Hungary's EU presidency in review: remembered more for its unorthodoxy than its policy achievements

(All of our previous reports on the Hungarian EU presidency are available here.)

Key findings

Hungary’s EU presidency was characterized by a combination of “honest broker” and “trolling” tactics. Instead of a bureaucratic approach, Hungary deliberately opted for a political presidency to support Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s longstanding goal of challenging and ultimately changing the EU’s traditional political establishment. Nevertheless, the Hungarian presidency achieved several of its policy goals and delivered important results, particularly on the expansion of the Schengen area, the accession process of the Western Balkans, and competitiveness. Yet, the Hungarian presidency is likely to be remembered more for its unorthodox goal of using the presidency to troll and thus weaken the EU than for its practical results.

• The Hungarian presidency was marked by unprecedentedly tense relations between the presiding country, other member states, and EU institutions. This was reflected in particular by earlier talks of stripping Hungary of the presidency, the partial boycott of informal Council meetings in Budapest by several member states and the Commission, the significant delay in presenting the presidency program to the European Parliament, and the pointed criticism of the Hungarian government by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during that session. Although relations somewhat improved by the end of the presidency, this shift was driven primarily by the pragmatic interests of all parties involved.
• On the political front, Orbán used the attention and symbolic power that comes with the presidency to provoke and challenge the European mainstream, to present himself as a successful, globally respected leader, to amplify his messages both domestically and internationally, especially regarding the EU and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and to make gestures to his international partners, especially Donald Trump.
• These actions were illustrated by Orbán's so-called "peace missions" at the beginning and end of the presidency, as well as his visit to Georgia immediately after its disputed elections. Although the government presented these diplomatic maneuvers, which were deliberately linked to Hungary’s role as Council president, as achievements, in reality they produced no tangible results, apart from weakening the EU’s unity.
• At the operational level, Hungary acted as an "honest broker" in dealing with open files. Of its seven priority issues (competitiveness, defense, enlargement, migration, cohesion policy, agricultural policy, demography), the Hungarian presidency achieved significant progress in three (competitiveness, enlargement, but only with a focus on the Western Balkans, and agricultural policy). Additionally, it managed to expand the Schengen Area. The topic of demography barely appeared.
• The main achievements included the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen area, reaching important milestones in the accession process of Albania, Montenegro and Serbia, adopting the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal, and approving a Council resolution on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the period after 2027. Although not Hungary’s priorities, the 15th sanctions package against Russia and the agreement on the G7 loan framework for Ukraine financed by frozen Russian assets were also important results of the period.
• The government failed to use the presidency credit to make progress on the issue of frozen EU funds. In fact, EUR 1.04 billion was lost forever.
• The succeeding Polish presidency stands in stark contrast to the Hungarian one. First, it is likely to mark a period of momentum as the newly formed EU institutions begin their substantive work. Second, under Donald Tusk, Poland is re-establishing itself in the EU mainstream and emerging as one of the EU's political drivers. Third, Poland will focus on making the EU more resilient to security threats posed by Russia.

The Hungarian presidency coincided with the six months following the 2024 European Parliament elections, which limited the presidency’s ability to advance the legislative process. The new European Parliament convened on 16 July, while the new European Commission finally took office on 1 December. During such "transitional" presidencies, trilateral legislative negotiations typically proceed at a slower pace.

Contents

• 1. The political dimension: A troll at the head of the table?
  • Unprecedentedly tense relations between the country holding the presidency and other member states and EU institutions
  • A deliberately political presidency to provoke the establishment and strengthen ideological allies
  • The so-called peace missions have not brought peace any closer
  • Hungary represented Russian interests concerning Georgia
  • No EU funds unfrozen
• 2. The policy dimension: Important results through honest brokerage, but comparatively few outcomes
  • Budapest Declaration on EU Competitiveness adopted
  • Advancing Western Balkans integration
  • Romania and Bulgaria's full accession to the Schengen area
  • The 15th sanctions package and the G7 loan framework passed
  • Other achievements and failures
• 3. Prospects of the succeeding Polish presidency: security in 7 dimensions, stopping all Russian energy imports, reloading the rule of law
• 4. Paid political advertising on the presidency and other EU issues on Meta and Google

