Balog’s speech at Baile Tusnad in 2017, when he said the government had not decided by that time whether the Hungarian-speaking Roma in neighbouring countries “constitute a burden or a resource.”67

Even though Jobbik attempted to refrain from anti-Roma politics in 2017, there is a willingness for a return to its previous rhetoric if the party believes the topic might yield political benefits.

Jobbik attempted to refrain from anti-Roma politics in 2017. The party’s chair believes that Hungarian-Roma cohabitation remains an important problem, but it is impossible to talk about it in detail, “without getting lost in the blind alley of racism”.68

The party cannot and does not want to remove the word “Gypsy crime”, which played an essential role in increasing the party’s popularity at the onset, from

its vocabulary, as the topic can be enticing even for more moderate voters in Hungary. There is an article on Jobbik’s website about what the party means by “Gypsy crime”. There are, it says, “criminal methods that can be connected to the gypsy minority […] which can only be managed in a special way due to their ethnic nature”.69 According to the website, this does not mean that all Roma are criminals, but the phenomenon “exists and spreads”.70 In an interview given to azonnali.hu in 2017, the party chair stated that he believes “Gypsy crime” does exist.71 Although Jobbik did not build its politics on this word in 2017, the term sometimes finds its way back into party leaders’ communication. The most bizarre episode of this can be connected to the head of Jobbik’s parliamentary group, János Volner. Volner posted a picture manipulated by the “politically correct media” on his Facebook page: he believes that certain media outlets made a picture of a “Gypsy criminal” whiter.72 It was later revealed that the person in the picture was, in fact, a victim, and not a suspect73 – yet Volner did not delete his post. János Volner’s correspondence in the matter brings back memories of the old Jobbik and shows that there is a willingness to return to the party’s previous rhetoric if it believes the topic might yield political benefits.

Homophobia

The basis of Fidesz’s politics is that a family may be constituted of a man, a woman and their children.74 According to Szilárd Németh, sexual orientation is not a political issue but a private one, although he noted to csepel.hu that he considers the Budapest Pride parade “exhibitionist and a provocation”.75 Fidesz parliamentarian group leader Gergely Gulyás would go so far as to condemn it if “a Fidesz-affiliated politician went to Pride”, but he does not consider this a possibility – at the same time, Gulyás added that the parade is protected by the Fundamental Law.76 The World Congress of Families (WCF) was held in Budapest in 2017. WCF, although officially supporters of the “traditional concept of family”, encompasses homophbic groups from – for example – Russia and the United States.77 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán himself held the keynote speech of the event, where he introduced Hungary as one of the most family-friendly European nations, and an “ideal” place for the summit.78 This indicates that the Orbán government is willing to cooperate even with organisations that are unacceptable to mainstream European member states in the interest of promoting its pro-family policies. This is important because the government likes to contrast European and Hungarian solutions to demographic challenges: migration, favoured by the European Union, and supporting the birth of Hungarian children, which is the preferred solution of the Orbán cabinet.

"Fidesz and Jobbik have a similar approach to LGBTQ issues: a family can only be based on the union of a man and a woman, and Pride is a tolerated event.

Similarly to Szilárd Németh, Gábor Vona also called the Pride Parade in Budapest a provocation in June 2017.79 The party’s statement at the time promised that Jobbik would not allow such “anti-family” events to take place if they were

70 kiliana.
76 HVG Kiadó Zrt, “Gulyás Gergely: Kizárt, hogy egy fideszes politikus is ott legyen a Pride-on”, hvg.hu, 10 June 2017, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20170610_gulyas_gergely_kizart_hogy_egy_fideszes_politikus_is_ott_legyen_a_prideon.
79 "Vona betiltana a Pride-ot, ha főpolgármester lenne", 3 June 2017, http://index.hu/belfold/2017/06/03/vona_betiltana_a_pride-ot_ha_fopolgarmester_lenne/.
However, by November 2017, the party chair changed his opinion: he said that he would not ban the gay pride parade as long as it does harm others’ sensitivity. Consequently, the two parties’ official stances converged strongly: both political forces believe that a family can only be based on the union of a man and a woman, while considering Pride a tolerated event.

On the whole, the anti-immigration stance – which pushed everything else to the background in 2017 – may have acted as a veil covering up misgivings which never went away about other minorities, but in the long run will lead to serious social damage. A joint research project by ELTE PPK’s Social Psychology Department and Political Capital (pending publication) has shown that the motives behind anti-Semitism and anti-Roma sentiments are highly similar.

A feeling of national superiority based on the notion of collective victimhood play a key role behind both. This, however, is fuelled not by a disdain for other groups, but mainly by a yearning for security (and partly cultural security). Thus, when the desire for security and predictability increases, this elevates the importance of one’s own group and its norms; and in this light, all external groups necessarily are seen as breaching these norms. Rhetoric based on security fears, and which serves to amplify these fears, is thus generally able to feed into the rejection of minorities.

The right wing, populist half of the Hungarian political space is witnessing an ongoing rearrangement in terms of the directions taken by the two parties occupying it. While Fidesz’s rhetoric is increasingly confrontational against its partners in the West (the EU, Washington and Berlin), and it is inching closer and closer to Russia, Jobbik is attempting to balance its lopsided pro-East international relations and to depict itself as a European party willing to cooperate in the frames of its moderation strategy. While Jobbik failed to build stable alliances even with the important actors of the French and Austrian far-right, let alone mainstream Western parties, Fidesz has become a point of reference for these radical forces. Jobbik remains firmly rejected by the West, although there seem to have been some positive developments in the approach of diplomatic bodies to the party. Therefore, the party’s wage union initiative serves two purposes: first, it is supposed to legitimise the party’s moderation strategy in international relations, while also offering a chance for the party to extend its relations in Europe through a series of negotiations.

The European Union and Visegrád

The Polish-Hungarian Fight against Brussels

The Visegrád cooperation has become more important for Fidesz in past years driven by the practical reason that Viktor Orbán has strived to increase his influence in the European Union with the aid of his V4 partners. Orbán believes that, “it will be decided now (in 2017) whether the people of Europe will retake
control of their own national lives from the European bureaucrats bound together with economic elites.\textsuperscript{83} To achieve this, he found a political ally in the Polish governing party Law and Justice (PiS), with whom they mutually protect each other in debates with the European Commission (EC) on the rule of law in the two countries. However, practical issues have shed light on the vulnerability of the Budapest-Warsaw illiberal alliance. Re-electing Polish opposition figure Donald Tusk confirmed that even the Polish-Hungarian alliance could be separated along the lines of individual interests in the EU.\textsuperscript{84} Although this resulted in temporary tensions in the relationship of PiS and Fidesz, the defensive and defiance-based alliance continues to be a point of emphasis in their public relations on the rhetorical level.\textsuperscript{85} Despite the fact that Prime Minister Robert Fico and Viktor Orbán’s relationship seems balanced compared to the period before 2012, the illiberal Polish-Hungarian axis and Slovakia’s social democratic governing parties gravitating more towards the mainstream, and more moderate vis-à-vis Brussels, are taking an increasingly different approach in the EU, which decreases the likeliness of joint Visegrád action.\textsuperscript{86} Viktor Orbán, who is often radical in terms of rhetoric and criticises the EU internally, has become a point of reference for European far-right parties: the Hungarian prime minister was most recently called an example to follow by Tomio Okamura, the head of the Czech anti-immigration, Eurosceptic party which gained 10.7% of the vote in the latest election.\textsuperscript{87}


86 The shared opinions on migration do not visibly remedy strategic conflicts of interest pulling the V4 apart. The Council vote on 24 October 2017 was indicative of the V4’s divided nature: while Slovakia and the Czech Republic approved the dossier on amending the EU directive on posted workers thanks to French lobbying efforts, Hungary and Poland (as well as Lithuania and Latvia) voted against it.


Jobbik Would Institutionalise Visegrád

In the framework of its “Western Opening,” the Visegrád cooperation has also moved into the spotlight for Jobbik, which in 2015 was propagating the concept of a Central European Union.\textsuperscript{88} Jobbik’s approach to Visegrád is indicated by the fact that the party has proposed several initiatives to expand V4 cooperation. Hungary assumed the presidency of the V4 in July 2017, and just before that, Jobbik had proposed to extend the cooperation to 11 members, to prevent emigration from the region. In connection with this, the party held negotiations on opportunities for the implementation of the wage union with the Solidarity 80 trade union.\textsuperscript{89} Gábor Vona has also proposed the establishment of a Visegrád Parliamentary Assembly.\textsuperscript{90}

The party has extensive contacts with the Polish far-right scene: Jobbik representatives regularly take part in independence day marches organised by Polish nationalists and radicals. In addition to the party’s youth wing, Jobbik vice chair and Ásatthalom Mayor László Toroczkai, as well as Jobbik MP Tamás Pintér, took part in the march in Warsaw on 11 November 2017.\textsuperscript{91} Toroczkai has also visited the Sejm at the invitation of the Polish radical National Movement, where he – according to information posted on Facebook – declared a war against “the two-speed Macron plan and parties founded by bankers”.\textsuperscript{92} The party signed a cooperation agreement in 2013 with one of the youth platforms of the Polish radical subculture, the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska). Although Jobbik’s official stance is that the nature of the cooperation is symbolic, the All-Polish Youth group most recently visited the party’s memorial event in Budapest on 23 October.\textsuperscript{93}

88 TS-szerkesztőség, “Monarchia, Duna Konföderáció, Intermarium”


Wage Union to Break the Quarantine

In terms of the party’s rhetoric related to its international relations, it was Jobbik’s approach to the EU which underwent the most change. The party had objected to European integration from the moment of its formation, and in 2012 they even burned an EU flag, demanding the cessation of Hungarian membership; recently, however, Jobbik has been representing a more differentiated policy towards the EU in the frames of its “Western opening”, and would even introduce the Euro. One of the most important tools of the party’s repositioning efforts was standing behind a left wing populist message and launching the wage union initiative, which serves two purposes: it is supposed to legitimate the party’s moderation strategy on the international level, and to extend its diplomatic relations in Europe under the pretext of negotiations. The campaign was launched jointly with the representatives of eight Central and Eastern European countries; they claim to be supported by 40 trade unions as well, although they would only highlight Polish and Bulgarian supporters.

