Achievements overshadowed by diplomatic tensions – Hungarian EU Presidency Watch

2025-01-14

A review of the period between 9 – 31 December

(Our previous reports on the Hungarian EU Presidency are available here.)

Key findings

  • The Hungarian presidency has undoubtedly achieved several of its policy objectives, notably the adoption of the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen area and the advancement of the Western Balkans countries’ accession process to the EU. On the other hand, as the Hungarian government has also used the symbolic power of the presidency to provoke the European mainstream, the government's ability to assert its interests proved to be severely limited.
  • Hungary failed to leverage its EU presidency to advocate for its interests regarding the frozen EU funds. The government has not even attempted to fully implement the super-milestones of the rule of law conditionality, so that part of the cohesion funds and the entire recovery fund remain frozen. Moreover, EUR 1.04 billion of the MFF funds have been lost for good.
  • Although Viktor Orbán repeatedly claimed to have called for a Christmas ceasefire in Ukraine, the goal was unrealistic. In the end, he had to acknowledge that peace negotiations were "the job of the big boys."
  • While Hungary quietly supported the 15th sanctions package against Russia adopted by the Council in mid-December, it did so with conditions. The government insisted on removing several individuals and entities from the list of those subject to asset freezes and travel bans.
  • The EU summit in December was a one-day event, with no major discussions and no major decisions expected or taken. The wording of the summit's conclusions had been agreed by ambassadors days earlier, and the text remained unchanged.
  • The Hungarian government considers the Schengen expansion its own achievement, and indeed it deserves credit for it. However, the key to the solution lay in the hands of the Austrian government.
  • Regarding the integration of the Western Balkans, the third Accession Conference with Albania in December (the second under the Hungarian presidency) resulted in the opening of two negotiating chapters in the external relations cluster. For Montenegro, three chapters were provisionally closed.
  • During the last month of the presidency, the government ran ads on the Facebook page of EU Affairs Minister János Bóka for a total of EUR 1,350. The minister’s page ran a total of EUR 4,200 worth of ads during the six months of the presidency, about a third of them in the last month. Apart from these ads, there were no political advertising campaigns by government actors on Meta or Google related to the presidency.

Contents

  • 1. The political dimensions: No EU funds and ceasefire, but diplomatic tensions ahead of presidency handover
    • 1.1 No EU funds unfrozen
    • 1.2 No Christmas ceasefire achieved in Ukraine
    • 1.3 Hungarian vetoes serving Russian interests
    • 1.4 Hungarian - Polish (no longer) two good friends
  • 2. The policy dimensions: Romania and Bulgaria join Schengen, Albania and Montenegro edge closer to EU membership
    • 2.1 The December EU summit in Brussels was less engaging than the EPC in Budapest
    • 2.2 Romania and Bulgaria: Welcome to Schengen
    • 2.3 Albania and Montenegro: a few steps closer to the EU
    • 2.4 Agriculture and Fisheries Council approves vision for Common Agricultural Policy after 2027
  • 3. Paid political advertising on the presidency and other EU issues on Meta and Google (9 – 31 December)

1. The political dimensions: No EU funds and ceasefire, but diplomatic tensions ahead of presidency handover

1.1 No EU funds unfrozen

  • Hungary has attempted to address concerns about transparency in the operation of public interest trusts. This should have led to universities that had changed their operating model being able to receive EU funding again for the Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe programmes. However, the legislative amendments adopted by the Hungarian Parliament proved to be insufficient. The European Commission's assessment identified 12 shortcomings, and no proposal has been made to the European Council to change the restrictive decision taken two years ago. The government may come up with new legislation to remedy the situation at any time.
  • In contrast, Hungary has not even attempted to fully implement the super-milestones of the rule of law conditionality. As a result, part of the cohesion funds and the entire recovery fund remain frozen.
  • At the same time, EUR 1.04 billion of frozen Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) funds have been lost for good, as they were allocated for 2022 and will no longer be available.

1.2 No Christmas ceasefire achieved in Ukraine

  • After talks with Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in December, Viktor Orbán repeatedly claimed that he had urged a Christmas ceasefire and a prisoner exchange. However, at the closing press conference of the Brussels EU summit on 19 December, he unexpectedly admitted that he had only framed these issues as goals, stating that peace negotiations were "the job of the big boys."
  • Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who attended the summit as a guest, dismissed Orbán's Christmas ceasefire proposal: "Such proposals cannot be taken seriously; they are nothing more than political PR."
  • In reality, Kyiv endured heavy bombing over Christmas instead of a ceasefire. A prisoner exchange did take place, but it was facilitated by Saudi mediation.

