

new political
actors in
europe
demos and
political capital
on new
opposition
movements in
hungary

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
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This research is based primarily on an online survey of the Facebook supporters of eight groups, which we have termed new opposition movements in Hungary. The results do not, therefore, necessarily reflect the views of each movement. Demos and Political Capital are independent think-tanks committed to undertaking innovative research in areas of public interest. We are not party political organisations. Our results are set out objectively and accurately without normative judgement.

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All errors and omissions are our own.

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A note on terminology

This study concerns the Facebook supporters of eight new opposition movements in Hungary. It is based on a survey of over 4,000 Facebook fans of these groups. Together, we refer to them as ‘new opposition movements’, (or respondents) but it is important to note that often each group has quite distinct and different responses. Where possible, we split the data by group to provide a clearer picture. Throughout the paper we present this information within the context of broader Hungarian society and make comparisons to similar data on other non-mainstream parties in Western Europe, as presented in the Demos reports *The New Face of Digital Populism* and *New Political Actors in Europe*.¹ By drawing such parallels, we are not claiming that the movements surveyed for this work are populist movements of the same type as those in those reports. Rather, this comparison is useful for us in understanding how – as a new political actor – these movements are similar to, and differ from, other movements and parties that challenge the establishment. The eight organisations surveyed here are often very different in nature and structure. There are some parties running for elections (LMP, E14-PM and 4K!), some organisations that have joined other parties (Solidarity and Milla), and others that remain entirely outside formal electoral politics (Student’s Network and the Two-Tailed Dog Party).

This report is part of a series examining new political actors in Europe. Further papers will be released later in 2013 and early 2014, including reports on the Pirate Party in Germany and the Syriza Party in Greece.

Throughout this paper, we draw on Europe-wide survey data from the spring 2013 Eurobarometer survey and the European Values Study 2008 to make comparisons where possible. These studies are cited where relevant.

Executive summary

New forms of communication – from the Gutenberg printing press to the first televised US presidential debate – always have an effect on politics. The internet is no different: analysts have long argued that mass communication through the web would facilitate collective action by bringing groups together around single issues, lowering barriers to entry and thereby fundamentally changing the nature of political movements.² Social media is now at the forefront of this change. More and more of us live more of our social, professional and political lives online. Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and LinkedIn are all examples of the rapid transfer of people's interactions, identities, arguments and views onto a new kind of public sphere, a vast digital social commons. Europeans spend an average of four hours a day online, and there are around 250 million Facebook accounts in Europe.³

Inevitably, this is changing politics too. The size, diversity and dynamism of social media platforms allow people to connect and form social movements outside the existing political channels far more quickly and easily than ever before. Research has found that online political activity can stimulate offline political activity and other types of collective action.⁴ New movements are emerging using social media and challenging existing parties in a way that was unthinkable a decade ago. The English Defence League in the UK; the Pirate Party in Germany and the Occupy movement are all examples of groups that have employed social media to grow rapidly and create a significant political and social impact – all in the last five years.

This *mélange* of virtual and real-world political activity is the way millions of people – especially the young – relate to politics in the twenty-first century. This nascent, messy and more ephemeral form of politics is becoming the norm for a younger,

digital generation. The MacArthur Research Network on Youth and Participatory Politics found that 41 per cent of young Americans engaged in at least one political act through social media during the last 12 months.⁵ This is particularly significant given that a growing number of people use social media as a source of breaking news. According to a December 2011 survey by the Pew Research Center, over 50 per cent of people learn about breaking news via social media rather than official news sources.⁶ Being part of a political social media group allows people to be part of the movement, to connect with like-minded people across the country and stay up to date with events at their own speed – to interweave their political activism into their social activities. Social media politics vary greatly, from single-issue campaigns to established political party Facebook accounts with strict control over content. But they share in common the idea of a direct, free and easy involvement, regular updates and information, and active participation from members. This can help generate a sense of ‘virtual belonging’ towards the specific online group enhanced by the possibility of interacting directly with like-minded people from all over the world. Political parties of all shades increasingly recognise the potential use of social media to respond quickly to events – and even to shape those events. With such low barriers to entry, recruiting huge numbers of people is relatively easy and can make movements difficult to ignore. Indeed, some analysts argue that the distinction between actions taken in ‘space’ and actions taken in ‘cyberspace’ has been dissolved, as social movement theories have moved on from traditional media to social media.⁷

Simultaneous to these trends – and potentially helped by them – there has been a rapid growth in left-wing, anti-capitalist groups all across Europe that criticise the established parties and institutions, and sometimes even representative democracy itself. In some cases, they are creating pan-European networks, something Mary Kaldor refers to as ‘subterranean politics’: those political groups, initiatives, events or ideas that are not usually visible in mainstream politics across the political spectrum.⁸ These movements are effective at mobilising young people and channelling discontent. They are using new methods of

organisation, especially modern technology and social media.

Increasingly, this anti-establishment subterranean politics is bubbling up to the surface. In Italy, Beppe Grillo, a popular comedian and blogger, ran a vehemently anti-establishment campaign, selecting his candidates online and refusing to give any interviews to the Italian media, communicating instead through his own blog: in the 2013 Italian general election, his Five Star Movement became the largest political party in Italy, securing around 25 per cent of the vote. In Germany, the Pirate Party, which campaigns for greater direct democracy and privacy rights secured 9 per cent of the vote in the 2011 Berlin state election, managing to win seats in the state parliament for the first time. Outside formal politics, the Indignados movement in Spain and the Occupy movements in the US and across Europe have grown into significant political forces over the past five years.

Hungary has a large subterranean politics, which is having a major impact on mainstream political parties. In particular, there has been a proliferation of ‘new’ opposition movements before and after the 2010 parliamentary elections. They vary in size, ideology, form, structure and their relationship with party politics. There is a broad spectrum, ranging from a sarcastic joke party (Two-Tailed Dog Party) through student organisations (Students’ Network) to parliamentary political parties (LMP) and the movement of the ex-PM Gordon Bajnai who governed in 2009–2010 with the backing of the socialist caucus (E14-PM). Even if not all of them are subterranean and clearly anti-establishment political movements (E14, LMP), they echo some voices of distrust of established parties and party politics and claim themselves committed to newer, participatory forms of decision making. Partly driven by that belief, they tend to be keen users of social media and other new technologies, which offer alternative communication and organisation methods.

How they operate, who they are, their relationship with other political parties and their likely future evolution is very difficult to discern. But together they are becoming increasingly important and represent a new type of movement: networked, internet savvy, motivated and visible – not just online. The

nature of these movements is that they are in constant change: they can emerge quickly but can decline quickly as well. This makes it difficult to understand and estimate their impact on Hungarian politics more generally.

Although the focus of this study is Hungary, similar movements are emerging across Europe. It is important for mainstream political parties, analysts and academics to have a deeper understanding of these movements, so as to better respond to the concerns of their supporters, determine how it might affect future policy and decision making, and establish what opportunities there are to help encourage new forms of legitimate political activism within the framework of democratic governance.

This study

The survey data presented in this report was collected by targeting the fans of a number of Facebook groups deemed to be followers of eight of these new opposition movements in Hungary between August and September 2013 (see chapter 3 for full details). Facebook was selected because it is the most widespread and popular social media site in Hungary. Members of these groups were shown an advert inviting them to participate in a survey and on clicking the advert, individuals were redirected to a survey that they were asked to complete.⁹ The survey and adverts were presented in Hungarian and then translated into English for the purposes of this report.

In total, 4,717 people responded to our survey. Following the removal of data that were either corrupt, intentionally misleading or incomplete, a final data set of 4,141 survey responses was produced (although not every question has so many responses). The results were weighted against the groups' online demographics available through Facebook's advertising tool (or in some cases, statistics generated by the administrators of the page or group targeted). This was done in order to improve the validity and accuracy of any inferences about the online population. Although online recruitment in social research is widespread, self-selective recruitment via social

network sites brings novel challenges. Because this is an innovative research method with both strengths and weaknesses, we have included an in-depth discussion of the methodology in annex 1.

The final data set is broken down as shown in table 1.

Throughout the paper, we compare the survey results to the answers given to the same questions by the Hungarian general public and occasionally to the Facebook supporters of other non-mainstream parties in Western Europe, as presented in the Demos reports *The New Face of Digital Populism* and *New Political movements in Europe* – including the Jobbik party, the German Pirate party, and the Five Star Movement in Italy.¹⁰ We do not believe that the parties surveyed here are analogous to those movements. Rather, this comparison is useful for us in understanding how – as a new political actor – the composition of Facebook supporters of this new Hungarian left as a group compares to those we have found in other European movements and parties that challenge the establishment.

Results

Supporters are a broad cross-section of age and gender, but typically well educated

The supporters of new opposition movements surveyed for this work represented a broad cross-section of Hungarian society – there was a very even gender split and all ages (only 42 per cent are under 34). This is in direct contrast to other Facebook groups of other anti-establishment movements surveyed across Europe, which tend to be predominantly male and young. However, they are far more likely than the national average to attend or have attended higher education (57 per cent, compared with a national average of 17 per cent, according to Eurostat), and less likely to be unemployed (around 7 per cent, compared with a national average of 9.8%, according to the Hungarian Central Statistics Office.¹¹).