The New Franco-German Tandem

Following the German election of September 2017, Hungarian-German diplomatic relations fell to their nadir once again; this is indicated by the fact that 27 years after its inception, 2017 was the first year when no German-Hungarian Forum was held. The Forum used to be one of the most important platforms of bilateral relations. The Hungarian government in past years has made German Chancellor Angela Merkel the main representative of the “nihilistic” elite driving Europe towards Islamic destruction, and the Hungarian-German relationship has cooled down partly because of “illiberal nation-building” and partly because of debates on migration and the mandatory quota system. This rarely mirrors the Hungarian Foreign Ministry’s stance, that Hungary’s main economic and political partner is Germany. For Fidesz, the two main lessons of the German election are that the faltering of pro-EU parties and the gains of the far-right are beneficial for the justification of the Hungarian prime minister’s vision on the “year of the rebellion”. The growing tensions in bilateral relations are also indicated by the fact that Merkel has started using tougher rhetoric against the Fidesz government: she most recently said that Hungary risks being deprived of its EU membership when it refuses to comply with the verdict of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), i.e. by not partaking in the temporary redistribution of asylum-seekers. Fidesz, however, is on great terms with the German Christian Socialist CSU: the party “interfered” in German domestic politics in 2015-2016, taking CSU’s side with Orbán and government representatives essentially openly criticising Angela Merkel.

Jobbik undoubtedly positions itself against the German mainstream and on the side of the far-right. Jobbik congratulated AfD for its second place in the Meckleburg-Vorpommern local election, which in the party’s interpretation indicates the success of a new approach, meaning that “people want to see forces searching for solutions to real problems in political life instead of old, 20th century elites”. An example of Jobbik’s “Western Opening”, which has proven elusive for the party so far, is a conference on migration held in 2016, entitled “Revolution in Hungary – An Example to Follow in Austria?”, where the far-right Austrian Wiener Akademischer Burschenschaft Olympia exchanged thoughts with Jobbik’s youth wing and the radical Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (HVM), founded by Jobbik’s László Toroczkai.

The French realignment, which also has a definitive influence on the EU’s future direction, was disadvantageous to Fidesz: French President Emmanuel Macron took a firm line against the Fidesz government: she most recently said that Hungary risks being deprived of its EU membership when it refuses to comply with the verdict of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), i.e. by not partaking in the temporary redistribution of asylum-seekers. Fidesz, however, is on great terms with the German Christian Socialist CSU: the party “interfered” in German domestic politics in 2015-2016, taking CSU’s side with Orbán and government representatives essentially openly criticising Angela Merkel.

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Macron will be an opponent and not an ally of the Hungarian government. The French leader has even raised the possibility of launching the so-called nuclear option, Article 7 procedures against Hungary, in case Budapest refuses to respect European values in education (lex-CEU) and asylum policy. The victory of the liberal, pro-European politician over Marine Le Pen, who shares Orbán’s illiberal vision, defied Fidesz’s expectations, as even pro-government media threw their weight behind the latter. The visions of Fidesz and the new French leadership are markedly different as far as the future of the EU is concerned. The Hungarian government objects to plans on deeper Eurozone integration, as well as to Macron’s ideas on a Eurozone budget and a shared minister of finance. The two governments held discussions on the ministerial level on Macron’s reform plans affecting the EU and the issue of posted workers, but the talks have not brought the two sides any closer to a compromise.

While Jobbik’s ideological characteristics are closest to the radical National Front (FN), the two parties have not formed a closer alliance. The relationship of the two parties had been managed before 2014 by the former head of Jobbik’s foreign policy cabinet and MEP Béla Kovács, accused of spying against EU institutions. Kovács has been only moderately active in the party since the start of the EP proceedings against him, and he thus plays no role in building alliances for the party at this point. Jobbik’s former anti-Semitic acts are unacceptable for the Marine Le Pen-led party, while the Hungarian group cannot identify itself with the French party’s “anti-Islamic, almost Zionist” nature. In the last presidential election, the Hungarian party definitely endorsed Marine Le Pen, indicating that they believed her victory would be more beneficial to Hungary, although they later pragmatically congratulated Macron. However, it is important to note that the message congratulating Macron carried a strong anti-establishment charge, and was not a compliment on the values represent-

While Fidesz’s rhetoric is increasingly confrontational against its partners in the West, inching closer and closer to Russia, and Viktor Orbán has become a point of reference for European radical right forces, Jobbik is attempting to balance its lopsided pro-East international relations and break out of isolation through the wage union initiative.
The United States: Business as Usual

Following Donald Trump’s election victory, for a while it seemed like there would be visible distinctions between the Obama and Trump administrations in the field of bilateral relations with Hungary. Viktor Orbán was the first to line up behind Donald Trump in summer 2016, and he hoped to prop up the sustainability of his own system in light of the Republican candidate’s victory. Fidesz expected a 180-degree-turn from the new administration in Hungarian-American relations, which had become tense in the preceding years. Recent events have, however, confirmed that critical views of the Orbán government enjoy bipartisan support in the United States: leading foreign policy experts (e.g. John McCain) of both the Democrats and the Republicans sharply criticise the anti-democratic decisions of the Hungarian government, and especially its pro-Russian politics. The Hungarian lobby in Washington has access to a robust budget, and in the past years, it has succeeded in mitigating critical voices against Hungary.\(^1\) Actors presumably supported financially by the Hungarian government played an important role in these efforts, including the pro-Putin chair of the House of Representatives’ relevant foreign policy sub-committee, Dana Rohrabacher. Washington’s approach, however, did not change with the inauguration of the Trump administration; the Republican-led Federal Government has offered HUF 200 million to support the local press in the countryside, with the aim of developing more balanced coverage. In response, the Hungarian government has called in the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Hungary, David Kostelancik, and accused the United States of interfering with Hungarian elections,\(^2\) which pushed bilateral relations to a new low.

This type of continuity in American foreign relations also holds true as far as the image of Jobbik is concerned, as the U.S. government continues to consider the party unacceptable. Former U.S. ambassador to Hungary Colleen Bell confirmed in January 2017, when she left her post, that the values represented by the party are inadmissible, and U.S. diplomats have no official contact with the party.\(^3\) Jobbik congratulated Donald Trump on his victory in a restrained message, albeit with the unambiguous message that the United States should respect Hungary and refrain from interfering in its internal affairs.\(^4\) So far efforts by Jobbik MP Gábor Staudt, ongoing since 2015, to build relations in Washington have not proven successful.

Relations with Eastern Illiberal Regimes

Before 2014, the governing party had justified its regular visits to Chinese and Arabic markets with its policy of Eastern Opening\(^5\) and foreign political pragmatism; not to mention the Hungarian administration’s well-known post-2010 pro-Russian and pro-Putin turn. After the Orbán government’s re-election in 2014, the tone of the aforementioned meetings began to exceed the usual limits of European diplomacy. Viktor Orbán, who regularly depicts the West as an ailing region, visibly praises his authoritarian, third-world allies: he himself posted a photo on his Facebook page\(^6\) where he is shown together with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko at a working meeting entitled “One Belt, One Road”. An event organised by anthropologist András Bíró, entitled “Day of Our Predecessors, Cultural Landscape,” propagating the Hunnic-Turkic origins of Hungarians, plays a decisive role in the management of the party’s relations in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan). The event, which earlier was supported by Jobbik and is organised under the patronage of Fidesz MP Sándor Lézsák, is attended by Turkish, Uyghur, Kazakh, Mongolian and Bulgarian diplomats, and in 2017 was co-financed by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.\(^7\) This confirms that Fidesz is committed to its Eastern orientation. Moreover, it shows that the

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5. The economic objective of the Eastern Opening is to diversify our export markets geographically, and expand them in Asia: one-third of Hungarian exports should go to the East. Although the Foreign Ministry believes the strategy is a success, this goal has not been met up to this day, and our exports to the EU have grown.
governing party is attempting to channel a part of Jobbik’s subculture towards itself. Since the relationship of Jobbik and András Bíró became tense, the party no longer provides a media surface to the event; Fidesz has thus practically managed to push Jobbik off this platform.

Meanwhile, the Hungarian government has continued to strengthen its relations with Iran and Azerbaijan as well, in the framework of the Eastern Opening; it signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the former and strives to deepen economic cooperation in multiple areas with the latter.116 The international scandal connected to Azeri money-laundering schemes has shed light on the fact that an offshore company with ties to the government in Baku received millions of dollars on its bank account in the Hungarian MKB Bank after the government extradited Ramil Safarov to Baku.117

The government’s rhetoric turned Turkey, which also plays an important role in Jobbik’s international relations, into one of the most positively-depicted partners of Hungary by 2017. “Hungary stands with its partners, and stands on the side of Turkey,” Viktor Orbán said after Turkish President Erdogan implemented restrictive measures envisaging the deterioration of civic freedoms after the attempted coup d’etat.118 Pro-Erdogan businessperson Adnan Polat belongs to Fidesz’s foreign economic hinterland; his skyscraper, for example, is home to the Hungarian Institute in Istanbul. There also seems to be a connection between the Hungarian prime minister’s son-in-law (István Tiborcz) and Adnan Polat’s business associates.

117 Ramil Safarov, a lieutenant of the Azeri Army in his twenties at the time, murdered Armenian officer Gurgen Margaian in his sleep with an axe during a NATO peace programme held in Hungary in 2004. Safarov was sentenced to life imprisonment by Hungarian authorities, and the Orbán government decided on his extradition on 31 April 2012. The Azeri axe murderer was granted a pardon in his home country, which was followed by a note of protest issued by the Hungarian government; but in terms of bilateral economic relations, the Orbán administration has been improving ties with Baku ever since.

Relations with Russia

The year 2017 is a record-breaking one in terms of Hungarian-Russian bilateral relations, as Viktor Orbán met Vladimir Putin – who uses his power to regularly infringe upon human rights and gradually restrict democracy – on two occasions. The Hungarian government has become strongly dependent on the Kremlin both economically and politically; even though the Hungarian prime minister tries to suggest the relationship is pragmatic, it is only about benefitting from joint interests. Orbán tries to “use” Russia as a counterbalance against his EU and Western partners (for example, to finance his political system), while in reality Hungary is the Kremlin’s tool in Putin’s strategy to weaken the EU and the West.119

“While the Hungarian government has become strongly dependent on the Kremlin both economically and politically, and Jobbik continues its openly pro-Russian politics, a major part of the Hungarian far right also remained visibly friendly to the Kremlin and serves as key channels of the Kremlin’s influence.”

