Growing influence of Russia and China in the new European Parliament?
This is a summary of the findings of a five-year research project on the foreign policy-related votes of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the Parliament's 9th term (2019-2024) and the first plenary session of the 10th term (2024-2029). This is a continuation of three studies we have published in recent years. Our aim was to assess the parties' attitudes towards authoritarian powers such as Russia and China that are trying to exert influence within the European Union. Therefore, we analyzed the votes of MEPs on 73 resolutions that were critical of Russia or China. Based on the votes in the 9th EP and the first vote on Ukraine in the 10th EP, we can project how these parties and their political groups will behave toward Russia and China in the remainder of the 10th EP.
This is a summary of the full study to be released soon.
The summary is also available as a pdf here:
Key Points
The mainstream political groups, such as the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the Renew Europe and the Greens have a comfortable majority in the 10th European Parliament (EP), representing 63% of its members. These groups are and will continue to be strongly critical of China and Russia.
Although radical and fringe parties have strengthened, they are still in the minority and divided. The three radical and far-right groups, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the Patriots for Europe (PfE) and the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), together make up "only" 25% of the 10th EP. Nevertheless, this is a significant increase from about 17% in the 9th legislature. The far-left The Left has also increased its share from 5% to 6%.
The soft Euroskeptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group is and will likely remain the most critical of Russia and China among the radical and far-right and far-left political groups in the European Parliament. As a result, the group can reinforce its strategy of moving to the center-right and aligning itself with the European mainstream.
The Patriots for Europe (PfE) group is dominantly pro-Russian, but still divided over Russia and even more so over China. It remains to be seen whether member parties with critical attitudes toward Beijing and Moscow, including smaller parties, newcomers, such as the Czech ANO, and more significant members of the former Identity and Democracy (ID) group, such as Italy’s Lega, will converge with the pro-Russian stance of the group’s major parties and move toward a more unified pro-authoritarian stance.
The extreme right Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group is the most supportive of Russia and China. The group is likely to be even friendlier to authoritarians than the ID group used to be.
The radical Left group continues to support China and is likely to continue to do so. However, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it has become more critical of the Kremlin, albeit with considerable divisions within its ranks. It remains to be seen whether this shift toward a more Kremlin-critical stance will continue.
The ideologically diverse group of independent MEPs (NI), who do not belong to any of the recognized political groups, tends to be more critical of Russia and China than the far-right and far-left groups but considerably more supportive than the ECR and the mainstream groups.
Authoritarian influence in the 9th European Parliament (2019-2024)
Political Capital’s previous, preliminary study, based on the votes of MEPs between 2019 and 2023 and published in May 2024, found that the mainstream political groups, such as the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the liberal Renew Europe and the Greens/EFA were highly critical of both China and Russia. However, fringe groups at both ends of the spectrum, such as the far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) and the far-left The Left, were supportive, lagging well behind the mainstream groups, with the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) in between. However, there was even also a small difference between the two fringe groups. While the ID was significantly more supportive of Russia and more critical of China, the Left, conversely, was more critical of Russia, and more supportive of China. The independent MEPs (NI), who do not belong to any of the recognized political groups and typically represent extremist and radical parties, were more critical of Russia and China than the ID and the Left, but considerably more supportive than the ECR and the EU mainstream.
Figure 1. Kremlin-Critical (KCI) and China-Critical (CCI) Index scores of the political groups in the 9th tern of the European Parliament (2019-2024). The scores are on a scale of 0% - 100%, with a higher score representing a more critical stance toward Russia/China based on the proportion of votes within the group.
Figure 2. Political groups of the 9th European Parliament (2019-2024). Source: European Parliament.
A reshuffled far right and far left in the 10th European Parliament
In the 2024 European elections, both the far right and the far left have made significant gains. These non-mainstream forces represent 32% of the mandates in the 10th EP, a significant rise from 22% in the previous term. The radical ECR increased its parliamentary group by 9 MEPs to 78. The far right is represented in at least two political groups in the 10th Parliament: the newly formed Patriots for Europe (PfE), which is largely a rebranded successor to the ID group , and the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), which includes the most extreme right parties. These two groups have a total of 109 MEPs, with the Patriots being the third largest group, representing a significant increase from the 49 members of the single far-right ID group in the previous parliament. The far-left The Left has also increased its mandates, from 37 in the previous legislature to 46 in the 10th EP.
In addition, some far-right and far-left parties, such as the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a new left-wing nationalist party from Germany that has been highly critical of Western support for Ukraine, have remained independent without group affiliation due to their radical or hybrid character. In addition, parties with authoritarian tendencies and pro-Kremlin narratives can be found sporadically even in mainstream political groups such as the EPP and the S&D.