Table 1 Final data set for survey

Group	Date of survey	Number of specific Facebook interest groups targeted	Size of population reached	Total Facebook link clicks	Total surveys started	Total surveys completed in full	Final data set
LMP (Politics Can Be Different)	01/08/13-01/10/13	1	66,000	2,211	428	291	347
4ki (Fourth Republic)	01/08/13-01/10/13	1	8,800	421	303	231	271
MKKP (Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party)	01/08/13-01/10/13	1	74,000	2,621	756	478	616
Gordon Bajnai (E14-PM) ¹²	01/08/13-01/10/13	1	79,210	4,205	1,310	933	1,099
Hallgatói Halozat (Students' Network)	26/08/13-01/10/13	1	17,174	1	113	88	110
Szolidaritás (Solidarity)	14/08/13-01/10/13	1	12,956	1	261	226	236
Milla (Milla)	14/08/13-01/10/13	1	111,973	1	1,362	1,170	1,288
PM (Dialogue for Hungary)	01/09/13-01/10/13	1	28,252	1	184	161	174
Total			463,155		4,717	3,568	4,141

Key areas of concern are the economic situation and lack of institutional trust

When asked to list their top concerns, the economic situation (31 per cent) and employment (20 per cent) were the top answers for respondents. Economic considerations are far more important to them than they are to Jobbik supporters. Among Jobbik supporters (the far-right opposition of the Orbán government), integration of the Roma (28 per cent) and crime (26 per cent) were the key areas of concern. For supporters of new opposition movements, by contrast, only 3 per cent of people included crime as one of their top two concerns. Respondents were also far more likely than the Hungarian average to distrust a wide range of political institutions – only 35 per cent trust the justice system (compared with 53 per cent of Hungarians overall); only 5 per cent trust the government (compared with 31 per cent of Hungarians overall); and only 6 per cent trust the national assembly (compared with 29 per cent overall). In relation to these issues, supporters of new opposition movements score remarkably similarly to supporters of Jobbik, of whom only 15 per cent trust the justice system and only 5 per cent trust the government.

Unlike other right-wing populist movements around Europe (and Jobbik supporters), there is great optimism about the European Union and other international institutions, like the United Nations

Supporters of new opposition movements appear to have greater trust and optimism about international institutions than Hungarian institutions. For example, the two most trusted political institutions are the European Union (72 per cent of respondents tend to trust it, compared with 47 per cent of Hungarians overall, and 9 per cent of Jobbik supporters); and 68 per cent of respondents trust the United Nations (compared with 51 per cent of Hungarians overall). Respondents are also more optimistic about the future of the European Union (21 per cent think it is heading in the right direction) than Hungarians in general (only 8 per cent of whom think it is heading in the right direction).

Respondents see a crisis in democracy in Hungary

Only 7 per cent of respondents said they were satisfied with the way democracy is developing in Hungary. This is in marked contrast to the Hungarian average. While very few Hungarians declare themselves to be very satisfied with democracy (5 per cent), many more are satisfied (26 per cent) – 31 per cent in total. This difference is not surprising since many of the groups base part of their appeal on opposition to the current Hungarian political establishment.

Pessimism about the future

On every measure, respondents were more pessimistic about the future than the Hungarian average. More than one-third (34 per cent) felt their life in general would be worse in 12 months' time (compared with 25 per cent of Hungarians overall); 55 per cent felt the economic situation of Hungary would be worse in 12 months' time (compared with 34 per cent of Hungarians overall); and 40 per cent felt their household finances would be worse in 12 months' time (compared with 30 per cent of Hungarians overall).

Supporters are more tolerant towards Roma than the national average, but concerns remain

There is an extremely high level of support among respondents for the idea that Roma groups have the right to attend non-Roma schools in Hungary: 61 per cent of people surveyed fully agreed (compared with the 39 per cent average). However, attitudes about the criminal disposition of Roma people are more ambiguous. Across the groups surveyed, 22 per cent think that Roma have a criminal disposition that runs in the blood – and a further 7 per cent either 'do not know' or 'do not wish to answer'. However, these responses are far more tolerant than those of Hungarian society overall: 59 per cent believe that criminal disposition runs in the blood of the Roma. Followers of new opposition movements are also fairly tolerant towards immigrants. These are clear differences with Jobbik supporters, who tend to be intolerant towards the Roma and immigrants.

Supporters are motivated to vote and to take part in a wide range of political and social activities

Supporters of these groups are significantly more likely than the average Hungarian to get involved in a wide variety of ‘real-world’ political activities. Overall, 7 per cent of respondents are formal members of political parties, with 4k! supporters the most likely to join them (16 per cent). This is considerably above the national average in Hungary, where just 1.5 per cent of citizens are members of political parties.¹³ A high ratio (86 per cent) of respondents would ‘definitely’ vote if there were a general election held in Hungary, compared with only 59 per cent of Hungarians overall. As for other kinds of political activities, nearly half (49 per cent) of respondents have been involved in an authorised demonstration, compared with just 4 per cent of the population overall. Two-thirds of respondents either have or might take part in a boycott, compared with 19 per cent of Hungarians more generally. High political activity (even if not to this extent) is a feature of Jobbik fans as well.

Official channels of media consumption are predominantly not trusted, but the internet is viewed as a highly trustworthy source

Of particular note are differing levels of trust regarding various ways of accessing information. Only 7 per cent tend to trust the television and 19 per cent tend to trust the press – both significantly lower figures than the national average of 52 per cent and 39 per cent respectively. This can be explained by many supporters’ view of the media as controlled by the government. However, 80 per cent of respondents say they trust the internet, more than for any institutions. This strongly suggests that respondents are seeking out alternative sources of information to what they regard as ‘official’ channels. These results mirror those found among supporter of Beppe Grillo, of whom 76 per cent trusted the internet and only 11 per cent trusted the press.

There is a ‘left-right division’ among these groups

On a range of measures, the groups surveyed for this research revealed slightly different views. Overall, the LMP seems to be

the most ‘right-wing’ organisation. LMP supporters were the most likely to trust the national institutions, including the government (12 per cent); the most likely to be satisfied with the way democracy is developing in Hungary (20 per cent); and the most likely to place themselves at the centre of the political spectrum: they scored an average of 5 on a 1 to 10 scale (where 1 is very left and where 10 is very right). This compares to an average of 3.9 across all groups surveyed. This is an interesting point as it shows that the left–right division that these movements wanted to leave behind is so powerful that it remained a divisive factor – leading to the split of LMP as a parliamentary party for example.

Implications

The groups surveyed for this project are indicative of a broader subterranean politics, increasingly visible in other parts of Europe, which tends to be characterised by a deep pessimism about existing political institutions, traditional media, domestic democracy and the future. However, they remain extremely political and highly motivated: willing to vote, protest and demonstrate. Whether these groups come from the left (as those surveyed here) or the right of the political spectrum, these features appear to be consistent with this new wave of protest politics.

Indeed, in Hungary these ‘participatory’ organisations are driven by some of the same underlying critiques as Jobbik and the other parties across Europe, but unlike Jobbik and other European parties, they are optimistic about international institutions like the United Nations and the European Union (which they see as possible saviours of Hungarian democracy), and they are more tolerant towards minority groups.

The Hungarian attempt to re-interpret politics is interesting: a possible model for other parties and movements that are seeking to create new, more participatory ways to engage with the political process. It also provides some lessons regarding the possible contradiction of apolitical politics. As movements which promise fundamental change get closer to

party politics, they often lose some of their mobilisation potential: as in the case of LMP, which was weakened by internal scandals after entering the parliament. Indeed, these movements seem to lose their power to change events when they get closer to the governmental politics, because of their ambivalent relations towards politics and traditional forms of representation. An interesting example is the Five Star Movement of Beppe Grillo; when getting closer to the chance of becoming a government force after getting into the parliament has struggled to create positive reform in the Italian parliament. It seems that subterranean, ‘apolitical’ political movements cannot easily use the power they have after being elected.

Perhaps the biggest question is what impact these movements (especially the more ‘anti-party’ movements) can have on representative politics, and how and in which direction they can mobilise young people. Power and mainstream politics appear to have negative connotations for the majority of supporters we surveyed: where power is often abused. Where this remains the prevalent attitude, it is not clear how far this new mobilisation can be translated into movements that can make representative democracy and existing institutions more open and democratic. In fact, there is a risk that apolitical politics could push people away from representative democracy and even provide justification for attempts (eg from the current Hungarian government) to redraw the constitutional system. Indeed, at this moment, it is not clear how these new apolitical or participatory or subterranean groups – highly active online – will bring real reform Europe-wide, because of their ambivalence towards power.

Nevertheless, many of the concerns of those surveyed in this report are shared by people across Europe. Over the last decade, trust in many democratic institutions has been eroded across the continent. In 2002, 39 per cent of Europeans trusted national government and 42 per cent trusted parliament while in 2010 only 24 per cent and 27 per cent respectively trusted these two institutions.¹⁴ Combined with falling party membership and voter turnout, this suggests that the appeal of extra-political movements – which combine an anti-establishment rhetoric with

smart ways of using modern media – could grow across Europe. Mainstream parties would do well to take these movements seriously, understand what is driving the concerns of supporters, respond to the challenges they present, and look for ways of reconciling protest politics with systems of representative democracy in new and radical ways. While it is not clear that these movements can change representative politics itself, they can (at least temporarily) change the political landscape. Mainstream politicians should reflect on these movements and consider whether and how to incorporate some of their proposals into politics, if they want to remain mainstream.

1 Background

Background and history

In April 2010, Viktor Orbán, leader of the Fidesz-KDNP Alliance party, enjoyed a landslide victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections, gaining more than 50 per cent of the votes and a two-thirds constitutional majority in the parliament. The Hungarian left suffered a catastrophic defeat: the Hungarian Socialist party (MSZP), which had won the 2006 election with 43 per cent of the votes, lost more than half its supporters, gaining only 19 per cent, only slightly more than the extreme right party Jobbik. The collapse in support was caused by a combination of factors, principally a loss of political credibility (following the infamous Öszöd speech of Prime Minister Gyurcsány),¹⁵ corruption scandals and harsh austerity measures. The Socialist party's effort to sell austerity measures as 'reform policy' to the public in 2010 was extremely unsuccessful and unpopular.