1. The political dimension: A troll at the head of the table?

Unprecedentedly tense relations between the country holding the presidency and other member states and EU institutions

• The Hungarian government has become increasingly isolated in the EU in recent years, mainly due to the dismantling of the rule of law and systemic corruption in Hungary, its “stick-between-the spokes” approach to EU decision-making, and its general attitude of defending authoritarian powers against EU criticism and action, especially its pro-Kremlin stance.
• After autumn 2023, ideas were floated in EU public discourse on how to prevent the Orbán government from causing significant damage to the EU during the Hungarian presidency. Some suggested stripping Hungary of the presidency, while the European Parliament debated the issue several times, suggesting, among other things, that the Trio should take over at least some of the presidency’s responsibilities and that the Parliament should boycott the presidency or obstruct the legislative process.
• The tense relations did not ease during the presidency, as the government did not use this opportunity to improve its reputation, restore trust, and regain goodwill, but rather focused primarily on provocations and on weakening the EU’s external unity and reputation.
• After the July diplomatic tour (the so-called “peace mission”, see below for details), several member states, especially the Baltic and Nordic countries, and the European Commission announced a partial boycott of informal Council meetings (i.e. sending representatives at lower levels than ministers and commissioners, which was rather a symbolic move, as no decisions are usually taken at these meetings). In addition, the European Commission canceled the visit of the College of Commissioners to Budapest, which was unprecedented. Moreover, the presentation of the presidency program to the European Parliament was postponed until October and led to an unprecedented confrontation between PM Orbán and Commission President von der Leyen, who harshly criticized the Hungarian government on several issues.
• Although there was much speculation that some member states would boycott the Budapest meeting of the European Political Community (EPC), this ultimately did not happen, largely due to the fact that this forum provided the first opportunity for European leaders to meet and discuss the situation following Donald Trump’s election victory two days earlier. As host, Orbán made gestures of goodwill, emphasizing that Hungary’s disputes with the EU would be resolved in Brussels, but on this particular event he encouraged everyone to enjoy Hungarian hospitality. Thus, a temporary modus operandi based on current mutual interests was established.
• Von der Leyen took one more jab at Orbán at the presidency’s closing press conference, when she listed the 15th sanctions package and the loan to Ukraine financed by frozen Russian assets as the main achievements of the Hungarian presidency, although these were not at all a priority for the government, which only conditionally supported the first and abstained at the second.

A deliberately political presidency to provoke the establishment and strengthen ideological allies

• Instead of a bureaucratic approach, Hungary opted for a political presidency to support Orbán’s longstanding goal of challenging and ultimately changing the EU’s traditional political establishment. As he boldly stated, “The Hungarian presidency will be remembered for a long time.” However, it is likely to be remembered more for its unorthodox goal of using the presidency to troll and thus weaken the EU than for its policy achievements.
• Both the "Make Europe Great Again" (MEGA) slogan, an unmistakable reference and wink to Donald Trump, and the so-called "peace missions" made it clear that the Hungarian government intended to use the attention and symbolic power that comes with the presidency to troll and provoke the European mainstream, to punch above its weight, to amplify its messages internationally, to make gestures to its international ideological partners, and to present the PM to the Hungarian public in particular as a successful and globally respected leader and peacemaker.
• In addition to the fact that provocations and displays of force fit Orbán’s political style and serve his goals, the decision for a strongly political presidency may have been supported by the fact that the Hungarian presidency took place at a politically sensitive time, marked by a political shift following the European Parliament elections, the U.S. presidential election and Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine. In comparison, this period was expected to offer even fewer opportunities to shape policy than the usual presidencies, due to the EU's institutional transition and the strong proactivity of the previous Belgian presidency, which deliberately accelerated certain matters, such as the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine, to prevent the Hungarian presidency from putting them on hold.