Figure 3. Political groups of the 10th European Parliament (2024-2029). Source: European Parliament.
In the following sections, we present the attitudes of radical right, far-right and far-left parties towards Russia and China according to the political groups to which these parties belong in the 10th European Parliament.
Attitudes of radical right, far-right and far-left political groups towards Russia in the 10th European Parliament
Attitudes of the reshuffled groups based on the votes of their member parties in the 9th EP
Overall, the attitudes of the radical-right, far-right and far-left political groups towards the Kremlin vary considerably. Members of the ECR were the most critical of Russia, while members of the newly formed ESN were the most supportive of Russia, voting almost unanimously against Kremlin-critical resolutions throughout the 9th parliamentary term, even after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In contrast, members of the Patriots were divided on Russia-critical resolutions, consisting of parties with supportive, somewhat critical, and highly critical positions on Russia. Until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Left, akin to the ID group, held supportive and favorable views of the Kremlin. Since 2022, however, the group has more frequently supported Russia-critical resolutions, albeit with considerable differences among its members.
Figure 4. Kremlin-Critical Index (KCI) scores of the national parties of the ECR, PfE, ESN and The Left groups. The KCI score is on a scale of 0% - 100%, with a higher score representing a more critical stance towards Russia. The figure includes all national parties from the PfE and ESN groups that were also members of the 9th European Parliament, but only those parties from the ECR and The Left groups that had and have at least two MEPs in both the 9th and 10th European Parliaments.
European Conservatives and Reformists: Hawkish on Russia
The ECR group was the most critical of Russia among the radical and far-right and far-left groups. ECR’s two key members, Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia (FdI) and the Polish Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), supported almost all resolutions condemning the Kremlin. Although Sweden’s Sverigedemokraterna (SD) did not align with the group’s strong Putin-critical position, the party’s impact is constrained by its modest size.
Patriots for Europe: Divided over Russia
The Patriots are the most divided on Russia in the European Parliament, with three distinct patterns of behavior. While some parties, such as France’s Rassemblement National (RN), were supportive of Russia, others, such as Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB), were somewhat critical of it, while a few, such as Czechia’s ANO and Italy’s Lega, were highly critical. The Hungarian Fidesz seemed to intentionally miss votes to avoid having to condemn the Kremlin, which is known to be friendly to the Hungarian government.
Europe of Sovereign Nations: Friends of Russia
The ESN group is the most supportive of Russia. The group is comprised of the most extreme right parties, gathered around the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).
The Left: Growing criticism towards the Kremlin
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Left group has become more critical of the Kremlin than before. While the group rarely supported resolutions critical of Russia at the beginning of the 9th parliamentary term, its member parties, including the La France Insoumise (FI), have increasingly supported resolutions condemning Russia to varying degrees since 2022.
The first test of attitudes towards Russia in the 10th EP: plenary vote on Ukraine in July 2024
The new political groups in the European Parliament have already been put to the test in terms of their stance on Russia. During the first plenary session, the MEPs adopted a resolution reiterating the need for continued EU support for Ukraine.
Figure 5. Distribution of votes by political groups. Final vote on the EP’s resolution on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine.
The ECR group maintained its highly critical stance on Russia and remained the most Russia-critical of the radical, far-right and far-left groups. In fact, it was almost on par with the mainstream groups, except for the higher share of votes against. The majority of its member parties supported the resolution, with the notable exception of Romania’s far-right newcomer, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR).
Members of the Patriots became more supportive of Russia. While the two largest parties, RN and Fidesz, unsurprisingly preserved their positions and voted against the resolution, other parties changed their stance compared to the 9th parliamentary term. The third-largest party, Lega, and the fourth-largest, ANO, which had previously shared an anti-Russian stance, now voted against the resolution or abstained. Spain’s VOX, which had previously been somewhat critical of the Kremlin, and the Netherlands’ newcomer, Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), both tied with ANO, did not participate in the vote or abstained.
The ESN group maintained its pro-Russian stance, with its members voting almost unanimously against the resolution.
The Left group remained divided over Russia. Although the most influential FI supported the resolution, smaller parties did not necessarily follow suit. Italy’s Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), a newcomer and one of the largest members of the group, surprisingly voted against the resolution, although its MEPs had consistently supported Russia-critical resolutions in the previous legislature, when they were independent.
Conclusions: What to expect from the 10th EP on Russia?
- Although non-mainstream groups have increased their share and become more visible, the European mainstream has a comfortable majority to shape the EP’s foreign policy resolutions.