The 2010 election result was underpinned by a broader crisis of confidence in the political system. Over the years 2006–2008 there was an accumulation of three types of (overlapping) mistrust: general mistrust towards the political elite in general; mistrust towards the 'traditional' left – particularly MSZP; and mistrust in globalisation and its (financial) institutions.

Taken together, the 2010 elections and the changing political landscape reflected these new trends. The MSZP produced its second-worst result since the collapse of communism in 1990; and the right (combining Fidesz and Jobbik) secured 70 per cent of the votes. Equally significant, though, was the arrival of newcomers to the political scene (this is rare: there has only been one example since 1990 of a new party securing enough votes to enter parliament).¹⁶ Young voters

in particular became more open to the idea that the established system, based on the rotation of power between centre-right Fidesz and centre-left MSZP, needed to be replaced with a new settlement. This gave rise to new establishment parties. Jobbik, a radical right anti-liberal party with anti-Semitic and anti-Roma sentiments, gained 17 per cent of the vote,¹⁷ and Lehet Más a Politika (LMP) or ‘Politics Can Be Different’), with an environmentalist human rights agenda, won 7.5 per cent of the votes in the first round of the election. These two parties are radically different on many measures, but they share anti-political sentiments and ethos of civic or grassroots politics and a worldview based on the narrative that the political system has been co-opted by a corrupt political and economic elite. Both Jobbik and LMP, despite having fundamentally political goals, regard themselves as civic. For them, citizens represent common values and a united, good and clean community – in contrast with corrupt, clientalist and oligarchic political leaders and elites. This, undoubtedly, entails self-organisation to a certain extent, which results in a strong ‘grass-roots’ identity.

Research by Andrea Szabó and Tamás Kern has found there are two youth subcultures in Hungary, which loosely correlate with these parties: the ‘generation of Kuruc.info’ (Kuruc.info is the popular, trendy, sarcastic news site of the extreme right, which sometimes includes inflammatory language and hate speech), which supports Jobbik, and the ‘Critical Mass generation’ (labelled after the Critical Mass Movement of cycling campaigners), which is connected to the LMP. Members of the Critical Mass group are characterised by their unique value orientation, which focuses on post-material, community, social and environmental values, and social and international solidarity. Similarly to the Kuruc.info group, it is very diverse and rich in its self-organised networks. The subculture of the extreme right can be defined as an ‘identity group’ bound by their common belief in national radicalism, which creates a close relationship between its members.

The LMP is a political party, but there are a large number of other opposition movements and groups which are different in many respects but share a similar establishment-critical, broadly

left-wing world view. LMP (Politics Can Be Different) is the prototype of such movements, but Dialogue for Hungary (established by ex-LMP members), 4K!, the Students' Network, Milla and MKKP all belong to this category. Solidarity, with its trade union background, is somehow the odd-one-out from this club with a workers' base.

Each organisation is summarised below. They all promise a renewal and redefinition of politics, usually based on a critique of existing representative democracy, a desire to include more civic voices in policy-making, and calls for new forms of political representation. Some of them (for example 4K! or HaHa) call for a new type of political establishment based on civic and not political principles and foundations.

Overview of movements

Negyedik Köztársaság Párt (Fourth Republic party, 4K!)

Originally a civic movement, the 4K!, or 'Fourth Republic party', defines itself as a left-wing patriotic political force in Hungary. After a half-year-long process, based on participatory principles, the statutory congress of the new party took place in April 2012.¹⁸ The organisation is led by András Istvánffy. As the name indicates, 4K! aims to re-establish a new republic (the current being the third) by breaking with the current constitution of Hungary created and passed by Fidesz (the 'one-party basic law'). The party would like to introduce a new constitution which would be subject to a national referendum and would seek to reinforce the role of independent institutions.

The party's agenda focuses on social justice, equality, self-determination and the renewal of Hungarian democracy based on participatory principles. The main goals of the party programme are granting the right of citizens to recall elected members of parliament and local councils, strengthening employment rights and the role of workers' ownership in the economy, stimulating social integration of the Roma in Hungary, developing a tax system based on solidarity, and creating state-owned public services and an agricultural sector in national

ownership.¹⁹ 4K! defines itself as a political force confronting the established political elite in Hungary. It opposes both the governing Fidesz party and the forces of the opposition including the Hungarian Socialist party, Together 2014, the Democratic Coalition and other smaller parties (with the exception of LMP), as a result of their former roles in government, their ‘oligarchic’ operation and their adherence to neoliberal economic policies. 4K! offered electoral alliance to LMP but the two could not agree on the prerequisite conditions. 4K! has recently launched a new slogan ‘New Revolution 1514-2014’, which commemorates the 500th anniversary of the peasants’ revolt led by György Dózsa against the nobility, which will take place in 2014.

At the time of this research, 4K! had 10,548 supporters on Facebook (likes) and 696 people talk about its page. The most sizable demographic of those who talk about 4K!’s page is aged between 18 and 24.²⁰

Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party, MKKP)

The Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party is a satirical party that spoofs what it considered the irresponsible promises of the established parties.²¹ According to Gergely Kovács, founder and chairman of the organisation, a growth in MKKP’s popularity is at core a criticism of the political elite.²² Founded as a civic initiative in 2006 in Szeged (the third biggest city in Hungary), MKKP was established initially to mock the political campaigns of established parties and to draw attention to living conditions and public issues in Hungary using sarcasm and humour (for example, they ran a campaign against right-wing extremism by producing a fake poster entitled ‘For a smaller Hungary’, in reference to Hungarian irredentists demanding the revocation of the Trianon Treaty).²³ MKKP can be seen as a response to the increasing distrust and discontent with the establishment parties and politics in general in Hungary.

The main demands and promises of the party include eternal life, free beer, world peace, one work day per week, tax

cuts, money without work, and a network of express buses which stop nowhere. In Szeged, in the middle of the Great Hungarian Plains, the party promised to build a space port and an artificial mountain for winter sports. The party's main activity is street art, stencils, posters, internet videos and memes. These are often humorous, while providing stark criticism regarding various issues: corruption, development projects, political cynicism, social conditions, unemployment, consumer mentality and various other topics.²⁴

In 2010, MKKP, then officially registered as the Two-Tailed Dog Union, entered the political arena by running in municipal elections in Budapest and Szeged.²⁵ However, the organisation failed to collect the nomination slips needed for a candidate to run in the elections. The party plans to run for 2014 parliamentary elections, but the court of jurisdiction refused the registration of the party in September 2013. (According to the court, the party's name does not refer to the factual activity of the party, and the goals of the party included in the statutes are far too general.)²⁶

The Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party has 87,616 followers on Facebook and 6,225 people were talking about its Facebook page at the time of this research (the most common age group being aged between 18 and 24).²⁷

Egymillióan a magyar sajtószabadságért (One Million for the Freedom of Press in Hungary, Milla)

The civic movement was founded on 21 December 2010, originally as a Facebook page. The initial goal of Milla was to struggle against the new media law that restricts press freedom in Hungary. Later the scope was widened, and Milla has become a platform for campaigns, organisations and activists promoting civic liberties and the principle of equal opportunities.

According to its definition on Facebook, 'Milla, above all, is a civic platform, a specific part of the general public, which primarily supports and promotes civic interests and voices.'²⁸

The movement is led by a board, which consists of seven people – former chairman Péter Juhász (also co-chair of Együtt

2014), and former members of parliament József Gulyás, Bori Takács, András Rényi, Mátyás Torsa, Szelim Simándi and Gábor Bakos.

From 2010 to 2012, Milla played a central role in organising big rallies against the government, among them demonstrations on important national celebration days such as 15 March, the memorial day of the 1848 Revolution, and 23 October, the memorial day of the 1956 Revolution. While opposition parties including LMP with similar goals to Milla were unable to mobilise crowds at these events, Milla and its partner organisations were able to bring tens of thousands on to streets.

Until October 2012, Milla defined itself as an autonomous, non-political, anti-establishment organisation that was separate from all political parties. Milla criticised not only the governing Fidesz party but all parties and politicians that played a role in pre-2010 governments, including the MSZP, blaming them for the current powerful position of the Fidesz party.

This civic, non-party image has changed after the demonstration on 23 October 2012. At that rally, organised by Milla, former Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai held a key note speech in which he announced the foundation of the Együtt 2014 Electoral Movement, which consisted of three partner organisations: the Homeland and Progress Foundation (led by himself), the Solidarity Movement (led by Péter Kónya) and Milla (led by Péter Juhász). Since its shift into formal politics, Milla has struggled with internal dilemmas. This struggle reached a peak in February 2013 when Milla's general assembly introduced a new leadership structure (changing from singular leadership to collective leadership) and stated that the organisation would preserve its civic orientation and maintain a distance from Együtt 2014. According to the assembly's decision, Milla will not run in any elections, nor have any candidates, nor take part in any partisan political struggle.

As a civic movement, Milla tries to merge the spheres of politics and civic engagement. In order to draw a clear line between its civic role and actors of partisan politics, Milla has set up clear conditions under which members could take a role in any parties (first, only one member of the board can hold a

position in any party at once, and second, Milla has an ethical code which includes its expectations of politicians).²⁹

The main activities of Milla include organising demonstrations and a permanent presence on online platforms. Milla maintains its own news portal,³⁰ but its main platform is the Milla Facebook page where memos, photos, videos and news are regularly posted.³¹ Posts are mainly about current issues and reactions on them. Initial demonstrations related to press freedom were later followed by anti-establishment and anti-government demonstrations (eg the ‘I do not like the system’ rally on 23 October 2011). However, Milla organised specific demonstrations as well, such as one about labour rights (on 3 December 2011), one against the new constitution (on 15 April 2011) and another in favour of the resignation of then president Pál Schmitt (on 21 April 2011).³² Furthermore, as a reaction to Pál Schmitt’s plagiarism scandal, Milla launched a campaign to elect an alternative president of the Republic.³³ Milla’s latest demonstration (on 23 October 2013) showed the crisis of the organisation, however. Although Milla and Együtt 2014 oppose the extensive cooperation among opposition parties, practically every left-wing political organisation was invited to the demonstration to deliver speeches. The rally came to an awkward end with speakers of different parties criticising each other on the stage.