Parallel to the “Western Opening”, Jobbik continues its openly pro-Russian politics. Its leading politicians, for example, emphasise at every possible opportunity that Hungary has to play to role of intermediary between the West and Russia. The party still legitimises the Russian regime based on the “conservative” values it shares with Russian state ideology, but its viewpoint is no longer restricted to the former dimensions of its opinion, namely that the EU is an ailing organisation

The majority of extremists and paramilitary organisations kept their pro-Kremlin views and serve as important channels of Russian influence. Their revisionist goals, anti-Ukraine statements, activities in neighbouring states and acts threatening societal peace (e.g. acts aimed against minorities and at starting a conflict between the Roma and the non-Roma) all fit into the Kremlin’s strategy focusing on generating divisions and conflict, and thus these organisations pose a direct national security threat. A characteristic chapter in this strategy is when HVIM organised a demonstration in 2014 entitled “Patriots for Russia”, where it declared that “Subcarpathia is not Ukraine, and Transylvania is not Romania”. One of the most dangerous hate groups was the Hungarian National Front (MNA). The group was dissolved at the end of 2016 after its leader murdered a police officer. The organisation maintained active relations with Russian secret services: they participated in joint airsoft drills with Russian military intelligence agents, and MNA’s former website Hidfo.ru was operating with the aid of Russian intelligence, and implemented active measures. Numerous organisations and individuals (e.g. HVIM, MÖM, the Army of Outlaws, EE, László Toroczkai, György Budaházy) have close ties with the Putinst and James Dowson and Nick Griffin, who have been banned from Hungary, the leaders of the British Knights Templar International (KTI) and the owners of an extensive fake news network.

121 This chapter is based on the following study: Attila Juhász et al., “The Truth Today Is What Putin Says It Is”. The Activity of Pro-Russian Extremist Groups in Hungary” (Political Capital, 2017).
123 We know from the leaked e-mails of Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s former leading strategist, that at the time of the Crimean crisis, the Kremlin directly encouraged Hungarian revisionism, especially in the case of Subcarpathia. The hacked e-mails of pro-Kremlin activist Alexander Usovsky suggest that Jobbik and a paramilitary organisation might even have received financial support to organise demonstrations. Jobbik and HVIM did,
Jobbik’s repositioning – its move towards the centre – created a vacuum on the far-right, which in part rearranged relationships within the radical scene and has contributed to the “repackaging” of the ideology introduced above. Organisations previously close to Jobbik, which could have been considered the extremist wing of the party, moved away from Jobbik and are becoming increasingly critical of Gábor Vona’s strategy, while they have remained on good terms with some extremist politicians of the party. The gap left by Jobbik on the far-right led to the strengthening of relationships and cooperation among the actors of the scene (e.g. Identitész – Army of Outlaws – Hungarian Self-Defence Movement [MÖM]) as well as to the formation of strong networks as early as in 2016. This vacuum then brought to life a new, joint movement called Strength and Resolve (Erő és Elszántság, EE) in 2017. Although Fidesz and far-right organisations essentially ended up on the same platform in the case of refugees and migration due to the radicalisation of the latter, Fidesz attempted to use extremist movements to discredit Jobbik. It did so first of all by pointing out their extremist views (especially in terms of anti-Semitism) and their (former) connection to Jobbik, and, second, by showing extremist organisations’ criticism directed against Jobbik and Gábor Vona as proof of the unreliability and lack of credibility of the party and its chair. After EE was formed, pro-government media seemed to have intentionally attempted to help the organisation: they published numerous interviews with some of its leaders in part to amplify their anti-Jobbik messages, and to continue maintaining the appearance of the “central power field”: i.e. that even after Jobbik’s move towards the centre, there is a radical force to the right of Fidesz that ensures the governing party’s supposed central position.129

Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (HVIM)

AHVIM was founded by László Toroczkai, Jobbik’s current vice chair and the mayor of a town located on the southern border of Hungary called Ásotthalom, in 2001. The most important topic for HVIM is the revision of Hungarian borders: re-establishing pre-1920 Great Hungary. The primary goal of the organisation calling itself “Hungarian resistance” encouraging “the protection of Hungarian ‘Lebensraum’ and identity” is not “to steal the show in contemporary politics” but to build a strong community that “can hold its ground both in cultural life and at the forefront of street activism”.130 HVIM is founded on a Hungarist,131 chauvinist ideology. It considers members of Hungary’s neighbouring nations inferior, although the group’s focus has changed somewhat as the refugee issue and migration came into the forefront. For example, in September 2015, they demonstrated together with the Slovak far-right (and anti-Hungarian) party People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS), led by Marian Kotleba, against the refugee camp at Bős (Gabčíkovo). Besides a few larger, nationwide actions, the organisation is active mainly on the local level. Its programmes are mainly for HVIM members and their own subculture. Their main goals are building a community, establishing and maintaining “comradeship” and spreading their ideology through small communities. This is why they call their programmes “cohesion gatherings”. HVIM may be the most embedded and extensive organisation in Hungary; the far-right group is also present in the Hungarian-populated areas of Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine. Although there is no data on the

129 The most notable is probably the interview published in the former economic weekly Figyelő with Zsolt Tyirityán, half of which is about criticising Gábor Vona; in the second half of the interview, journalist Tamás Pindroch’s superficial questions provide Tyirityán – one of the most radical thinkers of the scene – an opportunity to blur topics and avoid questions.

130 “Together for Europe – Conference in Dortmund”

HVIM, founded on a revisionist and Hungarist ideology, has drifted away from Jobbik by 2017 even though they refrain from criticising the party’s repositioning strategy. At the same time, HVIM has gradually improved its relations with other extremist organisations.

HVIM organised numerous smaller programmes for its members in Hungary and neighbouring nations, mainly in Romania. These trips, sporting events, meetings, camps and charity events are usually organised by local branches. The more important programmes in 2017, intended for all members, were the national internal camp traditionally held in early June,137 the internal camp for the Transylvanian branches also held in early June,138 and the Hungarian Island139 in August, which was organised as a closed-doors event after a one-year hiatus. In these events, they generally hold presentations, discussions, go on trips, take part in sports and participate in cultural programmes (e.g. concerts and visits to cemeteries). In the national internal camp, the paramilitary unit Wolves, led by HVIM co-chair Gábor Barcsa-Turner, held martial arts training sessions. Visitors could take part in airsoft games, and the Wolves presented unarmed weapons to participants. The group holds military training events for its members; this was aided by a number of military officers, according to Barcsa-Turner. The head of the members’ training programme is the former employee of Jobbik vice chair and National Assembly Vice President Tamás Sneider, Zsolt Dé, a war veteran from the Yugoslav Wars.140 The goal of the

HVIM used to be very close to Jobbik: besides numerous overlaps in personnel (e.g. László Toroczkai, György Gyula Zagyva and Gábor Barcsa-Turner, who was an employee of Jobbik’s parliamentary group) they received funding from the party through various channels.133 Since then, HVIM has drifted away from the Gábor Vona-led Jobbik, although it refrains from openly criticising the party’s strategy aimed at repositioning itself.134 Nevertheless, they remain on good terms with several Jobbik-affiliated politicians (e.g. Tamás Sneider). The most important is László Toroczkai, who has been the organisation’s honorary president since 2006; and even if he is presumably not involved in the day-to-day management of it, he is a frequent participant in, and a speaker at, HVIM events.135 Parallel to drifting away from Jobbik, HVIM has gradually improved its relations with the Army of Outlaws, Identitész and MÖM, as well as with EE after its formation, organising numerous joint events with the latter. HVIM has also made an effort to improve its relations with foreign organisations, for which an opportunity presented itself at the “Day of Honour” memorial event,136 and when vice chair Béla Incze participated in an international meeting in November organised by the German neo-Nazi organisation Die Rechte, which was attended by neo-Nazi groups from Bulgaria, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Russia. A banner with the text “The World without Zionism”, a picture of Ahmadinejad, and a photo depicting Assad with the text “Freedom for Syria,” were displayed on the walls of the venue of the conference entitled “Together for Europe”. They were accompanied by the banner of the Alliance for Peace and Freedom Party, which has members such as the Greek Golden Dawn, the German NPD and the Slovak Kotleba – Ludová strana Naše Slovensko (LSNS).

132 “Ájanlja fel adójája 1%-át, és mi akár robbantunk is Ön helyett”, Vígályó (blog), 3 September 2015, http://vigazo.blog.hu/2015/03/09/_ajanlja_fel-adaja_1-at-es_mi_akar_robbantunk_is_on_helyett/.


136 Remembering the events of February 11, 1945, when Nazi German and Hungarian Arrow Cross soldiers attempted to break out of Soviet encirclement. Almost all who attempted to break out died.
Wolves is the organisation of homeland defence and raising the youth in a militaristic manner, i.e. “raising a new generation of fighters”.141

Among programmes intended for the public and aimed at expanding the membership base and spreading ideology, the most salient in 2017 were the first-ever Armies’ Trip series,142 the “Day of Honour” memorial, the Trianon march,143 and the 10th Hungarian Island.144 The seven events of the trip series were connected to the Holy Crown, Trianon and the Nazi and Arrow Cross eras of Hungarian history both thematically and in terms of their location. The most salient event of the trip was the Attila Defensive Line Memorial and Performance Trip,145 held in September, which is traditionally an important event for the far-right scene. The trip was the result of the cooperation of numerous organisations (Army of Outlaws, Hungarian Bushcraft Community, EE, Skins-4Skins, MÖM and Jobbik’s local branches in Kerepes and Isaszeg), and also served the purpose of introducing Nazi and Arrow Cross relics (e.g. uniforms and weapons).146 The “Day of Honour” event is also traditionally an important occasion for the whole scene, and consisted of several subchapters in 2017. The main event recalling the memories of the Nazi era both in character and symbolism was attended by several countries’ neo-Nazi organisations (for example: Italian, German, Greek and Polish); Hungarian participants were the Skins4Skins Hungary, Hungarian Hammerskins, Army of Outlaws, Blood & Honour Hungary, Varese Skins and D.O.R.A., Örs Skins Legion, War and Cultural History Association, Hungarian National Guard, Southern Breakout and the Hungarian Self-Defence Movement.147 The Trianon march148 is traditionally one of the biggest and most important activities of HVIM in any given year. According to HVIM’s own data, 1500 people participated in the march in 2017, and the speakers’ line-up included Edda Budaházy,149 a number of leading figures in HVIM, and László Toroczkai. The Upper Hungary Hungarian Island held in the second half of June is a public life and cultural festival, where – besides the concerts of Hungarian rock, metal and national rock bands – presentations and discussions are also held. The event was sponsored by, for example, the Lipót Bakery in addition to some openly far-right organisations (for example kuruc.info).150