The so-called peace missions have not brought peace any closer

• In the very first week of Hungary’s EU presidency, Orbán embarked on a diplomatic tour, visiting Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Donald Trump in succession. The tour sparked sharp reactions, particularly among allies in the EU. Many criticized Orbán for acting as though he were negotiating peace under the mandate of the EU presidency, something he was not authorized to do. While this was never explicitly claimed in official government communications, the presidency logo was used prominently, implying that Hungary had an EU mandate. Vladimir Putin even addressed Orbán as the rotating leader of the EU, a remark that the Hungarian PM did not correct.
• Overall, these diplomatic maneuvers yielded no tangible results. Hungarian government communications presented the meetings themselves as achievements, but there was no substantial progress to report.
• By December, a lot had changed. Donald Trump had by then been elected president, and the Hungarian side had engaged with him several times, clearly establishing a close relationship between their respective teams. While there was no meeting between Orbán and Putin in December, they spoke by phone, and Orbán met with Zelenskyy in Brussels. The December talks were also positioned as a peace mission, but this time they were much more modest in scope and presentation, avoiding any overt association with the EU presidency. As a result, criticism of the Hungarian government was much milder during this period.
• By December, the Hungarian PM’s ambitions had become significantly more restrained. Orbán repeatedly claimed that he had called for a Christmas ceasefire and a prisoner exchange in Ukraine. However, at the closing press conference of the Brussels European Council on 19 December, he unexpectedly admitted that he had only framed these issues as goals, stating that peace negotiations were "the job of the big boys." In reality, rather than a ceasefire, Kyiv suffered heavy bombing over Christmas (as had been the case following Orbán’s July tour). Although a prisoner exchange did take place, it was facilitated by Saudi mediation rather than any Hungarian initiative.

Hungary represented Russian interests concerning Georgia

• Georgia's EU integration process has stalled, which is particularly painful for the European Union. Following the adoption of a Russian-inspired "foreign agent law," EU leaders declared in June 2024 that these developments had effectively halted Georgia's accession process. At the time, Orbán spoke positively about Georgia’s chances for membership.
• However, during the October presidential elections, even before the final results were announced, Orbán was the first to congratulate the new pro-Russian president. Shortly afterwards, he visited Although the trip no longer included the ceremonial elements of the EU presidency, it still caused a diplomatic scandal as observers reported election fraud and EU member states refused to recognize the election results. Soon after, the Georgian government announced that it would suspend its EU integration efforts until 2028.
• Later, Hungary vetoed sanctions that would have blacklisted certain Georgian police officials, who were involved in violent crackdowns on post-presidential election protesters.

No EU funds unfrozen

• The government failed to use the leverage of the presidency to make progress on the issue of frozen EU funds. There was no breakthrough in the rule of law mechanism, resulting in an extension of the freeze of funds. Universities, which were placed under the control of public trust funds chaired by people close to the government, still do not receive EU funds for participation in the Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe programs. The failure related to the rule of law procedure has resulted in the loss of EUR 1.04 billion and poses a serious threat to access the EUR 9.5 billion recovery fund, which must be committed by the end of August 2026.
• Additionally, no progress was made in establishing EU-compliant asylum regulations. As a result, by the end of December, the fine based on the European Court of Justice ruling was close to EUR 400 million. This can be deducted from any Hungarian payment claims.

2. The policy dimension: Important results through honest brokerage, but comparatively few outcomes

During the Hungarian presidency, member states adopted 55 Council conclusions and reached a common position on 19 issues, compared to 60 under the preceding Belgian presidency and 44 under the Swedish presidency.

The Hungarian presidency managed to finalize 9 legislative acts during the trilogues (informal inter-institutional negotiations between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission) that began in late October. This number is relatively low, even considering the transitional nature of the presidency. According to parliamentary sources, Finland finalized 23 such acts in 2019, while Italy finalized 20 in 2014.

The Hungarian presidency organized over 1,200 working group meetings, 50 Coreper meetings, 30 formal and 13 informal Council meetings. Additionally, Budapest hosted the informal meeting of heads of state or government and the European Political Community (EPC) meeting.