Milla had 111,996 followers on Facebook, and 8,454 people were talking about its Facebook page at the time of this research (most aged between 25 and 34).³⁴

Lehet Más a Politika (Politics Can Be Different, LMP)

The intellectual basis of the LMP party, founded in 2009, was an NGO called the Védegylet Association.³⁵ The founding declaration of the party states its commitment to a blend of liberal, centre-left and communal conservative values.³⁶ The party tried to keep its civic image and networks even after it had become involved in partisan politics. LMP ran together with the Humanist party in the 2009 European election, gaining 2.6 per cent, and in the 2010 national elections their party list gained 7.5

per cent of the votes, making LMP a parliamentary party. The grassroots structure of the party results in criticism of the left and right side of the political spectrum and all the establishment parties. The key issues that the group campaigns on include sustainability, renewable energies, equal opportunities, labour rights, combating poverty and democratic reform. LMP shot to prominence with a series of provocative performances inside and outside parliament concerning corruption, legislative anomalies and local environmental problems. Their most spectacular action was when members of the LMP parliamentary group chained themselves to the entrance of the parliament on 23 December, 2011.³⁷

Between the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013, the party underwent a crisis. Members became divided on the question of cooperation with other opposition parties, especially Együtt, led by former caretaker Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai. After the party congress' decision that LMP would not join the opposition alliance, eight members of the parliamentary group, along with some party members, left LMP and formed a new party called Párbeszéd Magyarországért Párt (Dialogue for Hungary Party).³⁸ After the split of the party, LMP positioned itself in the centre between the governing Fidesz party and the opposition parties that played a role in pre-2010 governments. LMP claimed to keep equal distance from all other parties and blamed them for having been equally responsible for Hungary's political situation. It rules out cooperation with the opposition parties and the governing party in 2014 elections.

Both the national and local arms of LMP operate Facebook pages. At the time of this research, the party had 21,255 likes on Facebook, and 1,159 people were talking about its page (the most common age is between 25 and 34.)³⁹

Magyar Szolidaritás Mozgalom (Hungarian Solidarity Movement, Szolidaritás)

Based on a network of trade unions, Szolidaritás was formed in October 2011 following a large anti-governmental rally ('D-day: democracy day').⁴⁰ Both the name and logo of the party refer to

the Polish Solidarity Movement formed in August 1980 in order to protect the rights of Polish workers: the movement later became the symbol of the resistance against the communist regime. Szolidaritás was formed as a civic movement, although its leaders Péter Kónya (a former army officer) and Kornél Árok (a former firefighter who has already left the movement) envisaged a political role from the start. Szolidaritás aims to put an end to the political division of Hungarian society. It declares itself ready to represent the workers in a radical way.⁴¹

In October 2012, Péter Kónya, the leader of Szolidaritás at that time, signed a cooperation agreement with the representatives of Haza és Haladás Egyesület and Milla to create Együtt 2014. Half a year later Párbeszéd Magyarorszáért, the new party of ex-LMP members, also joined the alliance.⁴²

As a member of Együtt 2014 movement, Szolidaritás represents the radical wing of the alliance, and often organises street-based activities. One of the most spectacular activities of Szolidaritás was a trade union march protesting against the employer-friendly new Law on Labour, where firefighters broke some fire hydrants along their route through Budapest.⁴³ In October 2011, activists toppled a mock statue of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán made of styrofoam. The performance led to widespread public condemnation from supporters of the government and even of the opposition.⁴⁴

Szolidaritás had 12,960 followers on Facebook and 1,845 people were talking about its page at the time of this research. The people who most frequently talked about its page were aged between 45 and 64.⁴⁵

Hallgatói Hálózat (Student Network, HaHa)⁴⁶

HaHa was founded during student protests against a legal proposal regarding higher education in October 2011.⁴⁷ In December 2012, the most important demands of the organisation were summarised in a five-point plus-one document, in which HaHa called for the comprehensive reform of the higher education system (including the cancellation of student contracts, and greater respect for the autonomy of universities).

The ‘plus-one’ point stated that students should demonstrate until their demands are accepted by the government.⁴⁸

HaHa defines itself as a group of self-organising students. The movement’s structure is based on grassroots principles and participatory democracy. The organisation consists of autonomous, local groups at various universities. They are independent from the official representation of students (student councils). Having broadened its focus since its foundation, HaHa now acts to defend student rights and advocate the organisation of students. HaHa is an independent organisation that keeps an equal distance from all political parties and does not cooperate with any of them.

In common with other movements, HaHa uses provocative demonstrations to gain attention. It organised its first demonstration in June 2012, called the ‘night for higher education’. However, HaHa became really active during the student demonstrations in the winter of 2012/13 as they organised student forums nationwide, held demonstrations and occupied a bridge and university building in Budapest. At the time of writing, they are relatively inactive, partly because of the criticism they received regarding their last demonstration against evictions in August 2013.⁴⁹ They are very active on social media. Facebook is a key platform of the organisation.

HaHa had 17,174 followers on Facebook and 503 people were talking about its page at the time of this research. The demographic which most commonly discusses its page is 18–24 year olds.⁵⁰

Párbeszéd Magyarorszáért (Dialogue for Hungary, PM)

The PM was founded in February 2013 by former LMP members who had quit the party because they opposed the decision to form part of Együtt 2014.⁵¹ PM was formed by eight former members of the LMP parliamentary group and about 10 per cent of the members of LMP.⁵² It defines itself as a green, left-leaning movement. The core values and vision of the party are anchored to its founding declaration, which states that civil liberties, democratic institutions, and Hungary’s democratic system in

general are in deep crisis.⁵³ Besides more typical left-wing demands such as job protection, workers' rights, equal opportunities and civil liberties, the environment is also a core issue. The party is committed to sustainable rural development and renewable energies. An important characteristic of PM is its commitment to the change of government through limited cooperation with some of the opposition parties. (One month after its foundation, PM joined the Együtt 2014 movement by forming a party alliance called Együtt 2014 – PM in March 2013.)⁵⁴ However, PM has been opposing an alliance with other opposition parties such as MSZP and the Democratic Coalition Party (the party of former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány).

PM has been getting considerable publicity through its provocative demonstrations and performances inside and outside the parliament. These tend to focus on corruption cases concerning the governing party, anomalies in public procurement, contradictions in the legislative process and criticism of the tender procedure for tobacco shops.⁵⁵ In one of their actions, for example, PM members of parliament held up banners criticising government corruption during the parliament's plenary session.⁵⁶

PM had 28,311 followers on Facebook and 5,049 people were talking about its page at the time of this research. The people who most commonly discussed its page were aged between 55 and 64.⁵⁷

Együtt – a Korszakváltók Pártja (Together 2014, Együtt 2014)

Együtt 2014 was founded in October 2012 by an alliance of three organisations: the Homeland and Progress Association, the Hungarian Solidarity Movement and Milla.⁵⁸ Soon afterwards, Együtt 2014 became a formal party called Együtt – a Korszakváltók Pártja (Together – Party of the Era of Change).⁵⁹

Együtt 2014 aims to integrate the values and messages of its member organisations. It incorporates the social democratic ideas represented by the Solidarity Movement, the focus on law, civil liberties and social self-organisation of the Milla Movement, and the green ideas of PM (although the latter is technically not

a member organisation but an allied one); finally it incorporates the focus on public policy competence of the Homeland and Progress Association. The main messages of the party are contained in two documents: Moral and Ethical Foundations⁶⁰ and the Cooperation Agreement.⁶¹ These documents state that the party aims to solve various crises caused by the current government. According to Együtt 2014, these problems include domestic and foreign policy, the constitutional system, the legal system and social values more generally. The party proposes to reconstruct the country's foreign relations and guarantee civil liberties and equal opportunities.

Originally, Együtt 2014 was established to unite opposition groups and be the main opponent to the governing Fidesz party in the 2014 national elections. At the time of Együtt 2014's foundation, the former prime minister and leader of the movement, Gordon Bajnai, wanted to become the opposition's prime ministerial candidate. However, because of its weakening public support (the party's support among active voters with party preferences was between 4 per cent and 8 per cent in October 2013), the chances for this seem to erode. Együtt 2014, forced by the new election system to cooperate, arranged a cooperation agreement with Hungarian Socialist party (MSZP) to run together in individual constituencies (while retaining separate party lists).

Gordon Bajnai had 79,210 supporters on Facebook and 11,300 people were talking about its page at the time of this research. The demographic which most commonly discussed its page was aged between 55 and 64.⁶²

2 Findings

Left-wing Hungarian activists on Facebook

This chapter presents the socio-economic characteristics and the age and gender data of the new opposition movements surveyed for this research.

Demographics

It is possible to identify the makeup of Hungary's Facebook membership by age and gender using Facebook's own (publicly available) advertising tool (see chapter 3 for details). Using the same method it is also possible to derive basic demographic information about the Facebook supporters of the groups surveyed.

Across the country as a whole, Hungarian Facebook users display an even gender split (table 2). The groups surveyed for this research also showed a fairly even split, with 53 per cent male and 47 per cent female. Interestingly, the groups surveyed are older than the typical Facebook user in Hungary: only 21 per cent are aged 16–24 (compared with 32 per cent of Hungarian users of Facebook overall) and 38 per cent are aged 45 or over (compared with 22 percent overall).