The central topic of HVIM throughout the year was the year the proceedings launched by Romanian authorities against two of its Transylvanian members, István Beke and Zoltán Szűcs, who are accused of terrorism. Similarly to other organisations (e.g. the Army of Outlaws), HVIM campaigned for their innocence, and held a donation campaign to help their families. HVIM organised several demonstrations for 29 October, the so-called “Day of Transylvanian Freedom”, which was intended to support the Hungarian minority in Romania in their aspirations for achieving greater autonomy. One event in Székesfehérvár was organised jointly by HVIM and the Fidesz-affiliated local council representative also responsible for tasks related to Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, Lajosné Deák. On that occasion, HVIM was represented by the organisation’s vice president, Botond Kónyi-Kiss, who held a speech, as did other organisers. In the summer of 2017 it was revealed that Romania had banned HVIM co-leader Gábor Barcsa-Turner from its territory for five years in 2015.151 Contrary to expectations, HVIM also objected to the independence of Catalonia together with other far-right organisations, and propagates Spanish unity. It draws parallels between the dissolution of Spanish unity and the split of Great Hungary. HVIM organised a counter-demonstration against the Budapest Pride parade in early July 2017; in September it demonstrated against the

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143 The Treaty of Trianon, closing Hungary’s chapter in the First World War, was signed on 4 June 1920. Consequently, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and 3.3 million Hungarians were left outside of the country’s borders. Traditionally, HVIM has organised a demonstration in Budapest for the day of the treaty’s signing, at which they march to the Romanian, Serbian, Slovakian and Ukrainian embassies. 144 “Irány északi! – X. Felvidéki Magyar Sziget”, pest.hvim.hu, accessed 22 November 2017, http://pest.hvim.hu/hirek/irany-eszak-x-felvideki-magyar-sziget.
149 The sister of one of the main actors of the far-right scene, György Budaházy, who has been convicted of terrorism; one of the central figures of the pro-life movement.
151 The ban of the other co-leader, György Gyula Zagyva, had been known before.
Ukrainian language law and against the quota decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) together with the EE; and in October they protested against the statue of Gyula Horn, Hungarian prime minister between 1994 and 1998, over the ex-premier’s actions during communist times and specifically because of the role he played in repressing the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

HVIM’s leaders:

• László Toroczkai, honorary president
• György Gyula Zagyva, co-leader
• Gábor Barcsa-Turner, co-leader
• Béla Incze, vice president
• Botond Kőnyi-Kiss, vice president
• Tamás Lipták, leader, Pest County
• Csaba Petró, leader, Miskolc
• Gergely Dobay, co-leader, Upper Hungary
• Bálint Tóth, spokesperson, Transylvania

Strength and Resolve (EE)

Probably the most important moment in the rearrangement of the far-right in 2017 was the formation of Strength and Resolve in Vecsés on 8 July. Contrary to preliminary plans, EE was established “only” as a movement, with the main goal of forming a “new right-wing force” after Jobbik’s repositioning left a vacuum in terms of the representation of their interests. Their primary tools and areas of interest are the “metapolitics” discussed by the ideologues of the “new right”, i.e. actions intended to influence public thinking, and not direct (party) politics. The movement lists ethnic self-defence, strengthening consciousness about race, and the “defence of ‘Lebensraum’” among its tasks.\textsuperscript{152} Besides the use of words, the careers of the founder of the organisation also indicate the movement’s ideological direction rather well, which is based on racism, white supremacy, anti-Roma, anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim and anti-gay sentiments, the primacy of community over individuals, and the uncritical respect of power, authority and traditions. Its members fight against liberalism and multiculturalism, which they believe are consciously destroying traditional, Christian values. Most of the movement’s leaders were previously active in neo-Arrow Cross, neo-Nazi organisations, and had proven their sympathies towards these ideologies on several occasions, (although they have been trying to deny or blur this ever since EE’s foundation). President Zsolt Tyityán was seen in a shirt depicting Nazi officers and the text “White Power”, together with MÖM-leader Attila László, in a Facebook picture that was later removed from the site,\textsuperscript{153} and a day later a Nazi documentary propagating the Waffen SS was placed on the Army of Outlaws’ website at his recommendation.\textsuperscript{154}

The movement’s foundation was not without frequent internal disputes characteristic of the far-right. Strength and Resolve was originally intended to be established as a joint project of the Army of Outlaws’ political wing, Identiťesz and the Érpatak Model National Network; however, at the last moment, they had a falling-out with the latter’s leader, Érpatak Mayor Mihály Zoltán Oroṣz; thus,


\textsuperscript{153} https://www.facebook.com/laszlo.attila.tibor/photos/a.207131573137636.1073741829.103074316876696/301418170375642/?type=3&theater&ifg=1 (The picture was archived by Political Capital)

a former Jobbik ally, the Towns National Alliance, became the third partner. Opinions differ on the conflict and the reason for the break-up: the Army of Outlaws and Identitez say Orosz registered a party called Rend és igazságszövet (Order and Justice, RIA) in the spring, well before the launch of the movement, while Orosz says the reason had to do with ideology, because contrary to the other two organisations, he does not differentiate between citizens on an ethnic basis, and is neither a Hungarist nor a Nazi. Neither explanation seems to be credible, because the Army of Outlaws had used the phrase “Order and Justice” on numerous occasions in the months before EE’s foundation, which suggests it was part of a strategy to introduce the name, and Orosz himself is no opponent of Hungarist ideology: in 2014, he said that Ferenc Szálasi was Hungary’s last legitimate prime minister.¹⁵⁵

Even though EE was created as a reaction to the ideological and power vacuum left by Jobbik’s repositioning, to reach activists and voters who feel disappointed, the movement has not reached its goals yet. "

EE was thus created as a reaction to the ideological and power vacuum left by Jobbik’s repositioning, to reach activists and voters who feel disappointed. Since its formation, the organisation has focused on building organisational capacity and gaining popularity to lay the foundations of registering themselves as a political party and then to participate in the general election, something they only talk about in conditional sentences at this point.¹⁵⁶ In the framework of their nationwide tour, ongoing since July 2017, they have held town hall meetings, and have established 13 regional branches in the following settlements (generally with 4-5 members each): Budapest, Gyöngyös, Győr, Iregszemcse, Kecskemét, Kisvejke, Miskolc, Mosonudvar, Paks, Pécs, Szeged, Tatabánya and Vecsés.¹⁵⁷ In October, they launched the Patriot Knowledge Development Programme,¹⁵⁸ serving the purpose of developing their members’ knowledge of public affairs and ideology, and in November the first meeting of all local branch chairs was held. EE has had to face a number of restrictions: Facebook deleted the organisation’s profile both in September and October, and in November OTP terminated their bank account.¹⁵⁹

To develop their international relations, EE’s representatives (mainly vice chair Balázs László) visited Brussels (in June), Great Britain (in October) and the organisation Der III. Weg in Germany (November). The most important international partner of EE is Knights Templar International (KTI), a Britain-based international far-right organisation, which has built an extensive online news channel network in the United States and Europe, and has developed close relations with local far-right, paramilitary organisations in a number of Central and Eastern European countries, where it maintains presence through its representatives. Although two KTI leaders, James Dowson and Nick Griffin, were banned from Hungary on the recommendation of the Counter-Terrorism Centre (TEK) – because they posed a national security risk¹⁶⁰ –, the organisation maintains a presence in the country through the head of its Hungarian branch, Imre Téglálsy, who is also one of the main figures of the pro-life movement as the president of Alfa Alliance. Since KTI has not been promoting its Hungarian activities since the expulsions, there is no accurate information available on the content of its relationship with EE apart from the fact that Balázs László met James Dowson and Nick Griffin during his visit to London at the end of October. However, this close relationship had been established with the founding organisations of EE before its formation, namely the Army of Outlaws and

¹⁵⁶ Supposing that the election is held in early April 2018, party registration must be finished by early February.
Identitesz. In Hungary, EE is on the best terms with HVIM and MÖM, besides the Army of Outlaws, its founding member, which is attested to by numerous joint events, activities and promotions of each other’s programmes.

EE has organised some larger demonstrations to supplement events intended to build popularity and salience, and specifically serving the purpose of building organisational capabilities. On 9 September, an event focusing on the rejection of immigration, called Defend Europe 1686, was held in Buda castle, and was attended by the Army of Outlaws, HVIM and MÖM. This was the first time they used the movement’s flags, which had been sanctified at a place belonging to the external funeral home of the Saint Gellért Parish. A few days later, EE and HVIM demonstrated against the CJEU’s quota decision, and then on 23 October, in his speech at the ‘56 memorial event, János Lantos compared human rights activists to former State Defence Authority (ÁVH) agents, who, if history “brings about such a situation, (...) generally end up hanging from a lamp post facing downwards”.

EE’s leadership:

- **Zsolt Tyirityán**, chair, leader of the Army of Outlaws.
- **Balázs László**, vice chair, ex-president of Identitesz, a member/sympathiser of the former Hungarist Pax Hungarica Movement (PHM)
- **János Lantos**, member of the board, the former vice chair of Pax Hungarica Movement, studying theology
- **Barnabás Abrahám**, ex-member of PHM, former territorial leader of Identitesz in Budapest
- **Márton Forgács**, former deputy territorial leader of Identitesz in Budapest
- **Attila Szabó**, former chair of Jobbik’s Vecsés branch, local representative, the clan leader of the Army of Outlaws in Vecsés
- **Csaba Imrik**, the chair of the Army of Outlaws in Budapest, five-time Hungarian champion and several time European champion in kempo


164 In May 2015 the Tax Office (NAV), in a joint operation with the Counter-Terrorism Centre (TEK), arrested some members of the Baranya clan. “RTL Klub: a Betyársereg tagjai is benne voltak az adócsaló bandában”, hvg.hu, 26 May 2017, http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20170526_a_betyarsereg_tagjai_is_benne_voltak_az_adocsalo_bandaban.