- The ECR is likely to remain strongly critical of the Kremlin in the 10th European Parliament, cementing its strategy of moving to the center-right and aligning with the European mainstream.
- The Patriots’ stance on Russia may depend on the ability of the major parties to exert influence over smaller parties, newcomers, and those members that used to be more critical of Russia, encouraging them to align with pro-Russian views. The lesson of the first vote is that some of the Patriots’ parties that had been critical of the Kremlin changed their stance to varying degrees, including adopting a supportive position, choosing to abstain, or not participating. It remains to be seen whether this signals a trend of previously Kremlin-critical parties moving toward and adopting the overall pro-Kremlin position of the group.
- The Europe of Sovereign Nations will be even friendlier to Russia than the disbanded ID group in the 10th
- The Left, which has become increasingly critical of Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, albeit with considerable divisions among its members, is likely to remain divided and may continue to shift toward a more critical stance. It remains to be seen what position the M5S will take in the long run and how its “political convergence” will affect the group’s stance, whether FI’s increasingly Kremlin-critical stance will prevail, and how this will affect the group’s smaller parties.
- Mainstream groups, such as the EPP, S&D, Renew Europe and the Greens, will continue to be in majority and strongly critical of Russia.
Attitudes of radical right, far-right and far-left political groups towards China in the 10th European Parliament
Attitudes of the reshuffled groups based on the votes of their member parties in the 9th EP
Overall, the radical-right, the far-right, and the far-left political groups have diverging attitudes toward China. While the members of the ECR were the most critical of China, the members of the ESN were the most supportive. Conversely, the members of the Left and the Patriots were divided on the China-critical resolutions. The Patriots include parties with supportive, somewhat critical, and highly critical attitudes toward China, while the Left includes parties with somewhat critical and supportive attitudes toward China.
Figure 6. China-Critical Index (CCI) scores of the national parties of ECR, PfE, ESN, and The Left groups. The CCI score is on a scale of 0% - 100%, with a higher score representing a more critical stance towards China. Based on the final votes cast on 27 resolutions critical of China. The figure includes all national parties from the PfE and ESN groups that were also members of the 9th European Parliament, but only those parties from the ECR and The Left groups that had and have at least two MEPs in both the 9th and 10th European Parliaments.
European Conservatives and Reformists: Vigilant on China
The ECR group was the most critical of China among the radical and far-right and far-left groups. While the largest and most influential parties in the ECR, such as Meloni's FdI and Kaczynski's PiS, consistently supported China-critical resolutions, Sweden’s SD once again lagged behind. If the political mainstream continues to push to de-risk from China, the ECR will likely follow suit.
Patriots for Europe: Even more divided over China than Russia
The attitudes of the members of the Patriots toward China varied more than toward Russia. While the majority of the group’s members were supportive of Beijing, Spain’s VOX was more critical, and ANO and Lega were vocal in their criticism. However, the pro-China parties differed greatly in the extent of their leniency. While Fidesz and VB occasionally endorsed China-critical resolutions, the leading RN and Austria's Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) rarely did so. The RN is by far the most supportive of Beijing in the group. It is possible that the group will not be able to establish a unified political stance on China.
Europe of Sovereign Nations: China’s best friends
The Europe of Sovereign Nations group is the least critical of Beijing. Its members have consistently voted against Beijing-critical resolutions throughout the 9th parliamentary term. The group will be the most pro-China group in the European Parliament.
The Left: China finds friends in the far left
The Left group was more supportive of China than of Russia. While a few parties, such as M5S and Finland’s Vasemmistoliitto (V), expressed some degree of criticism of China, the majority of parties, including France’s FI and Greece’s Syriza, advocated a pro-China stance. In the absence of a major political catalyst, such as China’s invasion of Taiwan, the Left will likely continue to support China.
Methodology
We analyzed the results of 73 EP votes cast by the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) between 2019 and 2024 that are either critical of Russia, China, or both. We classified 61 of the 73 resolutions as Kremlin-critical, 27 as China-critical and 15 as critical of both Russia and China. First, we determined the national parties' positions on each resolution based on the votes of individual MEPs. Then, based on these positions, we calculated a Kreml-Critical Index (KCI) and a China-Critical Index (CCI). Both indices have a value on a scale of 0-100, with a higher number representing a more critical voting pattern toward the Kremlin and China. The research included all national parties from the PfE and ESN groups that were also members of the 9th European Parliament, but only those parties from the ECR and The Left groups that had and have at least two MEPs in both the 9th and 10th European Parliaments.
List of parties mentioned in this summary report