Education and employment

We asked respondents to state their highest level of educational attainment (table 3). More than half (57 per cent) of online supporters stated that they had higher education qualifications. This is far higher than the national average of 17 per cent. It is also significantly higher than Jobbik supporters surveyed as part of this research series. Among Jobbik Facebook fans, only 22 per cent cited higher education. Similarly, Facebook fans of Beppe

Table 2 **Age and gender of Hungarian left-wing activist Facebook Fans (n=462,983); national statistics in brackets, n=4,600,000)**

Age	Groups total (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
16–24	21 (32.3)	13 (16.4)	8 (15.9)
25–34	21 (25.9)	12 (12.7)	9 (12.7)
35–44	19 (21.8)	10 (10)	9 (11.4)
45–54	14 (10.9)	7 (4.6)	8 (6.4)
55–64	16 (7.3)	6 (3.0)	9 (4.5)
65+	8 (3.3)	4 (1.7)	4 (1.6)
All	100 (100)	53 (50)	47 (50)

Table 3 **Highest educational attainment of respondents (n=4,141); national statistics in brackets⁶³**

	Total (%)
Primary school	3 (31.7)
Vocational school without graduation	7 (21.3)
Secondary school	31 (30.1)
Higher education	57 (17.0)
I do not know	0.4
I do not wish to answer	2
No answer	1

Grillo's Five Star Movement were significantly more likely to cite university than the national average in Italy (27 per cent versus 11 per cent).⁶⁴

Overall, 7 per cent of respondents are unemployed: below the national average of just over 10 per cent (see table 4); 14 per cent are currently students.

The group with the greatest proportion of fans with higher education qualifications is Milla, with 67 per cent, while MKKP fans are the least likely to have undergone higher education (47 per cent) and the most likely to have only primary school education or below (9 per cent).

This also masks some variation across the groups. Hallgatói Hálózat is unsurprisingly the movement with the largest

Table 4 **The employment status of Hungarian left-wing activist Facebook fans (n=4,141); national statistics in brackets⁶⁵**

	Total (%)
Employed at least 30 hours per week	45
Employed less than 30 hours per week	3
Unemployed	7 (10.1)
Retired	20
Student	14
I do not know	1
I do not wish to answer	4
No answer	4

percentage of students (39 per cent), while Szolidaritás and PM are the groups with the highest level of unemployment (11 per cent). Unemployment rates are similar between the over 25 and the under 25 age groups (8 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively). However, the percentage of people who are employed at least 30 hours per week is significantly higher among people over 25 (53 per cent) than under 25 (14 per cent). This suggests that a significant part of the support base might be those employed temporarily or part time. While equivalent to supporters of the German Pirate party (7 per cent), unemployment levels were slightly higher for supporters of the Jobbik party (11 per cent), and significantly higher for supporters of Beppe Grillo's Five Stars Movement (19 per cent).

Membership and involvement

Understanding the relationship between online and offline activism is important. Therefore we asked respondents whether they were 'formal' members of any political parties in Hungary (table 5); Overall, 7 per cent of respondents are formal members of political parties, with 4K! supporters the most likely to be formally involved in a political party at 16 per cent. This is considerably above the national average in Hungary, where just under 2 per cent of citizens are members of a political party.⁶⁶ By contrast, 16 per cent of Jobbik's online supporters declared themselves to be official members of their party, which reflects

Table 5 **The proportion of respondents who are formal members of any political party (n=varied)**

(%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)	No answer
Average across groups(n=4,003)	7	90	0.5	-
Szolidaritás (n=236)	11	88	1	0
PM (n=174)	11	89	1	0
MKKP (n=579)	3	94	2	1
Milla (n=1249)	3	86	1	0
LMP (n=333)	13	81	6	1
Hallgatói Halozat (n=106)	4	94	0	1
4K! (n=260)	16	82	2	0
Együtt (n=1066)	8	88	3	1

the more formal structure of the Jobbik party compared with these movements.

These groups are part of a number of new types of political movement that use social media to arrange offline activities. We therefore asked respondents about the extent of their political activism over the past six months (table 6).

These results suggest that supporters of these groups are significantly more likely than the average Hungarian to get involved in a wide variety of types of ‘real-world’ political activism. For example, 49 per cent of respondents have been involved in an authorised demonstration, compared with just 4 per cent of the population overall. Two-thirds of respondents either have or might take part in a boycott, compared with 19 per cent of all Hungarians.

Considerably lower levels of political activism were found among Beppe Grillo’s fans, with only 57 per cent of respondents saying they have or might sign a petition, 29 per cent saying that they have or might join a boycott, and 16 per cent saying that they have or might participate in unauthorised strikes. Conversely, levels of political activism were higher among supporters of the German Pirate party: more than 96 per cent of respondents from that party declared that they have or might

Table 6 **The extent of political activism in the last 12 months (n=varied); national statistics in brackets**⁶⁷

	Have done (%)	Might do (%)	Would never do (%)	Don't know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
Signed a petition (n=3478)	65 (14.9)	21 (30.3)	8 (53.8)	4 (0.8)	2 (0.3)
Joined a boycott (n=3313)	16 (2.0)	51 (17.0)	15 (79.2)	12 (1.6)	4 (0.3)
Participated in authorised demonstrations (n=3437)	49 (3.94)	29 (20.5)	12 (74.5)	7 (0.9)	2 (0.2)
Participated in unauthorised strikes (n=3230)	6 (0.4)	38 (5.4)	28 (93.5)	24 (0.5)	5 (0.1)
Occupied buildings or factories (n=3230)	5 (0.4)	26 (3.2)	42 (95.8)	23 (0.5)	7 (0.1)
Actively participated in a student movement or NGO (n=3271)	22	44	14	15	4

sign a petition, more than 86 per cent that they have or might take part in a boycott, and more than 56 per cent that they have or might join an unauthorised strike.

Respondents under 25 are less likely than over 25s to engage in certain actions, but more likely to get involved in others actions. Of the under 25s, 83 per cent have or might sign a petition, 59 per cent have or might join a boycott, and 76 per cent have or might participate in authorised demonstration. For the over 25s, the figures are 85 per cent, 71 per cent and 78 per cent respectively. On the other hand, younger respondents are more likely to occupy buildings and factories (42 per cent) and actively participate in a student movement or an NGO (74 per cent) than the older ones (27 per cent and 64 per cent respectively). Males and females responded similarly to the questions, with the most visible difference concerning their

Table 7 **The proportion of respondents who would sign a petition, split by group (n=varied)**

	Have done (%)	Might do (%)	Would never do (%)	Don't know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
Szolidaritás (n=222)	82	10	4	2	2
PM (n=160)	71	16	8	0	2
MKKP (n=450)	53	27	14	3	2
Milla (n=1146)	71	19	6	2	1
LMP (n=274)	65	16	10	5	4
Hallgatói Hálózat (n=98)	80	9	9	2	0
4K! (n=225)	71	20	5	2	0
Együtt (n=923)	55	26	12	4	4

likelihood to occupy building or factories (33 per cent of men have or might do so, compared with only 26 per cent of women).

These overall results obscure interesting variations in the groups surveyed. Table 7 shows the responses of each group to a question asking whether respondents had signed a petition.

Szolidaritás, Hallgatói Hálózat (Student's Network) and PM members seem to be the most active groups in this type of activism, with 82 per cent, 80 per cent and 71 per cent of them, respectively, claiming that they have signed a petition.

The same breakdown is available for a question asking whether supporters have ever joined an unofficial strike (table 8). Followers of Hallgatói Hálózat are by far the most likely to participate in unauthorised strikes. This may be explained by the University Occupation Movement in late 2012 and early 2013, when members of these movements held their meeting in university classrooms in order to express their dissatisfaction with the reform plans of the government.

Party preference and voting activity

Among the followers of the new left-wing organisations we find extremely high levels of willingness to vote in 2014: 86 per cent average would participate in an election if it were held this

Table 8 **The proportion of respondents who would join an unofficial strike, split by group (n=varied)**

	Have done (%)	Might do (%)	Would never do (%)	Don't know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
Szolidaritás (n=194)	9	46	15	26	5
PM (n=146)	5	41	25	25	6
MKKP (n=444)	6	32	33	24	6
Milla (n=1056)	4	41	23	28	4
LMP (n=226)	8	27	35	25	4
Hallgatói Halozat (n=96)	16	43	17	25	0
4K! (n=222)	7	43	20	26	5
Együtt (n=714)	5	35	35	19	6

Sunday (table 9). This is far higher than the 59 per cent measured in the overall internet user population. The differences among these groups are robust: over 90 per cent of the followers of Dialogue Hungary, Solidarity and Together 2014 would vote. The least likely to participate (63 per cent) are the members of the MKKP, which is not even an official party. Followers of the Students' Network, with one of the youngest followings and with no intention to run on the election in 2014, shows the second lowest participation rate (70 per cent).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the ratio of undecided voters is also much lower among the followers of these groups than the national average (43 per cent). The party preferences of the different organisations are significantly different (table 10). The most homogeneous are the followers of the Dialogue for Hungary, with 71 per cent aiming to vote for the E14-PM electoral alliance. Followers of Gordon Bajnai show more heterogeneity: 56 per cent of them would vote for E14-PM, but Jobbik and Fidesz supporters can be found among them as well (supposedly the latter are not Bajnai-fans, only followers of his Facebook page).

We can find the highest popularity levels for right-wing parties among the followers of LMP (11 per cent and 13 per cent). The most opposed to existing parties are the followers of MKKP

Table 9 **The proportion of respondents who would vote if there were parliamentary elections this Sunday (n=varied)**

	You are sure you would vote (%)	You would probably go to vote (%)	You probably would not vote (%)	You are sure would not go to vote (%)	I do not know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
National average ⁶⁸	59	16	3	10	12	-
Average (n=4017)	86	8	2	2	2	2
Szolidaritás (n=231)	94	3	0	2	1	1
PM (n=174)	93	3	0	1	0	2
MKKP (n=585)	63	18	5	6	5	2
Milla (n=1249)	88	8	2	1	1	0
LMP (n=333)	81	10	1	2	3	2
Hallgatói Halozat (n=106)	70	19	5	6	0	0
4K! (n=263)	82	11	2	3	1	1
Együtt (n=1066)	93	4	1	1	1	1

and 4K!, with more than third of them choosing ‘other’ party as an option to vote. It is interesting to note that the popularity of MSZP is extremely low across the groups, while the party of the ex-prime minister, the Democratic Coalition (led by Gyurcsány), has slightly better results.