Army of Outlaws

The Army of Outlaws is the second largest organisation after HVIM, but it is also the most violent. It was founded in 2008; one of the founders is László Toroczkai. The current head of the organisation is Zsolt Tyirityán, who was sentenced to prison for causing grievous bodily injury with a racist intent; in August 2017, a court found him guilty of denying the crimes of the national socialist system in his speech at the 2016 “Day of Honour” memorial event. Tyirityán said in December 2016 that the “army” has around 400 members, including former law enforcement agents (e.g. police officers, soldiers, national security service agents, mercenaries), as well as people with underworld connections. The Army of Outlaws is openly racist, anti-Roma, anti-Semitic and believes in white supremacy, while branding itself a sports association because whose main goal is to develop its members’ fitness and their physical and military readiness. In reality, the Outlaws operate as an arbitrary volunteer security force mainly targeting the Roma. Their “protective” services (“offering” in fact more intimidation than protection) are often used by private persons to settle debates. In the framework of these activities, a sufficient number of Outlaws show up in a given community to be able to intimidate their targets, and they act in a threatening way (for example they “patrol” the area) against the local Roma population. Tyirityán regularly encourages members to partake in military drills and learn how to conduct guerrilla warfare using the tools of terrorists. The Army of Outlaws used to be on good terms with Jobbik and Gábor Vona, but since the party’s attempt at repositioning itself, the relationship has deteriorated, although it has remained quite good with some extremist politicians, for example Toroczkai and János Volner. Volner, who Tyirityán maintains an “honest friendship” with, participated in the Outlaws’ yearly meeting
The Army of Outlaws was not as active in 2017 as in previous years as far as intimidating activities are concerned: only two such cases were reported. Additionally, they played an important role in, and were the organisers of, the “Day of Honour” demonstration; they supported Budapest’s Olympic bid, supported Transylvanian-made Csíki Sör in its legal and communication dispute with Heineken; took part in events against George Soros, human rights watchdogs and CEU; organised charity events; provided security for events hosted by other organisations (for example, at the inauguration of the Horthy statue in Káli in May, which was also attended by Identitesz, HVIM and Mihály Zoltán Orosz); and they also held sport programmes and training events. New local branches (or “clans”) were founded in Borsod, Győr and Dunaújváros in 2017, but the nationwide tour of EE was also used to promote the organisation. Members attended Transylvania multiple times (for example to attend the Csiszmolyó Pilgrimate). On the domestic level, the Army of Outlaws is close to MÖM and HVIM, in addition to Identitesz. Internationally, its main ally is KTI, the leader of which, James Dowson, presented them with 30 English police tactical vests on their “army inspection” in February 2017.171

The Alliance of Identitarian University Students (Identitesz)

The Alliance of Conservative Students, founded in late 2015, transformed into Identitesz in the second half of 2016. They essentially ceased activities once EE was founded, as three of their leaders became members of the latter’s board, and they had had no extensive membership and base. Although Identitesz has attempted to connect to the European identitarian movement in its communications and ideology, it represented the far-right’s more traditional, older direction compared to the Europe-wide movement, with its chauvinistic, Hungarist-like views mirrored in their choice of words and symbols. The former chair of Identitesz, László Balázs, was visible around the Pax Hungarica Movement, but other leaders of the organisation were also connected to neo-Nazi and neo-Arrow Cross movements and ideologies.172 The organisation tried mainly to focus on university students in a number of larger university towns (e.g. Debrecen and Budapest), through noticeable, symbolic activities (e.g. demonstrations with flags and banners) and an active online presence (for example the creation of an image video). In the first half of the year, the organisation’s focus shifted to building relations with other organisations, which led to Identitesz’s de facto dissolution and the formation of EE. Its closest partner and main financial benefactor was KTI. Identitesz’s headquarters was located in KTI’s Budapest office as well.173 They organised their largest event jointly with KTI, the Stop Operation Soros conference in March,174 which was attended not only by almost all prominent members of the Hungarian far-right

scene, but also by some pro-Russian European “heavyweights”. Security at the conference was provided by MÖM, and besides the representatives of Identitês and HVIM, as well as Imre Téglásy, speeches were held by foreign presenters such as the vice chair of the Italian neo-fascist party Forza Nuova, the former chair of the far-right British National Party, a chair of KTI Nick Griffin, a representative of the Macedonian Stop Operation Soros Movement, and an MP affiliated with the Kotleba-led LSNS. Daniel Friberg, James Dowson, Mihály Zoltán Orosz and Edda Budaházy sat in the audience.

Hungarian Self-Defence Movement (MÖM)

MÖM, which existed since October 2014, became the largest organisation after HVIM and the Army of Outlaws by the end of 2017; they are present mainly in Eastern and South-eastern Hungary, especially in smaller settlements in the Great Plains region. While the leader of the organisation, Attila László, has said MÖM had a presence in 60–70 settlements in December 2016, this number could have increased to 80–90 by late 2017. The movement is based on chauvinistic, Hungarist, revisionist ideologies, which is indicated by, for example, the self-declared central goals of protecting the “Lebensraum” and “living territory”. However, instead of ideology and symbolic action, MÖM focuses on “the fight against social injustice”, one’s personal responsibility to the community, willingness to act and local-level activities. At the same time, an important organisational factor in the movement is anti-Gypsyism. MÖM leader Attila László has previously described the Roma as worms, devils, rats or trash, which led to the dissolution of his previous association by the courts.

MÖM’s main topics are public safety, the tidiness of public spaces, solidarity and unity. Its goal is to create operational self-defence forces in settlements. To achieve this, they organise charity events (e.g. collecting donations for animal shelters or poor families with multiple children), clean public spaces and organise training events and camps for their members. Nevertheless, their main activities are intimidating marches which they call “walks improving the public’s mood” and “healthcare marches”, which they hold in the Roma majority parts of settlements and outside the homes of Roma families, in order to restore “public safety”. At the marches, members wear uniform jackets displaying the MÖM logo. Authorities often decide not to interfere, although in some cases the event was secured and MÖM members were issued a fine. The marches usually take place in small settlements in the Great Plains region or its southern part, but in 2017 MÖM members also patrolled in Budapest, Orosháza, Miskolc, Mogyoród, Pécs and Törökszentmiklós. The organisation’s leader, László Attila, also promotes himself as an entrepreneur providing security services.

For MÖM, 2017 was mainly about the development of the organisation and its relationships. Its nationwide tour entitled “Recruitment Campaign” involved the organisation of town hall events, the formation of local branches and the recruitment of new members and activists in numerous settlements. The group also launched a donation collection campaign to finance its growth. In their leadership training camp, their members take part in ideological courses, training programmes and martial arts practice. Their largest yearly event is the MÖM Youth Camp and Hungarian Self-Defence Days held in Zagyvarékas, which was – besides around 100 new members taking an oath of loyalty to the group – attended by partner organisations such as the Army of Outlaws and KTI; and Jobbik MP László György Lukács, President of ‘56 Pest’s Lads Institute Levente Murányi, and retired Hungarian Army colonel József Tián held speeches. MÖM maintains a very close relationship with HVIM and the Army.
of Outlaws, indicated by several joint events and meetings. MÖM has also welcomed the foundation of EE. KTI is supposedly an important sponsor of the organisation: in its 2016 yearly report, KTI highlights MÖM as a partner of KTI to which they had presented tactical vests and other equipment in October 2016 as gifts. In 2017, MÖM was tasked with securing the joint conference of Identitesz and KTI in March. Its members had followed James Dowson as his bodyguard beforehand, and MÖM fervently rejected Dowson’s and Griffin’s expulsion from Hungary in spring 2017. KTI was present at the MÖM Days as well. MÖM is the only one of the organisations discussed here that maintains ties with Jobbik not only on the personal (e.g. Toroczkai), but on the organisational level as well. Attila László is the president of Jobbik’s Végegyház local branch, and MÖM plays an active role in Jobbik’s wage union campaign: it promotes the initiative and helps collect signatures.

Identity Generation

The organisation founded in 2014 is the official Hungarian wing of the pan-European movement, which had organised some activities in Hungary before 2017. They become really active that year, and have managed to increase their salience. Nevertheless, the movement can still be considered small and not well-known, with only a handful of followers. Similarly to its European counterparts, the Hungarian group fights against immigration, liberal values and political correctness, for the preservation of European identity and culture, and the increased presence of Christianity in communities and politics. Compared to the organisations introduced above, it is an important difference that ideitarians reject chauvinism, placing “national thought” above all else, and organisations attacking other European nations; they believe in a unified European identity. Therefore, Trianon and the issues of Hungarians beyond the borders are not in the focus of the Identity Generation.

Legion of Honour, Order and Justice

Although Mihály Zoltán Orosz, known for his anti-Gypsyism, anti-Semitism, anti-liberalism and homophobia, strives to depict himself as the unapprehended daredevil of the Hungarian far-right, his activities cannot be called meaningful on the national level. While he was forging increasingly closer relationships with the Army of Outlaws and Identitesz, together with whom they were planning the establishment of a joint organisation, EE was founded without Orosz/ He was thus left alone in his previously registered Order and Justice Party (RIA). Orosz’s relationship with Jobbik has also deteriorated: the Tiszavasvári local self-government signed a cooperation agreement with him in 2016 to regulate the local Roma community. The agreement expired in early 2017, and Gábor Vona distanced himself from him. There are tensions between Orosz and László Toroczkai as well; one sign of this was that Orosz criticised László Toroczka’s infamous anti-Muslim decree in late 2016. Since EE’s foundation, Orosz has been attempting to improve his party’s popularity through online communication, local press conferences and town hall meetings. He tends to address local issues, and he is generally active in the settlements of the North-eastern part of the country. He criticises immigration, Fidesz governance (for example corruption), liberal views and even Jobbik’s local policies (for example in Ózd), as well.

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180 For example, participation in a demonstration against torturing animals, distributing mineral water with a homophobe sticker on it on the day of the Pride parade, the organisation of sports days and informal meetings, placing banners with the text “Islam kills, say yes to the Eastern border closure” in the capital, starting a billboard and flyer campaign in some universities, collecting donations for policemen and street campaign for building a border closure on the Eastern Border.

