‘Eurosceptic Internationale’ at the gates of Brussels? – The state and outlook of populist alliance-building across the EU and Hungary’s role in it

On the occasion of Political Capital’s (PC) latest research on the state and outlook of the populist radical right, we asked our guests how they see their cooperation efforts on the European stage ahead of the 2024 European Parliamentary elections.

Speakers:

• Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield, Member of the European Parliament, Greens/EFA
• Steven Forti, lecturer, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
• Zsuzsanna Végh, visiting fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States
• Karolina Zbytniewska, editor-in-chief, EURACTIV.pl

Moderator: Bulcsú Hunyadi, head of programmes, Political Capital

Main takeaways from the discussion on the topic: 

• Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield finds PM Giorgia Meloni a dangerous player in the EP because she plays the political game very well. She is giving off the impression that she is moderate while, in reality, she is trying to replace some of the core values of the EP. Within the EPP, there is more and more debate between the centrist liberal fraction and the more right-wing one. The Polish elections in October have fragilized PiS, so Fidesz has to cooperate with Fico to avoid complete marginalization, but they are not entirely aligned. Delbos-Corfield thinks that Ukraine will no longer be a dividing topic for the far-right. She also expressed that Fidesz’s national sovereignty consultation against Brussels is a bad look for Orban. Politicians like Meloni will not find this the best time to be near him before the European elections.
• Steven Forti highlighted Meloni’s importance in the next European Parliament elections because of the rising influence of Italy and her far-right government. Her goal is to collaborate with Manfred Weber, leader of the EPP group, thus influencing the new European Commission. He agrees that there is a widespread view that Meloni is moderate, but it is a false image that she had created. She is pragmatic and intelligent and understands that if she wants to stay in power in this challenging economic situation, she needs to be pro-NATO and maintain good relations with Brussels.
• Zsuzsanna Végh argued that Meloni’s strategy is to build cordial ties with EU institutions, while Orbán is confrontative towards Brussels, pursuing a Eurosceptic political campaign. However, these differences do not frighten Orbán, as he tries to build relations with ECR. For Orbán, belonging to a political group with an allied far-right government is attractive, and he knows Fidesz would have a better chance of influencing European politics in such a setup. Another reason for Orban to choose ECR is that a cordon sanitaire is still in place against ID, and working together with the German AfD in ID could further damage the crucial Hungarian-German relations. It remains a significant question how the dynamic between Fidesz and PiS evolves when the latter is in opposition. She also noted that the experience of Brexit pushed radical parties away from advocating for an exit from or the dissolution of the EU. Instead, these parties are increasingly united around the idea of a Europe of nation-states, reforming and weakening the EU from within.
• Karolina Zbytniewska said the main problem with uniting ECR with ID would be the leadership question, as no populist leader wants to give up their power. Another question is these parties’ stance on Russia. In Poland, there is a growing sentiment against supporting Ukraine. That is why PiS changed its pro-Ukraine narrative to a more pragmatic one just before the elections, arguing for a focus on national defense instead of support for Kyiv. Consequently, it is not that dangerous for PiS to work with Fidesz anymore, as they could find common ground on a critical view of Ukraine. Nevertheless,  Fidesz’s pro-Russian politics could remain an obstacle.

The research on which the discussion is based is available here. (soon)

The full conference can be watched here.

This summary was written by Dániel Szántó - intern of Political Capital