We asked respondents which political party they voted for in the last general election in Hungary (2010) (table 11). It is unsurprising that the majority of these followers come from the left, with the same ratio (26 per cent) from MSZP and LMP. 8 per cent said that they voted for Fidesz in 2010 and 4 per cent said they voted for Jobbik (it is hard to be certain, however, if these people are genuine supporters of these new left-wing movements now or merely ‘followers’ of them).

Social and political concerns, immigration and Roma

We asked respondents a number of questions about their social and political views. Where the information is available, we have

Table 10 **The party respondents would vote for if there was a parliamentary election this Sunday (n=4141)**

	Fidesz	MSZP	Jobbik	LMP	DK	E14-PM	Other	I do not know	I do not wish to answer
National average ⁶⁹	27	13	8	2	2	5	1		43
Average (n=4006)	4	4	4	7	7	47	10	11	6
Szolidaritás (n=321)	4	7	1	2	8	62	2	5	8
PM (n=174)	0	3	0	2	13	71	3	6	1
MKKP (n=579)	5	1	6	7	2	19	35	18	7
Milla (n=1249)	0	5	1	4	7	61	4	11	6
LMP (n=333)	11	4	13	27	5	19	5	10	6
Hallgatói	0	2	1	9	2	45	17	19	5
Halozat (n=106)									
4K! (n=260)	1	3	3	16	5	17	41	11	3
Együtt (Gordon Bajnai) (n=1066)	6	4	6	1	9	56	2	8	6

Table 11 **The parties respondents voted for in the 2010 parliamentary elections (n=4141)**

	Facebook supporters (%)	Hungary (%)
Fidesz-Christian Democratic	8	53
MSZP	26	19
Jobbik	4	17
LMP (Politics Can Be Different)	26	7
MDF	3	3
Civil Movement	1	1
Labour Party	0	0
MSZDP	0	0
Joining The Party	0	0
MIEP	0	0
Do not know	1	(N/A)
Do not wish to answer	8	(N/A)
No answer	24	(N/A)

Table 12 **What respondents thought were the two main challenges that Hungary faces; percentage in the top two (n=4,141)**

	Total (%)	National average (%)
Economic situation	31	21
Unemployment	20	29
Education	10	4
Tax system	9	4
Integration of the Roma	8	(N/A)
Healthcare	8	14
Rising prices and inflation	4	58
Crime	3	3
Energy	1	1
Environment	1	1
Pensions	3	9
Immigration	0	1
Housing problems	1	(N/A)
Terrorism	0	1
Foreign policy issues	1	1
I do not know	0	(N/A)
I do not wish to answer	0	(N/A)

drawn comparisons with national averages based on either the Eurobarometer survey 2013 or the European Values Study 2013, in order to make more meaningful inferences.

The top two biggest concerns

We asked respondents to rank their biggest social and political concerns, taken from a list of 15 current issues (table 12).

Equivalent data collected for Jobbik demonstrate that economic considerations are far more important for supporters of opposition movements than for Jobbik followers. Among Jobbik supporters, the integration of the Roma (28 per cent) was the top concern, followed by crime (26 per cent). For supporters of these movements, by contrast, only 3 per cent of people included crime as one of their top two concerns.

Overwhelmingly, the economic situation and employment were the top concerns, although it is to be noted that democratic

Table 13 **The views of respondents on whether immigrants are a problem for Hungary or bring opportunities to Hungary (n=3561)**

	Total (%)
Immigrants are a problem for Hungary	23
Immigrants bring opportunities for Hungary	43
I do not know	28
I do not wish to answer	6

reform or legal reform is not included as an option on these surveys.

The predominance of economic concerns also characterises the responses of supporters of Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement in Italy. When asked to choose from a list of 18 current issues, the vast majority of interviewees chose the economic situation (62 per cent) and unemployment (61 per cent) as their top concerns. Conversely, the two least mentioned issues were terrorism (15 per cent) and defence and foreign affairs (13 per cent).

We asked respondents what they thought about immigration (table 13). Overall, respondents were on balance pro-immigration: 43 per cent thought that immigrants bring opportunities for Hungary.

Views on immigration vary across the parties. Együtt has the highest percentage of supporters that see immigrants as a problem for Hungary (30 per cent). Conversely, Hallgatói Hálózat is the group with the highest proportion of activists who think that immigrants bring more opportunities than problems to the country (53 per cent). Generally, these data indicate that the followers of new left-wing political movements of Hungary are relatively tolerant. The relative majority of Hungarians (for other questions) usually express notable antipathy towards immigrants.⁷⁰

We also asked two questions about attitudes towards Roma. The reason for putting them in the analysis was that

Roma are the minority that is generally regarded with the strongest hostility by Hungarian society in general.⁷¹

There are extremely high levels of support for the idea that Roma groups have the right to attend non-Roma schools in Hungary (table 14): 87 per cent agree with the statement. There is not a great deal of variation in the answers across the group. However, attitudes about the criminal disposition of Roma people are more ambiguous. Across the groups, 22 per cent think that Roma have a criminal disposition that runs in the blood – and a further 8 per cent either ‘do not know’ or ‘do not wish to answer’.

Again, we can find that the followers of these groups are much more tolerant than the overall society, with 61 per cent of the respondents agreeing completely, for example, that all Roma children have the right to attend non-Roma public schools for their education (compared with 39 per cent of the Hungarian population overall). An even more important piece of data is that only 22 per cent of the followers of these groups overall agree with the statement: ‘a criminal disposition runs in the blood of the Roma’ (table 15), in contrast to 59 per cent of the overall population. This is an obvious dividing line between these groups and the supporters of Jobbik, who represent an extremely intolerant section of society.

MKKP and LMP supporters seems to be the least tolerant from this block, with closest results to the average.

While there was no significant variation of opinion between genders, there was a greater difference in inter-generational perceptions. Only 54 per cent of respondents under 25 fully agreed that Roma children should be able to attend non-Roma schools, compared with 65 per cent of respondents over 25.

With regards to the second question we asked about the Roma, the under 25s demonstrated once again a more negative attitude, with 19 per cent fully agreeing that a criminal disposition was a trait inherent in the Roma against 8 per cent of respondents over the age of 25. Males are also more likely to agree that a criminal disposition runs in the blood of the Roma than females (26 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively, who either tend to agree or fully agree).

Table 14 **The extent to which respondents agreed that ‘all Roma children have the right to attend non-Roma public schools for their education’ (n=varied)⁷²**

	I fully agree (%)	I tend to agree (%)	I tend to disagree (%)	I do not agree (%)	I do not know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
National average	39	43	11	3	4	-
Group average (n=3520)	61	26	6	5	1	2
Szolidaritás (n=222)	63	26	5	3	0	2
PM (n=164)	69	24	1	0	3	2
MKKP (n=456)	50	30	9	8	1	1
Milla (n=1172)	71	23	2	1	1	1
LMP (n=278)	50	31	7	7	1	2
Hallgatói Halozat (n=98)	78	18	1	3	0	0
4K! (n=220)	61	30	5	1	1	1
Együtt (n=923)	56	24	10	6	1	2

Table 15 **The extent to which respondents agreed that ‘a criminal disposition runs in the blood of the Roma’ (n=varied)⁷³**

	I fully agree (%)	I tend to agree (%)	I tend to disagree (%)	I do not agree (%)	I do not know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
National average	23	36	23	11	6	-
Group Average (n=3437)	10	12	19	51	5	3
Szolidaritás (n=219)	12	15	17	45	5	5
PM (n=157)	6	7	24	56	7	1
MKKP (n=450)	16	15	18	44	4	4
Milla (n=1146)	6	9	18	63	3	2
LMP (n=271)	15	15	19	42	5	3
Hallgatói Halozat (n=90)	6	4	16	72	4	0
4K! (n=220)	5	12	19	60	4	1
Együtt (n=901)	13	16	22	40	6	5

Expectations for the future

We asked respondents a series of questions about the extent to which they were optimistic or pessimistic about their future, for their personal lives and the future of Hungary overall (table 16).

Generally, respondents tend to share pessimism regarding their economic future – both about their own personal finances and the economy of Hungary. However, opinion was not enormously different from the national averages. Only 12 per cent believe their own economic situation will be better in 12 months; this figure is only slightly lower than the national average of 16 per cent. Similarly, respondents' expectations about their own lives in general are broadly in line with national averages in Hungary. More marked, however, is the pessimism about Hungary's economic situation: only 9 per cent of respondents believe it will be better in a year, compared with 17 per cent of the country overall.

In general, younger respondents tend to be more optimistic about the future than the older ones. Only 36 per cent of under 25s think their personal life will get worse in the next 12 months, compared with half of supporters over 25. This optimism among the younger supporters can be found in Beppe Grillo's Facebook supporters. Those under 30 years old are slightly less concerned than supporters over their 30s about the economic situation of their country (63 per cent against 68 per cent whom think it will get worse) and the financial situation of their household (44 per cent against 54 per cent). The same trend was found among Jobbik Facebook supporters: those over the age of 30 tended to be less optimistic about the future than those under 30.