One unique segment of the Hungarian far-right scene is the community of activists who live here or visit the country often; most of them do not involve themselves in the lives of Hungarian far-right organisations, and use the country solely as a physical base. They are connected to the European “new right” and the American alt-right movements; their goal is the protection of Christian, white, European/Western culture from immigration, left wing and liberal views and political correctness. Their views match the incumbent Hungarian government’s ideology, and they praise Orbán’s anti-EU, anti-liberal, anti-refugee and anti-immigration politics. The most well-known among them might be the Swedish Daniel Friberg, who is the owner of Arktos Media Publisher, the editor of AltRight.com; even Hungarian pro-government media show a great deal of interest in him because of his book entitled “The Real Right Returns”. Friberg has participated in the events of several Hungarian far-right organisations (for example Identitész and Identity Generation), but he always specifically emphasises that he is not close to any Hungarian group. Tor Westman, AltRight.com’s technical director and Arktos’s head of marketing; American-Hungarian Melissa Mészáros, who is AltRight.com’s co-editor and a vlogger; and Matthew Forney, an AltRight.com writer and a blogger, also live in Hungary. But Arktos’s rivals, employees of the Counter-Currents Publishing Group also chose Budapest as their place of residence: the founder, Michael Polignano, lives here, as well as Friberg’s former business associate John Morgan, who switched his loyalty from Arktos to its rival in May-June 2017. Additionally, French vlogger Willem Nassau, American Paul Ramsey (RamZPaul), Swedes Erik Almquist and Patrick Brinkmann, and French-Hungarian Ferenc Almássy (originally Lavallou) also reside in Hungary. Austrian Holocaust denier Gerd Honsik chose Sopron as his place of residence. There could be several reasons behind the decision of these foreign far-right activists and apologists to move to Hungary. First, the country is an ideologically and politically beneficial environment for them, where the views they espouse form parts of the mainstream because of the government’s rhetoric and propaganda. Second, Hungarian society is, essentially, ethnically and culturally homogenous due to the low proportion of immigrants, which is an important desire of these activists. Third, Hungarian society is culturally conservative and follows a traditional set of values, which is also close to the beliefs of far-right individuals moving here. Fourth, the ideologically and politically beneficial environment (anti-immigration sentiments, Euroscepticism, illiberalism, pro-Kremlin politics) means that they can live without interference from authorities as long as they adhere to the rules of the game. Finally, Budapest is cheap compared to the West, yet it has good connections in terms of transportation and is able to provide them with a high standard of living.

The Hungarian government also benefits from the presence of far-right activists. The international scene is generally well-embedded, activists with a significant ability to form the community’s opinions praise Orbán and his relentless anti-refugee and anti-immigration stance, and his campaigns against the EU, liberal mainstream and elites, political correctness and George Soros; and they spread their “positive views” about Hungary among their European and American comrades. This, in part, strengthens Orbán’s messages intended for his own voters, reinforces his domestic political image, and in international politics also helps Orbán, who is awaiting an international “elite change” – the “rebellion of the people” –, because it legitimises and strengthens populist, anti-immigration and anti-EU forces all over the EU, and especially in its Western parts.

Two well-known, pro-Kremlin figures of the British far-right, James Dowson and Nick Griffin, leaders of the international far-right organisation Knights Tem-

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plar International,\textsuperscript{184} chose a strategy different from the far-right expat community living in Hungary, who generally do not involve themselves in Hungarian domestic politics. The Brits have visited Hungary frequently, and they were planning to move here when, in spring 2017, authorities unexpectedly banned them from the country on the recommendation of the Counter-Terrorism Centre (TEK) for posing a national security threat.\textsuperscript{185} As we have suggested in the section introducing Hungarian organisations, Dowson and Griffin (the KTI) involved themselves in Hungarian domestic politics to a great extent by forging close relations with the main Hungarian far-right organisations (e.g. the Army of Outlaws, MÖM, Identitesz, EE and HVIM) as well as with László Toroczkai and György Buddházy. KTI’s channels also disseminate the former’s videos on collecting donations, and KTI organised a charity dinner and folk music concert for Christmas 2016 to help the latter.\textsuperscript{186} KTI thus supposedly gained significant influence over Hungarian organisations, and with this it might have threatened the government’s and Fidesz’s influence over this scene. At the same time, Dowson and Griffin might have posed a direct and real national security threat as well, by finding a footing in several Central and Eastern European countries and building close ties to far-right organisations from Poland to Bulgaria, which KTI has supported financially and by sharing connections, media knowledge and donations of law enforcement equipment. However, the effect of the expulsions is weakened considerably by the fact KTI remains active in Hungary under the guidance of Hungarian order chief Imre Téglásy.\textsuperscript{187} The third possible explanation for the bans is that international attention focused on the activities of these international far-right figures, many of them formerly convicted, has become uncomfortable for the government. Hungarian authorities have also stepped up resolutely against Horst Mahled, who fled to Hungary to avoid his penalty for denying the existence of the Holocaust and disseminating anti-Semitic propaganda: he was apprehended in May and handed over to German authorities in June.\textsuperscript{188} Before the upcoming court date of Dowson and Griffin, who sought legal remedy against the resolution on their expulsion, KTI started a campaign on its surfaces. First, they praised the government’s anti-immigration policies and, second, they appealed to Hungarian authorities to retract the decision on their expulsion. In September 2017, KTI dedicated several online posts to introduce their activities in Hungary, and in October they published a video where Dowson’s Lawyer, Tamás Gaudi-Nagy, discusses the expulsions and their unsustainable nature, and Dowson introduces his personal background, life and views, depicting himself as a well-intentioned, Christian, conservative individual with a large family. He addresses Viktor Orbán personally to ask him to save his children from Jihad and allow his family to move to Hungary.\textsuperscript{189}

\textsuperscript{184} “Knights Templar International: Christian Knights or Fascist Front?”, IRBF (blog), 23 May 2016, http://irbf.org.uk/knights-templar-international-analysis/.
\textsuperscript{185} Gergely Miklós Nagy, “Kitiltási sorozat”.
\textsuperscript{186} “KTI Annual Report for 2016”.
Jobbik itself has claimed since 2013 that its previous extremist activities have been rejected. The Jobbik-led settlements are the most suitable for the examination of the party’s strategy of moderation.

Policies at the Local Level

The local self-government system has been transformed from its roots since 2010 by Fidesz with the party’s parliamentary supermajority. It took away mayors’ competences to maintain and oversee education and healthcare institutions; it cut back local self-governments’ budgets significantly. It is thus no easy task to grasp the peculiarities of Jobbik’s governance: we had to select areas where local administrations still have room for manoeuvre. Consequently, the first focus point of our investigation was the local self-government’s community organisation and symbolic political activities. Moreover, we touch upon the Public Works Scheme (PWS), which is financed by the central budget, but where local self-governments enjoy significant room for manoeuvre in implementation and organisation. This holds true also for some social benefits and aid programmes, and we consider the examination of the concerns of the Roma community especially important: we wish to describe what the general relationship between the Jobbik-affiliated mayor and the Roma representation of the settlement looks like. Moreover, we touch upon what Jobbik itself prioritises in the settlements in question: we thus examine how public safety holds up in these communities. Finally, we weigh the mayoral activity of the radical party, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. Throughout the analysis, our main consideration is how Jobbik’s local government differs from that led by independent mayors and ones affiliated with other parties.

Naturally, one of the most serious problems of contemporary Hungarian society – the social situation of the Roma minority – did not start with Jobbik’s reign. There is no significant Roma minority in Tapolca and Ásotthalom. In Ózd, Tiszavasvári and Ásotthalom, the Roma live in segregation and in seriously backwards conditions. Segregation is not only visible in terms of place of residence, but also in social relationships and, most worryingly, education: non-Roma parents take their children out of schools attended by Roma children if they can. Jobbik did bring about change in these practices, but its main proposal in the field of education (namely that Roma children should be obliged to live...
in dormitories to “learn social norms there”) is universally described by experts and educators we asked as detrimental: for most children (be they Roma or non-Roma), distance from the family would be unbearable. On the other hand, “catch-up” schools (afternoon or day care programmes) and supplementary schools would prove highly helpful, but Jobbik does not only refrain from encouraging these, it was even hostile to the ones already existing: the Tűr István and Dr. Őmbédkár schools previously also operating in Ózd were transferred elsewhere.\(^{191}\)

Characteristic of Jobbik in settlements led by the party were its efforts to divide the local Roma community: Dávid Janiczak appointed a Roma rapporteur, who had received barely any votes in the previous minority elections. He also significantly decreased the budget of the (Lungo Drom-dominated) Roma self-government, which had been more inclined towards Fidesz in previous elections. In Tiszavasvári, the “honey pot” principle – offering money from tenders in exchange for political loyalty – was used to divide the Roma community.

One of the most pressing challenges of the Roma youth is the lack of quality education. The government has aggravated the situation further by lowering the school-leaving age to 16: the PWS became an opportunity to earn money for the 16 to 18-year-old youth living in poverty and – regardless of how little their wage is – it has become a more enticing option than spending two more years in school. Despite the fact that the latter would have led to a higher qualification and thus would have provided young people with better perspectives, many of them believe they would have no chance anyway. They see very few positive examples; most adults around them can only survive off the PWS and selling goods collected during junk-clearance (hereinafter referred to as the “junk market”). Jobbik proposes raising the school-leaving age to 17, which would be only somewhat better than the 16 years of age implemented by Fidesz.

The two right wing parties essentially agree on the PWS, social benefits and aid (Enyedi-Róna 2017): in the settlements under examination, only those were eligible for social benefits and the PWS who kept their place of residence in order (the “clean garden, neat house” principle) both under the Fidesz- and Jobbik-affiliated local administrations. The PWS – and the majority of social benefits – are financed by the central budget, but local self-governments have a significant room for manoeuvre in their implementation and distribution. We did not see that the PWS would really guide its participants (back) towards the primary labour market in any of the settlements under examination (as this is a very rare occurrence in the whole country): retraining and further training is highly arbitrary – and the common practice is that PWS overseers are rather inflexible when a public worker finally gets a chance to go to a job interview.