Budapest Declaration on EU Competitiveness adopted

• Competitiveness was the flagship theme of the Hungarian presidency, and the topic through which the government sought to shape European public discourse. In the run-up to the six-month period, government statements consistently emphasized concerns about the EU’s competitiveness, high energy prices, lack of investments, and the competitive advantages of the U.S. and China. Against this backdrop, member states adopted the Budapest Declaration on EU Competitiveness, which the government later described as the starting point for transformative changes. The Declaration outlined 12 key tasks, some of which included specific deadlines for the European Commission to present legislative proposals.
• However, the presidency's narrative is nuanced by the fact that in several of these areas the EU already had concrete proposals or existing legislation. The basis for the competitiveness goals stemmed from work done a year earlier by two former Italian prime ministers, Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi, at the request of von der Leyen.
• Earlier, Orbán had said that "connectivity" should be a key element of the EU’s competitiveness, referring to unrestricted relations between the EU and China. However, this idea was left out of the declaration as member states take a much more cautious approach to China and other emerging economies.

Advancing Western Balkans integration

• The Hungarian presidency devoted significant energy to accelerating the integration of the Western Balkans. These efforts yielded partial successes, with the accession processes of three countries in the region reaching new milestones.
• In the case of Albania, the third Accession Conference (the second under the Hungarian presidency) took place on 17 December, where two negotiating chapters of the external relations cluster were opened. For Montenegro, three chapters were provisionally closed. Serbia was informed by the EU that it should develop its position in order to allow the opening of the competitiveness cluster. This was considered a particularly significant achievement, as prior to the Hungarian presidency, 14 countries had opposed advancing Serbia's process.
• As a result, all three countries now have target dates for concluding their accession negotiations. Montenegro aims to complete this phase by the end of 2026, Albania and Serbia by the end of 2027.
• However, no substantial progress was made in the cases of North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Moldova.

Romania and Bulgaria's full accession to the Schengen area

• One of the outstanding achievements of the presidency period was the full accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area as of 1 January 2025. The Hungarian government considers this a success of its own making, although the key to the solution lay in the hands of the Austrian government. The domestic political climate in Austria finally allowed it to lift its earlier veto, a development that had been expected for months before the Hungarian presidency began, and indeed came to pass.
• However, Hungary cleverly seized on the opportunity by announcing the decision after a ministerial-level meeting attended by Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, and Hungary. The announcement was later formalized by the interior ministers in December.
• The two countries had been members of Schengen for sea and air borders since 31 March 2024, but land border controls were still in place until the current decision.

The 15th sanctions package and the G7 loan framework passed

• Despite some concerns, two important Ukraine-related decisions were passed during the Hungarian EU presidency. One was the 15th sanctions package, which was agreed in the Council within ten days. Although the Hungarian government tried to avoid over-emphasizing the issue, von der Leyen specifically highlighted the adoption of the sanctions package as the greatest achievement of the Hungarian presidency. However, Hungary managed to remove several Russian politicians and public figures from the sanctions list, including – once again – Patriarch Kirill.
• The other issue was a EUR 35 billion loan financed by frozen Russian assets. Hungary and Malta were the two countries that abstained, but did not veto the decision.

Other achievements and failures

• A major achievement at the end of the presidency was the adoption of the Council resolution on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the period after 2027. This issue had been on the agenda of previous presidencies, but no consensus had been reached due to opposition from the Romanian government. In December, however, Bucharest finally agreed to the document, which was then adopted by the member states without debate.
• Contrary to the presidency’s plans, member states failed to reach a common position on several important matters, including the European Defense Industry Program (EDIP), the Combating Child Sexual Abuse in the Online Space (CSA) dossier, the European pharmaceutical dossier, and the patent package.