Interestingly, the results illustrate that there is a significant difference between these respondents and the Hungarian public: respondents are far more likely to think that Hungary is heading in the wrong direction (see table 17). A large majority (85 per cent) of respondents think that Hungary is heading in the wrong direction, compared with 54 per cent of the Hungarian population overall. Such a view is slightly more widespread among older than younger supporters, with 86 per cent and 76 per cent of them respectively declaring that things are going in the wrong direction in Hungary. However, respondents under 25 are more pessimistic than those over 25 when it comes to the

Table 16 **Whether respondents thought that the next 12 months would be better, worse or the same, when it came to... (n=3,561)⁷⁴**

	Better (%)	Worse (%)	Same (%)	I do not know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
a Their life in general					
National average	16	25	57	2	–
Average	19	34	40	7	1
Szolidaritás	9	48	32	9	1
PM	11	41	42	7	0
MKKP	28	23	39	7	1
Milla	13	36	43	8	1
LMP	27	26	42	5	0
Hallgatói Halozat	21	26	45	8	1
4K!	21	29	41	8	1
Együtt	15	31	35	7	1
b The economic situation in Hungary					
National average	17	34	47	2	–
Average	9	55	17	3	0
Szolidaritás	3	81	12	3	1
PM	2	71	26	1	0
MKKP	25	62	10	4	1
Milla	2	74	19	5	0
LMP	15	46	33	9	0
Hallgatói Halozat	9	57	25	1	0
4K!	5	69	24	2	0
Együtt	9	69	15	4	0
c The financial situation of their household					
National average	16	30	53	1	–
Average	12	40	25	6	1
Szolidaritás	6	62	19	13	1
PM	8	54	30	7	1
MKKP	16	38	37	6	1
Milla	9	52	31	8	1
LMP	20	39	35	4	1
Hallgatói Halozat	6	54	26	11	1
4K!	11	53	33	4	1
Együtt	12	54	27	7	1

Table 17 **Extent to which respondents thought that, in general, things were going in the right direction or in the wrong direction in Hungary and the European Union (n=3,561); national statistics in brackets⁷⁵**

	Right direction (%)	Wrong direction (%)	Neither (%)	Don't know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
Hungary	8 (21)	85 (54)	5 (23)	1 (2)	1 (n/a)
The European Union	21 (28)	22 (33)	41 (31)	14 (8)	1 (n/a)

EU: only 16 per cent think that things are going in the right direction, as opposed to 22 per cent of respondents over 25.

Respondents to the survey are markedly more positive about the direction of the European Union than the Hungarian average (table 17). This is potentially explained by the fact that the relationship to the EU is starting to be a key political dividing line, with pro-left parties and movements expressing more sympathy towards the EU, while Jobbik is clearly anti-EU, and Fidesz increasingly becoming a Eurosceptic party. Opposition movements in Hungary generally regard the EU as the possible 'saviour' of Hungarian democracy, against Orbán's centralisation tendencies. Supporters of Beppe Grillo and the German Pirate party share a similar concern about the direction of their country, with only 6 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively, saying that things were heading in the right direction. Unlike our respondents, however, both groups were as pessimistic about the EU – 78 per cent of both groups said that things were going in the wrong direction in the EU.

Politics and democracy

We asked respondents to position themselves on the political spectrum ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 being furthest left and 10 furthest right (table 18). The average score for respondents was 3.9 (interestingly, this score is identical to the same score when the question was asked of supporters of Beppe Grillo's Five Star

Table 18 **Where respondents position themselves on a political spectrum⁷⁶ (n=varied)**

Party	Left (%)					Right (%)					No answer (%)	Average position (%)
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Collated average (n=4141)	12	8	17	16	18	5	3	2	1	3	16	3.9
Szolidaritás (n=236)	29	8	16	16	17	2	3	1	0	2	5	3.3
PM (n=174)	17	13	23	19	16	1	1	0	0	1	9	3.2
MKKP (n=616)	3	2	9	11	21	9	7	4	2	4	29	4.9
Milla (n=1288)	11	12	24	20	17	3	2	0	0	0	10	3.4
LMP (n=347)	4	3	9	14	20	12	4	6	1	9	18	5.0
Hallgatói Halozat (n=110)	7	9	14	20	16	12	2	1	0	1	18	3.9
4K! (n=271)	16	8	16	10	15	4	1	0	0	2	29	3.5
Együtt (n=1099)	16	6	17	14	17	3	3	2	2	4	16	3.9

Movement), which suggests respondents consider themselves to be generally left of centre. This is not a surprising result. However, the results suggest there is some significant variation between the groups. For example, supporters of LMP place themselves at exactly centre on the spectrum with a score of 5, while Szolidaritás respondents averaged 3.3.

We asked respondents about the extent to which they were satisfied with the current state of democracy in Hungary (table 19). The results show that the overwhelming majority (75 per cent) are not at all satisfied. Just 7 per cent express satisfaction. This is in marked contrast to the Hungarian average. While only very few Hungarians declare themselves to be very satisfied with democracy (5 per cent), many more are satisfied (26 per cent) and there are fewer who are 'not at all satisfied' (22 per cent). This is not surprising since many of the groups partially base their appeal on their opposition to the current Hungarian political system and establishment.

Interestingly, under 25s appear to be slightly more optimistic than over 25s on this question: 64 per cent of under

Table 19 Whether respondents are very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in Hungary (n=varied)⁷⁷

	Very satisfied (%)	Satisfied (%)	Not very satisfied (%)	Not at all satisfied (%)	I do not know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
National average	5	26	42	26	1	-
Average (n=3603)	2	5	16	75	1	1
Szolidaritás (n=224)	3	2	5	88	0	1
PM (n=160)	0	1	14	84	0	1
MKKP (n=456)	3	8	24	62	1	3
Milla (n=1185)	1	1	13	84	1	0
LMP (n=285)	7	13	24	51	2	0
Hallgatói Halozat (n=98)	0	1	23	74	0	0
4K! (n=228)	0	5	21	73	0	0
Együtt (n=956)	5	7	13	75	0	1

25s says they are ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ satisfied with democracy; compared with 83 per cent for over 25s. The general dissatisfaction with democracy is also apparent among supporters of Beppe Grillo and the German Pirate party, for whom only 4 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively, are satisfied with democracy in their country. This also supports the research of Mary Kaldor on subterranean politics, which has found that dissatisfaction with democracy is one of the core driving forces behind the growth in these movements.⁷⁸

Trust in institutions

Trust in other people, as well as political and social institutions, is generally considered to be an important indicator of social capital in democratic societies. The Hungarian general public tends to be relatively trusting. Over half of Hungarian trust the police, army, European Union, the justice system, and churches: 31 per cent also trust the government.

Among respondents, there are several marked differences when compared with national averages. Both the police and

army are significantly less trusted, as is the justice system, which only 35 per cent of respondents tend to trust. Perhaps the biggest difference is the level of trust in government. Only 5 per cent of respondents tend to trust the government (compared with 31 per cent of Hungarians overall) and 78 per cent tend not to trust it.

Of particular note are the variances in the level of trust in different ways of accessing information. Only 7 per cent tend to trust the television and 19 per cent tend to trust the press; significantly less than the national average of 52 per cent and 39 per cent respectively. This can be explained by many supporters' view that the media is controlled by the government. However, 80 per cent of respondents say they trust the internet: the highest score of any institution. This strongly suggests that respondents are seeking out alternative sources of information to what they regard as 'official' sources. These results mirror those found among supporter of Beppe Grillo, of whom 76 per cent trusted the internet, while only 11 per cent trusted the press.

Unlike supporters of right-wing populist parties surveyed as part of this series, respondents show high levels of trust in large international political institutions (table 20). For example, 72 per cent tend to trust the European Union and 68 per cent tend to trust the United Nations. Similarly, there are high levels of trust in NGOs, with 65 per cent of respondents tending to trust them.

We also asked respondents about the trust levels they have in other people (table 21). Trust in other people is generally considered to be an important indicator of social capital in democratic societies. Interestingly, the scores suggest that, on the whole, respondents are more likely to trust other people than the national average – 41 per cent say that most people can be trusted, compared with 17 per cent of Hungarian overall.

Overall, these results show significant variance from the national average: supporters of these movements are far more likely to be willing to trust other people. This also sharply contrasts with Jobbik supporters, who answered broadly similarly to the Hungarian average. When broken down by group, there are some notable variations in the data. While the

Table 20 **The extent to which respondents trust institutions (n=varied)⁷⁹**

	Tend to trust (%)	Hungary		Tend not to trust (%)	I do not know (%)	I do not wish to answer (%)
Police (n=3437)	29	60	63	37	7	1
Army (n=3437)	41	57	42	28	14	2
European Union (n=3437)	72	47	20	46	6	1
Justice or the legal system (n=3437)	35	53	55	43	7	1
Churches (n=3437)	19	51	72	37	7	2
Trade unions (n=3437)	25	31	59	54	13	1
Government (n=3437)	5	31	78	65	5	1
Local government (n=3437)	18	-	75	-	5	1
Political parties (n=3396)	9	20	84	77	4	2
Big companies (n=3396)	29	-	52	-	15	2
The internet (n=3437)	80	41	16	32	5	1
TV (n=3396)	7	52	87	45	5	2
The radio (n=3437)	13	47	77	47	7	2
National parliament (n=3437)	6	29	82	68	4	1
SMEs (n=3354)	47	-	36	-	15	2
The UN (n=3396)	68	51	20	37	15	2
The press (n=3437)	19	39	72	52	7	2
NGOs (n=3437)	65	-	25	-	8	1

Table 21 **Whether respondents think most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people⁸⁰ (n=3620); national statistics in brackets**

	(%)
You can't be too careful	48 (79)
Most people can be trusted	41 (21)
I don't know	6 (0)
I do not wish to answer	1 (N/A)

average level of trust is 36 per cent, members of Milla and Hallgatói Hálózat are the most likely to trust other people, with 45 per cent and 40 per cent feeling that most people can be trusted respectively. Conversely, Együtt and Szolidaritás appear the least trusting, with 47 per cent and 48 per cent of members respectively stating that you can't be too careful with most people, against an average of 42 per cent.