What can be considered a trait unique to Jobbik is prioritising public safety. In Devecser, the local administration has even levied a special tax to finance the so-called field guard. In Ásotthalom, Toroczkai has practically built his whole image on the protection the border, and in Ózd, Janiczak promised mounted police and quad police, albeit his plans have not yet come to fruition. It is very difficult to tell if public safety has improved in the cities of Gábor Vona and his party. Data suggests that the number of criminals fell by slightly above the national average, except in Ásotthalom, but – with the exception of Tapolca – these are towns where crime was more prevalent to begin with (the base numbers were thus higher). In any case, it is certain that Tiszavasvári and Ásotthalom can be considered especially endangered towns according to statistics. Data must be taken with a grain of salt, however, for example because the lower number of perpetrators does not necessarily mean fewer crimes were committed, and naturally only the cases solved and reported are included in the statistics.

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\(^{191}\) They were chased away by the previous local administration, but Endréss Zsolt, then a Jobbik MP, only mocked this in the National Assembly. http://www.daiit.hu/a-jobbik-felszolalasa-a-parlamentben-buddhis-ta-ciganyok-akk-holokauszt-mereteinek-zsido-vezetokek-plane-borsodban/
The two right wing parties are also similar in many ways in the field of symbolic politics (anti-communism, the Szekler flag and Trianon commemorations), but the use of the Árpád stripes is more typical of Jobbik. In Ózd, they even painted its colours onto the wall of the city hall, and Erik Fülöp has replaced the previous EU flag with the Árpád-striped one. In Tiszavasvári, a street bears the name of locally-born Lajos Szögi, who was lynched by a group of Roma individuals in 2006 in Olaszliszka.

The Main Traits of Jobbik’s Local Governance

The mistakes and failures of previous administrations and Jobbik’s communication campaign have played a role in Jobbik’s rise to power in each of the settlements examined in this study. In Ásotthalom, the previous mayor accumulated serious debt. In Tiszavasvári, Fidesz was divided and did not even field a local candidate in 2010. In Ózd, Jobbik was successful in riding the wave of dissatisfaction brought about by the Roma World Tent project. In Devecser, many felt left behind after the red sludge disaster. And in Tapolca, the downgrading of the local hospital caused public uproar. Not only did Jobbik identify the problems, but it has also managed to allocate significant resources to the settlements with the help of the central party organisation. It conducted intensive field work – even the party’s opponents admitted during interviews that communication is the main strength of Jobbik. The party’s rivals lacked such skills; and Jobbik’s dedication to this did not deteriorate after the party came into power. Every mayor affiliated with Jobbik has managed to build a significant fan base in social media. Devecser is the best example for the lack or ineptitude of opponents, where Gábor Ferenczi killed an old lady when he hit her with his out of negligence, and received a suspended sentence in a legally binding decision. It was Ferenczi himself who had proposed allowing for more severe penalties in such cases as a Member of Parliament. The real surprise is that none of his opponents addressed this in the campaign, and the Jobbik-affiliated politician did not have to explain himself regarding this particular case.

Another strength of Jobbik is that they showed their much more pragmatic – more reality-based - face once they got into power, something they did not do in the campaign. For example, “radical exclusion”, which they promised to implement in their platform in case the Roma failed to integrate, has not come to fruition so far. In Devecser, Mayor Gábor Ferenczi did not change the operation of the junk market, and thus the Roma can continue their activities there as they had done before 2014 – and it is the main source of income for the majority of them. (At the same time, it is interesting that Ferenczi said in an article in October 2017 that the market earns HUF 20 million in profits, while in another one in March he suggested HUF 7 million in profits a month.) The previously openly Eurosceptic Jobbik has been unscrupulous when they applied for EU funding. Finally, Jobbik could also achieve unexpected successes in terms of finding allies: in Ózd and Tiszavasvári, they managed to convince former local representatives of Fidesz to join them, and in Ásotthalom and Ózd even left wing representatives and numerous locals have praised the administration’s law and order policies (for example, the “clean garden, neat house” principle). The head of Ózd’s Roma self-government gave Dávid Janiczák’s actions a score of six out of ten.

On the local level, Jobbik prefers spectacular but only superficial law and order policies over eliminating the root causes of problems. Their local governance is characterised by anti-Roma discrimination and segregation, prioritising public safety, irresponsible promises, the lack of experts, cadre politics as well as “quality of living” and symbolic measures.

However, the list of the party’s weaknesses is much longer. Numerous promises of the party have proven to be completely out of touch with reality: for example, they planned a thermal bath and a winery in Ózd, a town with a climate unsuitable for these ideas, and the promises of a mounted police and a quad police have also failed to be implemented due to financial constraints. Jobbik...
bik’s mayoral candidates promised Russian and Middle-Eastern investments in Tiszavasvári and Ásotthalom, none of which have materialised. Gábor Ferenczi promised financial compensation for the sludge disaster in the amount of HUF 400 000 to every resident of Devecser, which the local self-government would have paid out of their own pockets.

The main challenge of Jobbik both nationally and locally is that it has very few skilled experts. It was especially characteristic in Tiszavasvári that the main aspects of building clientele and political loyalty overrode professional considerations: the city submitted fewer tender applications than it could have, it appointed the head of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (HVIM), György Gyula Zagyva, as the PWS overseer,194 and to “maintain order” they called in Érpatak Mayor Mihály Zoltán Orosz’s “paramilitary unit”, the Legion of Honour.195 Moreover, the mayor there also had the local council raise his wages and allowances (we will discuss this in detail in the section on the events of 2017). In Ózd, the local administration implemented several measures that suggest a lack of knowledge about the legal system: the ombudsman found the practice of monitoring public workers with cameras to be illegal,196 while excluding people with a criminal record form the opportunity to receive social housing was deemed unlawful first by the National and Ethnic Minority Rights Protection Office (Nemzeti és Etnikai Kisebbéséi Jogvédő Iroda, NEKI) and then by the Borsod County Government Office. The aforementioned cases also shed light on the fact that the pragmatism of Jobbik has its limits. Twelve of the twelve points in the Tiszavasvári action plan entitled “Helping the Roma Integrate into Society”197 approved in 2014 regulate issues concerned solely with public safety, healthcare and residential conditions, which partly addresses the living conditions of the Roma, but its goal is only to improve the situation in segregated areas, and not the eradication of the root causes of segregation. Under local Jobbik administrations, the police rather frequently acted specifically and sometimes disproportionately against the Roma. Although pro-Jobbik media loudly claim that there is peace and order in the town, and that the local Roma like the current situation, the video series of left wing activist Márton Gulyás show a more balanced picture.198 Tens of thousands of forints were often deducted from the wages of the Roma, leaving them often to live off a few thousand forints a month.

László Toroczkai’s infamous statements (“Soros’s university should be banned, closed and its ruins should be covered with salt”), and his anti-homosexual and anti-Muslim decree, did not strengthen the picture of a moderate Jobbik, either. Lajos Rig, Jobbik’s MP elected in the Tapolca constituency, shared a Facebook post – according to Rig’s explanation after the fact, accidentally – entitled The Roma are the Jews’ biological weapon.199 Rig was also forced to go on the defensive regarding a tattoo with the text “Honour and Loyalty”, which is similar to the Waffen SS’s motto, “My honour is my loyalty” (Meine Ehre heißt Treue).200

Finally, we can find several examples of divisions within Jobbik: the mayor of Ózd, whose office was wiretapped, placed a bug in the local Jobbik office. In Devecser, Jobbik-affiliated Deputy Mayor György Kozma turned against fellow party member Ferenczi, and the position of deputy mayor remained unfilled for a long time after Kozma was recalled; Kozma then ran against Ferenczi in the by-election – but the incumbent mayor scored a convincing victory. The mayor of Érpatak had openly been allied with Jobbik before 2014 (and many had then referred to him as an example to follow), but afterwards, Mihály Zoltán Orosz only remained on good terms with the local self-government in Devecser, and finally even there they ceased to cooperate with him. The best example, however, is on the national level: László Toroczkai, one of the party’s deputy chairs, regularly contradicts his own party chair Gábor Vona both in his statements and actions.

195 hvg.hu; Pánikban a tiszavasvári romák az érpataki polgármester légújla miatt (2016) http://hvg.hu/itthon/20160216_tiszavasvari_roman_jobbik_erosz_mihaly_zoltan_erpataki_polgarmester_ciganyok downloaded 5 November 2017
196 It is mandatory for the settlement’s public workers to agree to a recording being taken of them while they are working.
After the events leading up to this year, let us take a look at the developments of 2017. The most tumultuous developments were witnessed by Devecser, where the by-election brought about by the dissolution of the local council saw the re-election of Mayor Gábor Ferenczi with 69% of the vote. The fact that the council was dissolved, and the aforementioned internal disputes, however, indicate that the town is not without turbulent events. Although Jobbik mayors are rarely accused of being too empathic towards the Roma and destructive individuals, this is exactly what happened to Ferenczi. Numerous debates have erupted concerning the barracks in Devecser, but at one point Devecseri’s circle of friends—mainly of Roma origin—broke into the property in order to throw a party. The head of the association turned to the police, but the investigation yielded no results, as the first sergeant told the authorities that Ferenczy gave verbal permission to the entrants to use the premises. “His answer to the question by the president of the association about what is up with rules and the protection of private property was that he should turn to the courts or one of the African embassies and should complain there”,201

A demonstration against Dávid Janiczak in Ózd was organised for a different reason—under the pretext of racism and terrorism. According to a report, there were only a handful of protesters, and Janiczak thanked his fellow council representatives who stood with him at City Hall square, stating that he did not believe the case to be too “concrete”, because protesters did not show up at the public hearing.202 Among the disadvantages Roma are affected by, local public life is mostly concerned with the issue of water. Abcüg’s report reveals that regardless of the fact that the community received HUF 1.72 billion for improving its water supply network, focusing especially on disadvantaged areas, many are still unable to connect to the water system. The Roma are the most affected by this.203 Additionally, Janiczak often posts in the social media about law enforcement units and tasks; one of the highlighted news items is about the start of the training course for the Homeland Defence Reserves of the Ózd district. “The Hungarian military is rearranging and renewing its reserves system, one element of which is creating a new form of service based on local communities”.