1.3 Hungarian vetoes serving Russian interests

  • At the December meeting of foreign ministers, the Hungarian government once again resorted to its simplest lobbying tool: the veto. While it supported the 15th sanctions package against Russia, its approval came with conditions. The government insisted that several individuals and entities be removed from the list of those subject to asset freezes and travel bans, including Patriarch Kirill, Russia's ambassador to the UN, the Russian Olympic Committee, and two football teams.
  • Additionally, the Hungarian government vetoed the release of EUR 6.5 billion from the European Peace Facility and opposed the relocation of a coordination unit and advisers to Kyiv as part of the EU's training mission. It also blocked the inclusion of Georgian police chiefs on the sanctions list, despite their involvement in violent actions by the armed forces against protesters. (On 10 December, Hungary also hosted Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili in Budapest.)

1.4 Hungarian - Polish (no longer) two good friends

  • It is almost symbolic that the handover of the presidency to the Polish government coincided with a very serious political conflict. Hungary granted political refugee status to former Polish Deputy Justice Minister Marcin Romanowski, who is under criminal investigation in Poland and has an arrest warrant out for him. According to Hungarian Minister Gergely Gulyás, an impartial hearing of Romanowski’s case, free from political interference, is not guaranteed beyond reasonable doubt in Poland.
  • In a statement, the Polish Foreign Ministry sharply criticized the Orbán government's decision, saying that Romanowski is subject to a European arrest warrant. According to the Polish ministry, the measure is "a hostile step towards the Republic of Poland and runs counter to the fundamental principles of cooperation between EU member states". The statement further stresses that the move is contrary to the principle of loyal cooperation.
  • When Polish journalists confronted Orbán at the summit, the Hungarian PM deflected responsibility. He said it was an ongoing procedure, to which he was not a party. He added that "relations between Poland and Hungary are not good. Especially because two days ago the Polish justice minister brutally attacked the Hungarian government in Politico". In the interview, Adam Bodnar told the EU journal that "the example of Poland shows that if there is no change of leadership, it can be extremely difficult to reverse the course of the rule of law and regain democratic values".
  • The priorities of the Polish presidency, which began on 1 January 2025, could not be more different from those of the outgoing Hungarian presidency. Nearly all of Warsaw’s goals are aimed at curbing Russian influence, whether by developing the EU's defense capabilities, fighting disinformation, or reducing energy dependence. According to Agnieszka Bartol, head of the Permanent Representation to the EU, “During our presidency, we will be strong defenders of the rule of law.” Warsaw intends to shape the debate on the rule of law over the next six months by drawing specifically on its own experience and know-how, including by emphasizing the role of civil society organizations and the media in maintaining the rule of law.

 

2. The policy dimensions: Romania and Bulgaria join Schengen, Albania and Montenegro edge closer to EU membership

2.1 The December EU summit in Brussels was less engaging than the EPC in Budapest

The EU summit in December was a one-day event, with no major discussions and no major decisions expected or taken. The wording of the summit's conclusions had been agreed by ambassadors days earlier, and the text remained unchanged.

  • Ukraine: The leaders reiterated their support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the UN Charter and in line with Ukraine’s peace formula. They also emphasized that no initiative on Ukraine can be taken without Ukraine. EU leaders reviewed progress on military support to Ukraine, and called for faster and more effective delivery of air defense systems, ammunition and missiles, as well as training and equipment for Ukrainian brigades.
    • Antecedents: On 16 December, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted the 15th package of individual and economic restrictive measures in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine. This round targets the shadow fleet and North Korean officials and, for the first time, also Chinese companies that manufacture drones for Moscow.
  • Strategic debate: EU leaders held a strategic debate on the EU’s global engagement and priorities in the current geopolitical context, without taking any decisions.
  • Migration: EU leaders took stock of progress in implementing past conclusions on migration, including ongoing work on the external dimension: implementing adopted EU legislation and applying existing laws; preventing and combating irregular migration; urgent efforts to facilitate, increase and accelerate returns; safe countries of origin; the fight against instrumentalization, human trafficking and smuggling; safe and legal pathways in line with national competences.
    • Antecedents: On 12 December, the Justice and Home Affairs Council reached a general approach on a proposed directive which lays down minimum rules to prevent the smuggling of migrants. The law would replace the current EU legal framework, which dates back to 2002. The proposal aims to bring member states’ criminal laws closer together on issues such as the definition and sanctioning of migrant smuggling.
  • Syria: With the fall of the criminal Assad regime, EU leaders highlighted the historic opportunity to reunite and rebuild Syria. They stressed the importance of an inclusive, Syrian-led political process and underscored the need to uphold human rights, including women’s rights, non-sectarian governance and the protection of religious and ethnic minorities.