3 Methodology

About the survey

The methodology employed in the collection and analysis of our data is set out in detail in *The New Face of Digital Populism*.⁸¹ This section offers only a condensed discussion, focusing mainly on issues specific to this particular research project.

Participant recruitment

As in *The New Face of Digital Populism* we decided to use Facebook principally because the site is a popular mode of communication for supporters of new opposition movements in Hungary. We targeted survey adverts to people who were resident in Hungary and members of groups deemed related to eight of these groups. We targeted adverts directly at four of the groups using the Facebook advertising tool; for the other four groups we contacted the Facebook page administrators and asked them to host the advert on their page. The advertising tool adverts ran from 13 August to 1 October 2013.

Adverts appeared in Hungarian on the right-hand side of the Facebook pages of those targeted. They invited participants to complete a short survey; on clicking it they were redirected to a digital questionnaire hosted by the Survey Monkey website. This was entirely in Hungarian, and began with a short statement outlining the purpose of the research, providing a widget allowing users to signify their consent before starting the survey. If consent was given, users then proceeded through several pages of questions, concluding with a brief overview of the research project's aims and the contact details of the lead researcher. In total, 4,717 people responded to our survey. Following the removal of data that were either corrupt, intentionally misleading or incomplete, a final data set of 4,141

survey responses was produced. However, not every question has so many responses. The $n=$ value in each question shows how many have responded. The non-response varies for each question, which is to be borne in mind when interpreting the results.

Data analysis

Weights were employed to increase the external validity of our results. To do this, we gathered background information on the composition of the groups used to recruit participants using Facebook's advertising tool (which is freely available for any user to access), or requesting the relevant data from the page administrators of each of the Facebook groups targeted, and assigned each participant a score value on the basis of the prevalence of their demographic profile (in this instance, age and gender). Analysis then employed simple descriptive statistics, presenting the total occurrence for each response categories in the weighted data set.

Using coded datasets as a starting point, each individual survey response was tagged with a demographic code 'a-b' to identify age and gender, where $a = \{0,1,2\}$ – 0 = no answer, 1 = male, 2 = female – and $b = \{0,1,2,3,4,5,6\}$, where 0 = no answer, 1 = 16–24, 2 = 25–34, 3 = 35–44, 4 = 45–54, 5 = 55–64, 6 = 65+. For the purposes of this analysis, no distinction was made between leaving the question blank and choosing the 'I don't want to answer' option (this was done for certain questions after the main analysis). For each a-b code, a percentage distribution was calculated for that particular group of survey responses. Where gender or age information was unavailable, a percentage distribution based on only one category was used – e.g. for 0–2, the percentage distribution the percentage of responses from all people aged 25–34, regardless of gender.

Weightings were then calculated for each individual response. The calculation was the demographic distributions for each group divided by the demographic distribution for each individual set of survey results. Each individual response therefore had a weighting and a demographic tag. All subsequent

counts were based on these weightings, including any that do not distinguish between survey groups. Pivot tables were then created for each question and group of responses, with a structure of headings of 0,1,2,3 etc, depending on how many options there were for each question, and then a weighted count of how many people chose each option. These pivot tables formed the basis for all subsequent analyses.

Limitations

Although our use of weights allowed us to achieve some degree of population representativeness by correcting for systematic age or gender related bias, it is possible that other biases remain. Therefore care must be taken when interpreting our results, and it is with the following caveats that our findings are presented.

Care must be taken when considering the activities and views of the ‘offline’ groups. It cannot be assumed that those who are members of the online group do not differ from the offline group, so our findings cannot be claimed to offer insight into the views and activities of the broader offline movement. Likewise, our findings cannot be claimed to represent the ‘official’ views of the group or its leadership, and should not be represented in this way.

Furthermore, the use of social network surveys is subject to a well-known technical and methodological critique focusing on the nature of self-entry interest classification and the lack of content reliability on social networking sites. It cannot be claimed that our data illuminate the views or opinions of all Facebook users who support the groups in question. Rather, our results offer an insight only into the views of those *publicly declared* supporters who formed part of the membership of the Facebook groups identified above.

It is important to note that while many of the items in our questionnaire are drawn from the Eurobarometer survey, differences in data collection methodology prevent an unproblematic comparison of results. In particular, Eurobarometer’s use of face-to-face interviews leads, we believe, to significant differences in rates of missing data for questions

addressed to sensitive issues. In our sample, rates of non-response to questions on political protest were high, whereas Eurobarometer recorded significantly lower levels of participant non-response.

Notes

- 1 J Bartlett, J Birdwell and M Littler, *The New Face of Digital Populism*, London: Demos, 2011; J Bartlett et al, *New Political Actors in Europe: Beppe Grillo and the M5S*, London: Demos, 2013.
- 2 T Postmes and S Brunsting, 'Collective action in the age of the internet: mass communication and online mobilization', *Social Science Computer Review* 20, no 3, 2002, pp 290–301; M Castells, 'The mobile civil society: social movements, political power and communication networks', in M Castells et al, *Mobile Communication and Society*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2007.
- 3 G2, 'eCultures Europe', 2012, www.g2-eculture.com/ (accessed 6 Nov 2013).
- 4 AI Alberici and P Milesi, 'The influence of the internet on the psychosocial predictors of collective action', *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 23, issue 5, Sep/Oct 2013, pp 373–88.
- 5 Social media powers youth participation in politics', *Science Daily*, 26 Jun 2012, www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/06/120626121043.htm (accessed 6 Nov 2013).
- 6 S Laird, 'How social media is taking over the news industry', 18 Apr 2012, <http://mashable.com/2012/04/18/social-media-and-the-news/> (accessed 6 Nov 2013).
- 7 J Meek, 'YouTube and social movements: a phenomenological analysis of participation, events and cyberspace', *Antipode* 44, issue 4, Sep 2012, pp 1429–48.

- 8 Global Civil Society, 'Subterranean politics in Europe', 2013, www.gcsknowledgebase.org/europe/ (accessed 6 Nov 2013).
- 9 In some cases (e.g. Milla, Párbeszéd Magyarországért, Szolidaritás) when we could not target the supporters of such groups directly, we asked the editors of this page to post the survey on their Facebook page.
- 10 Bartlett et al, *The New Face of Digital Populism*.
- 11 Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2013, 3 Jul to Sep 2013.
- 12 We have targeted Gordon Bajnai's Facebook page because it was directly targetable with Facebook ads (unlike the Facebook page of E14-PM).
- 13 I van Biezen, P Mair and T Poguntke, 'Going, going... gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe', *European Journal of Political Research* 51, 2012, pp 24–56, www.astrid.eu/~il-siste/Studi-ric/Van-Biezen_Mair_Poguntke_Europ-Journ_Pol-Research_1_2012.pdf (accessed 6 Nov 2013).
- 14 European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 57*, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57_en.htm (accessed 6 Nov 2013); European Commission, *Eurobarometer 76*, Dec 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_first_en.pdf (accessed 6 Nov 2013).
- 15 In 2006, a secret speech was published in which the MSZP prime minister at the time, Ferenc Gyurcsány, admitted that continuous lying had been necessary by MSZP to secure re-election. In response, Hungary had its worst riots in decades.
- 16 In 1998 the radical right party MIÉP (with some members of the first governmental party MDF) could enter the parliament- but only for one term.

- 17 J Bartlett et al, *Populism in Europe: Hungary*, London: Demos, 2012.
- 18 Negyedik Köztársaság, 'A Pártalakítási Folyamat', nd, <http://negyedikkoztarsasag.hu/tortenet> (accessed 6 Nov 2013).
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- 26 Elutasították a Kétfarkú Kutya Párt bejegyzését', Origo, 17 Sep 2013, www.origo.hu/itthon/20130917-elutasitottak-a-ketfarku-kutya-part-bejegyzeset.html (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

- 27 Facebook, 'Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Part', 24 Oct 2013, <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Magyar-K%C3%A9tfark%C3%BA-Kutya-Part/14792493292?fref=ts> (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
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- 29 'A Milla továbblép', 26 Feb 2013, http://nemtetszikarendszer.blog.hu/2013/02/26/a_milla_tovabblep (accessed 7 Nov 2013); N Máté, 'Nem lesz szatellit a Millából', 26 Feb 2013, http://nol.hu/belfold/vezetot_es_iranyt_valt_a_milla (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
- 30 See www.minimumplusz.hu/ (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
- 31 Facebook, 'Egymillióan a magyar sajtószabadságéért', 24 Oct 2013, <https://www.facebook.com/sajtoszabadsagert?fref=ts> (accessed 7 Nov 2013); Facebook, 'One Million for the Freedom of Press in Hungary'.
- 32 Facebook, 'One Million for the Freedom of Press in Hungary'.
- 33 P András, 'A hét dönt?s', 9 Mar 2012, <http://alternativelnok.blog.hu/> (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
- 34 Facebook, 'Egymillióan a magyar sajtószabadságéért'.
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Across Europe, there has been rapid growth of left-wing, anti-capitalist social and political movements that criticise the establishment and use social media to organise and communicate their message. Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement, the Pirate Party in Germany and the Occupy movement are examples that have employed the medium to grow rapidly and create a significant political and social impact – yet often outside and invisible to mainstream politics.

Hungary has seen a proliferation of these 'subterranean' political movements before and after the 2010 parliamentary elections. They vary in size, ideology, form, structure and their relationship with party politics, and include a sarcastic joke party, student organisations, parliamentary political parties and a movement led by the former Prime Minister. All of these groups echo some distrust of established parties and party politics and claim to be committed to newer, participatory forms of decision making.

This report presents the results of a survey of over 4,000 Facebook fans of eight of these new opposition movements in Hungary. It includes data on who they are and what they think. It also compares these views with other similar parties in Western Europe, the Hungarian general public and supporters of Jobbik. This report is the eighth in a series of country specific briefings about the online support of populist parties across Europe.

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