3. Prospects of the succeeding Polish presidency: security in 7 dimensions, stopping all Russian energy imports, reloading the rule of law

• The Hungarian presidency coincided with the final phase of the previous political and institutional cycle and the transition period, whereas the Polish presidency is set to mark a period of momentum as the newly formed EU institutions begin their substantive work.
• Even more striking is the different perception of the two countries and their leaders within the European Union. Hungary has found itself sidelined in many respects, seen by some as an obstacle to the normal functioning of the EU. Meanwhile, under Donald Tusk, Poland is re-establishing itself in the EU mainstream.
• Warsaw plans to dedicate its six-month presidency to a single overarching goal: security in the broadest sense, encompassing seven dimensions: (1) defense and security, (2) protection of people and borders, (3) resistance to foreign interference and disinformation, (4) ensuring security and freedom of business, (5) energy transition, (6) competitive and resilient agriculture, (7) health security. At least five, if not six, of these are directly related to Russia and its aggression against Ukraine. Enhancing defense capabilities, countering Russian hybrid attacks and disinformation within the EU, improving economic competitiveness, and reducing energy dependence are all directly or indirectly linked to the Kremlin's efforts to rebuild spheres of influence.
• The Polish presidency aims to introduce the 16th sanctions package against Russia in the first months of the year, likely before the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion.
• It also wants to lead initiatives aimed at stopping all Russian energy imports to the EU. The presidency has an ally in Dan Jørgensen, the new energy commissioner, who has promised a comprehensive plan by mid-March for the EU to completely phase out all Russian energy sources, including nuclear, by 2027. While this goal seems ambitious and challenging, it could be a significant test for Hungary, which has increased its dependence on Russian gas and oil since the start of the full-scale war.
• In addition, the Polish presidency intends to champion the rule of law. This pledge appears credible, as it aligns with the government’s own interests in preparing for a possible return to power of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) led by Jarosław Kaczyński, to power. Warsaw plans to leverage its own experience and expertise to shape the rule of law debate over the next six months, emphasizing the role of civil society and the media in upholding democratic principles.
• In addition to emphasizing the importance of the CAP and cohesion policy, migration may be an area of convergence between Budapest and Warsaw. Both countries voted against the asylum and migration pact. However, Poland's argument focused more on the pact's obsolescence, as it fails to address challenges such as the use of migrants as a weapon along the EU's borders with Russia and Belarus.

 

4. Paid political advertising on the presidency and other EU issues on Meta and Google

Domestically, the presidency did not appear to be a high priority for the government in terms of allocating significant funds for social media promotion. Advertising spending clearly indicates that the Hungarian government and the PM perceived the EU presidency primarily as a means to advance their own political goals.

• The official Facebook page of the Hungarian presidency had no ads at all, while the page of the Minister for European Affairs, János Bóka, had a total of 11 ads. Each of these was a short video about the presidency or related events. The government spent a total of EUR 4,200 on these ads.
• However, the ruling Fidesz party spent twenty times more on promoting the combative image of Orbán in connection with two events:
  • In the first month of the presidency, Fidesz spent EUR 26,150 to promote the so-called “peace mission” through 81 separate ads, promoting the stops and meetings of the tour. The ads, which covered the visits to Kyiv, Moscow and Beijing and were created between 3-8 July, all displayed the presidency's logo. However, the ads created on 12-13 July, which were related to the Trump meeting and the summary of the entire tour, did not display the presidency's logo.
  • On 9 October, Orbán presented the Hungarian presidency program to the European Parliament, followed by an intense debate. Fidesz immediately launched an intensive domestic political advertising campaign on social media. The PM's Facebook page featured a 20-episode video series on the "Strasbourg battle," as the ads called it. These videos contain only the PM’s responses to the debates, not the criticism he received. At the end of the short films, Orbán is presented as the winner of the debates, having won by KO. Fidesz spent EUR 58,300 on this campaign.

 

All our previous reports on the Hungarian EU presidency can be found here:

• Achievements overshadowed by diplomatic tensions (9 – 31 December)
• The final act: new peace offensive, budget passed, Schengen to be extended (25 November – 8 December)
• Proceedings against Hungary continue as Schengen deal nears for Bulgaria and Romania (11 – 24 November)
• A Volatile Unity: Hungary’s Leadership Amid Geopolitical Shifts and EU Challenges (28 October – 10 November)
• Gearing up for the big show amid a "peace mission" 2.0 and new levels of anti-EU rhetoric (14 – 27 October)
• In the shadow of the “Strasbourg Battle” (30 September – 13 October)
• Prioritizing politics over policy? (July – September)
• Trolling to weaken the EU while winking at Trump: the first week of Hungary's rotating EU presidency (July 2024)