Disinformation blitz during the Hungarian EP election campaign

While deceptive narratives about local and national issues are widespread and continue to divide European societies, some disinformation content is prevalent across the 27 Member States. These European-level disinformation narratives are aimed at the armed conflicts, climate change, EU institutions, electoral processes, and migration. The pervasive nature of disinformation campaigns intended to undermine the electoral process and the democratic debate ahead of the 2024 European elections, as well as to shift the votes towards particular candidates, is a significant concern.

The European and municipal election campaigns in Hungary were notably saturated with disinformation aimed at national and European issues. As there is no legal limit on campaign spending for local and European elections, Fidesz, with the involvement of third parties, dominated the media, social media, and political advertising with hostile disinformation about political opponents and the war in Ukraine. By framing the election as a choice between "peace or war" or even "life or death," Fidesz created a highly polarized political environment and discourse. The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive picture of the most prominent disinformation narratives detected in the run-up to the double elections on 9 June 2024 in Hungary and to situate them in an international context.

Our main findings:

• False narratives and conspiracies about migration, the war in Ukraine, energy security, and the EU institutions plagued the European elections. Many of these disinformation narratives are far from new; they are re-framed around old prejudices and misconceptions to fit the current circumstances.
• Disinformation narratives targeting the EU with “warmongering” and domestic challengers for cooperating with them were particularly prevalent during the European election campaign in Hungary. The most prominent hostile narrative was the alleged danger of "pro-war" European politicians and their Hungarian counterparts wanting to pull Europe into World War III. Fidesz sought to discredit those European “left-wing” (including Ursula von der Leyen, Manfred Weber, Donald Tusk, and Emmanuel Macron) and Hungarian politicians who contradicted the government's “peace” narrative. This narrative gradually gained prominence during the course of the campaign and eventually overshadowed all other narratives.
• After the “clemency scandal” shook the Hungarian domestic political scene, a new challenger, Péter Magyar, stepped into the limelight and launched a new anti-regime movement while engaging in an anti-corruption discourse. Fidesz and its proxies promoted hostile narratives aimed at discrediting Magyar with varying intensity. These narratives portrayed Magyar as "power-hungry," "violent," "pro-war," "dollar leftist," and a "leftist messiah" serving the interests of George Soros.
• The government's perspective was prominently featured in state media and traditional pro-government media outlets, which presented current events and individuals from the government's perspective. The pro-government camp spent a significantly higher amount on political advertising than all opposition parties combined. The level of spending on social media was notably high, even by European standards.
• Once again, the pervasive dissemination of voters with false and misleading information among voters constituted a significant challenge in the European election campaigns. Notwithstanding the number of commitments by Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) to combat disinformation in line with the EU's Digital Services Act and Code of Practice on Disinformation, Fidesz was able to disseminate pro-government, anti-EU, and pro-Kremlin narratives through sponsored campaigns with practically no constraints. The government amplified its campaign messages to an extent where that eclipsed all other voices.
• The flood of the Kremlin-inspired, Euroskeptic “pro-peace narratives” is anything but an isolated case. The two recently established radical right European groups, Patriots for Europe and Sovereign Nations of Europe, are expected to be the superspreaders of some of the aforementioned disinformation narratives during the forthcoming European parliamentary term. These groups – especially Patriots for Europe. The third largest group in the European Union – may contribute to the mainstreaming of pro-Kremlin narratives within the broader European discourse.