Ózd’s most important investment project is the new prison currently being constructed, which will provide jobs to locals.205 László Toroczkai also considers the presence of law enforcement units to be important. In the case of Ásotthalom, border protection and handling the migration crisis are definite priorities. Moreover, Toroczkai has finally managed to reach an agreement on the construction of a transit zone near the settlement,206 and he believed the construction of a second fence on the southern border to be important as well.207 Paying special attention to entertaining the population is a characteristic of all mayors examined in this study. In Ózd, fan zones were set up during the Hungarian national football team’s run in the 2016 European Championship, and the town organised a dirt rally championship in 2017. Dávid Janiczak enthusiastically covered the events on his Facebook page,208 Zoltán Dóbó also understood that one of the most important tasks—and most visible results—from local self-governments might be community organisation: in 2016, a mini-zoo209 and a beach210 was opened in the community. In Tiszavasvári, they mainly used the PWS to clean and improve public spaces as well as for propaganda: the mayor likes to share such work on his social media page, including the overseeing of repairs to one of the walkways.211 This allowed the mayor to simultaneously show that the city is being built and to display a picture of people as they are working. They also opened a new sports museum, and the town was home to the 68th National Roving Conference of the Hungarian Olympics Academy.212 Similarly, they pay careful attention to improving the town’s image in Devecser: the focus is on erecting or renovating statues.213

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202 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCkL3mjV-JY
203 Eszter Neuberger; Hiába a csatorna, soha nem lesz víz az ózdi romák házaiiban (2017) http://index.hu/belfold/2017/05/05/hiba_a_csatorna_soha_nem_lezs_viz_az_ozdi_romak_hazaiban/
207 hvg.hu; Mújusra készühet el az okoskerítés Csongrád megyében (2016) http://hvg.hu/hvg.hu/20170227 majusra_keszulehet_el_az_okoskerites_csongrad_megyeben
208 http://www.ozd.hu/news.php?id=4576
209 János Szijártó, Minialakírt nyílt Tapolcian (2016); http://www.tapolcauijsag.hu/minialakirt-nyilt-tapolcan/
210 János Szijártó, Hivatalosan is átadták a strandot (2016); http://www.tapolcauijsag.hu/hivatalosan-is-atadtak-a-strandot/
213 Triannon megemlékezés kettőskereszt-avalattal (Devecseri újság 2016 június) http://www.devecser.hu/sites/default/files/dokumentumok/devecser_2016_junius.pdf; I. és II. világháború áldozataira emlékező szo-
All Jobbik-affiliated settlements, but especially Devecser and Tiszavasvári, were criticised heavily for the lack of significant investments and failing to bring outside resources to the communities: in Devecser, the previous mayor – under whom the settlement undoubtedly won numerous tenders – said, “it is said that under the current leadership, the town started only one project (hall relocation) in three years, and even that stopped halfway, and since then they have been litigating with the investor”. Ásotthalom’s László Toroczkai received funding to develop the Southern Memorial Park, and he is strengthening the cult of Sándor Rózsa locally.  

In Tiszavasvári, we can observe some positive developments compared to the 2010-2014 period in this regard: the town submitted successful applications for protection against inland waters, developing the public catering system and installing sun collectors. At the same time, it is a negative development that the town is having an increasingly difficult time financing healthcare provision; outpatient care is thus now being threatened as well, which has become a frequent topic of local council meetings. Similarly to public safety, we cannot “give a definitive answer” in this case either: the lead-time of tenders is 10 years. The investigative work of Magyar Narancs revealed that the mayor of Ásotthalom, László Toroczkai, did everything on a small scale that Jobbik accuses Fidesz of doing nationally: he increased his own allowances, used taxpayer money to help companies and employees close to him, and expanded his own clientele. Al\n\n\n
The most controversial act of the mayor was his anti-Muslim and anti-homosexual decree, which banned muezzins from being active in the community and prohibited publicly forming an opinion on gay marriage as well as any statement contrary to the definition of family in the Fundamental Law. Although the decree breaches the Fundamental Law in many aspects, including the fact that it is formally untenable, Toroczkai fought for it to the end. In the end, the Constitutional Court struck down the law in 2017. The investigative work of Magyar Narancs revealed that the mayor of Ásotthalom did everything on a small scale that Jobbik accuses Fidesz of doing nationally: he increased his own allowances, used taxpayer money to help companies and employees close to him, and expanded his own clientele. Al\n\n\n214 Kata Janeczkió; Német Tamás; Lehallgatást akart a lehallgatott polgármester is (2017) http://index.hu/belfold/2017/01/09/janiczak_ozz_jobbik_lehallgatasi_botany/
215 NTT: A Fidesz korrupcióról kérdési Janiczakot (2017) http://index.hu/belfold/2017/05/06/a_fidesz_korrupciorol_kerdesi_janiczakot/
216 HVG; Janiczak üzert Németh Szilárdnak (2017) http://hvg.hu/ithlon/20170506_janiczak_uzert_nemeth_szilardnak
217 HVG; Az ásotthalmi “fehér utópiáról” készíttet riportot a BBC (2017) http://hvg.hu/vilag/20170207_Asotthalom_toroczkai_laszlo_bbc_rendelet_mecsset_csador_burkini
218 Tamás Nóton; A BBC SZERINT TOROCZKAI FEHÉR UTÓPIÁT AKAR LÉTREHOZNI ÁSOTTHALMON (2017) https://afahr.hu/2017/02/07/toroczkai_laszlo_asotthalom_bbc_migracio_iszlam_jobbik
219 KB; Befőtték a muszlim vallást és a melegséget egy magyar községben (2016) http://index.hu/belfold/2016/11/24/befoltottak_a_muszlim_vallast_es_a_melegseget_egy_magyar_kozsegben/
221 MG; Toroczkai iszlámellenes törvényt hozatala (2017) http://index.hu/belfold/2017/04/13/toroczkai_islamellenes_torventy_hozatala/
though Toroczkai promised, when he was elected, that he will only accept the minimum wage from his salary and will transfer the rest of the money to foundations, his salary is nearly HUF 550,000. He receives a monthly reimbursement and his gas costs are covered. (His salary was raised to HUF 548,000 this year, and he receives a monthly reimbursement of HUF 82,000.) Moreover, it was also revealed that the mayor likes to appoint his own men to important positions; for example, Gyula Vilmos Derjanecz was appointed to lead a company belonging to the local self-government, Várostanya. Derjanecz served in this position between 2014 and early 2017. Former HVIM member Péter Hajnal was appointed the new notary; Hajnal was also a representative of the Innovative Communication Foundation (Innovatív Kommunikáció Alapítvány, IKA), founded in 2012, that organised the Sándor Rózsa cult relying on taxpayer money in Ásotthalom. When notary Péter Hajnal resigned from his post at IKA, he was replaced by former independent representative and the founder of Jobbik’s local branch, Veronika Dobó. Dobó is also the assistant of Toroczkai. The curator of the Sixty-four County Foundation (HVA), László Varga is also an entrepreneur in Ásotthalom. As the curator of HVA, he has submitted successful applications multiple times for money requested for the implementation of the Southern Memorial Park project. Varga is also the manager of Balkan Bt, as well as its limited partner, and thus can also be connected to Toroczkai. This is the company that helped publish Magyar Jelen, a periodical whose editor-in-chief was Toroczkai – and taxpayer money went into it from Jobbik. Dave-Safety Vagyonvédelmi Ltd aided Toroczkai’s campaign, which continued operating the local beach – and the mayor has openly campaigned for it. Another member of the company, which was later sold and is currently being forcibly dissolved, was Géza H., from whom Toroczkai had earlier purchased the farm he is currently living on; in turn, HVA purchased the land from him on the Southern Memorial Park is located. The local self-government has also bought land from him. Azonosságtudat Foundation’s Ásotthalom office was registered at Géza H.’s address as well, and currently it is in courtesy use. The role of József Márki is also notable: he declared in 2013, as a member of Jobbik’s local branch, Veronika Dobó. Dobó is also the assistant of Toroczkai. The curator of the Sixty-four County Foundation (HVA), László Varga is also an entrepreneur in Ásotthalom. As the curator of HVA, he has submitted successful applications multiple times for money requested for the implementation of the Southern Memorial Park project. Varga is also the manager of Balkan Bt, as well as its limited partner, and thus can also be connected to Toroczkai. This is the company that helped publish Magyar Jelen, a periodical whose editor-in-chief was Toroczkai – and taxpayer money went into it from Jobbik. Dave-Safety Vagyonvédelmi Ltd aided Toroczkai’s campaign, which continued operating the local beach – and the mayor has openly campaigned for it. Another member of the company, which was later sold and is currently being forcibly dissolved, was Géza H., from whom Toroczkai had earlier purchased the farm he is currently living on; in turn, HVA purchased the land from him on the Southern Memorial Park is located. The local self-government has also bought land from him. Azonosságtudat Foundation’s Ásotthalom office was registered at Géza H.’s address as well, and currently it is in courtesy use. The role of József Márki is also notable: he declared in 2013, as a member of DK, that he would vote for Toroczkai. He was later commissioned by the mayor to carve the statue of Sándor Rózsa, the cost of which was paid by the HVA.228

228 In February 2015, Jobbik initiated a referendum regarding four issues, including restrictions on immigration.  

### Appendix: Overlaps in the Programmes of Fidesz and Jobbik

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<td>Exclusion of problematic citizens (the unemployed, those whose children do not attend kindergarten or school, and those who pursue ‘anti-community’ behaviour) from welfare benefits</td>
<td>Jobbik (2010 manifesto)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased legal penalties for criminals and capital punishment</td>
<td>Fidesz234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation of education, incorporation of nationalist authors into school curricula, mandatory student excursions to neighbouring countries, potential for segregated classes, and reduced age for mandatory school attendance</td>
<td>Jobbik (2010 manifesto, partially)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components of the new constitution: reference to the Holy Crown, reference to Christian roots, Memorial day of the Versailles Treaty, citizenship to Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries</td>
<td>mostly Jobbik (2010 manifesto)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Hungary, the shift of the governing party Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) towards the far-right accelerated in 2017, as did the apparent moderation of what may be considered the largest opposition party, Jobbik – Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). The latter’s leadership claims Jobbik is becoming a “people’s party”. These two contradictory trends define the whole of the Hungarian political space, considering the fact that these are the two most popular political parties in the country, and their strategies are not independent of one other.

The current study analyses the state of the radical right and the far-right in Hungary in 2017. We present the dynamics of the relations between Fidesz and Jobbik with regards to both domestic politics and foreign affairs, examine the electoral base of both parties, give an overview of the annual activities of the most significant far-right organisations and elaborate on the local politics of Jobbik.