All Summit outcomes are available here.

2.2 Romania and Bulgaria: Welcome to Schengen

  • The Justice and Home Affairs Council has adopted a decision to lift controls on persons at internal land borders with and between Bulgaria and Romania as of 1 January 2025. Since their accession to the EU, Bulgaria and Romania have applied parts of the Schengen legal framework (the Schengen acquis), including those related to external border controls, police cooperation and the use of the Schengen Information System.
  • The Hungarian government considers the Schengen enlargement its own achievement, and indeed it deserves credit for it. However, the key to the solution lay in the hands of the Austrian government. Changes in Austrian domestic politics allowed it to lift its previous veto, a development that had been anticipated for months, even before the Hungarian presidency began. Nevertheless, Hungary deftly seized the opportunity, announcing the decision after a ministerial-level consultation between Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, and Hungary, which was later formalized by the interior ministers.

2.3 Albania and Montenegro: a few steps closer to the EU

  • The last days of the presidency saw several important events in the enlargement process of the Western Balkan countries. The EU member states held intergovernmental conferences with Albania and Montenegro, and the main elements of the process were summarized at an EU-Western Balkans summit on 18 December.
  • In the case of Albania, the third Accession Conference (the second under the Hungarian Presidency) took place on 17 December, where two negotiating chapters of the external relations cluster were opened. For Montenegro, three negotiating chapters were provisionally closed: 1, Intellectual property law, 2, Information society and media, 3, Enterprise and industrial policy.
  • The EU-Western Balkans summit focused on enhancing integration through the previously announced growth plan, deepening political cooperation in a number of areas, including foreign and security policy, building economic foundations for the future and mitigating the effects of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as well as cooperation in managing migration and fighting corruption and organized crime.

2.4 Agriculture and Fisheries Council approves vision for Common Agricultural Policy after 2027

  • As a non-discussion item, the Agriculture and Fisheries Council unanimously adopted a set of conclusions on a farmer-focused post-2027 common agricultural policy (CAP), towards a competitive, crisis-proof, sustainable, farmer-friendly and knowledge-based future EU agriculture. In this context, the Council provided political guidance for the new Commission to take into account when preparing the Vision for Agriculture and Food in the first 100 days of its mandate, as well as the legislative proposals for the post-2027 CAP.

3. Paid political advertising on the presidency and other EU issues on Meta and Google (9 – 31 December)

  • During the last month of the presidency, the government ran ads on the Facebook page of EU Affairs Minister János Bóka for a total of EUR 1,350. One of the three ads was about the end of the presidency. Bóka's page ran a total of EUR 4,200 worth of ads during the six months of the presidency, about a third of them in the last month. Apart from these ads, there were no political advertising campaigns by government actors on Meta or Google related to the presidency.
  • Some pro-government politicians promoted events of the Hungarian presidency through paid political advertisements featuring the #HU24EU logo. However, the total amount spent was minimal.
  • Meanwhile, the Hungarian government’s official Facebook page spend EUR 23,700 on ads promoting the Digital Citizenship Programme and the New Economic Action Plan during the reporting period. This shows that promoting the presidency through political advertising was not a priority for the government.

Social media plays a very important role in government communication, and the bigger picture helps to understand all the above data. During the election campaign (between 1 January and 15 June 2024), the pro-Fidesz camp spent EUR 5.4 million on advertising on Meta and Google (while all 15 opposition parties and their associated media spent a quarter of this amount).

 

Our previous reports on the Hungarian EU presidency can be found here:

  • The final act: new peace offensive, budget passed, Schengen to be extended (25 November – 8 December)
  • Proceedings against Hungary continue as Schengen deal nears for Bulgaria and Romania (11 – 24 November)
  • A Volatile Unity: Hungary’s Leadership Amid Geopolitical Shifts and EU Challenges (28 October – 10 November)
  • Gearing up for the big show amid a "peace mission" 2.0 and new levels of anti-EU rhetoric – Hungarian EU Presidency Watch (14 – 27 October)
  • In the shadow of the “Strasbourg Battle” – Hungarian EU Presidency Watch (30 September – 13 October)
  • Prioritizing politics over policy? – Hungarian EU Presidency Watch (July – September)
  • Trolling to weaken the EU while winking at Trump: the first week of Hungary's rotating EU presidency (July 2024)