Engaged but vulnerable: Young people's relationship with political (dis)information

Introduction

How interested are young people in politics? What sources do they use to inform themselves about public affairs? Do they recognize disinformation when they encounter it? How do they react to the content of questionable credibility? Our analysis aims to answer these questions.

We have collected and processed relevant public opinion research, both from Political Capital's own previous research and from publicly available national and international surveys.

The focus is on the 18-35 age group, referred to in this analysis as 'young people' and 'young adults'. According to the 2022 census data, this group represents 21% of Hungarian society.

Public opinion surveys targeting young people are not consistent in terms of the specific age group they examine. Some surveys focus on individuals aged 15-30, others on those aged 18-29, and some on people between 16 and 35. Where the raw data was available, we calculated the results for the 18-35 age group. Where this was not available, we used the published data.

See the section 'List of Public Opinion Surveys Used' for methodology and details.

This analysis is also available in Hungarian.

Executive summary

• Among the younger generation, who are generally less politically active than older age groups, interest in politics and public affairs has gradually increased in recent years. More and more young people are following news related to these issues and are spending more time staying informed than before. At the same time, political actors are increasingly recognizing the role of the younger generation in expanding and maintaining their electoral base. However, a downside to this positive trend is that young people are more exposed to politically motivated disinformation, including harmful information that is based on real facts but manipulated to create misleading narratives.
• The younger a person is, the more likely they are to get their information from social media channels. At the same time, these are precisely the platforms where disinformation and misleading content is most freely disseminated. Moreover, tech giants (such as Meta, YouTube or TikTok) are less and less committed to fighting disinformation.
• Uncertainty about facts and news sources is also high among young people, which can be described as the phenomenon of 'factual relativism'. This is not an isolated issue: political polarization, a propagandistic media environment and the information disruptions experienced during the pandemic and the war in Ukraine have all contributed to growing distrust among young people. More than two-thirds of 18-35 year olds are somewhat or strongly inclined to doubt the existence of objective reality and the clarity of facts. This suggests that resistance to disinformation is not only dependent on digital literacy but is also closely linked to trust: in whom and what we believe in terms of a shared interpretation of reality.
• The majority of young people are confident in their ability to recognize disinformation, and they widely perceive its presence in news consumption: more than three quarters of them say they regularly encounter misleading or false information. However, we cannot be sure how much of the content that respondents identify as disinformation is false, nor how much disinformation goes unnoticed. This raises the question of how well-founded young people's confidence really is.
• Although there is a strong need among young people to be able to check information of dubious credibility, many do not make the effort to use the tools available to them. Most simply move on when they suspect they are dealing with questionable content, without checking the information or discussing it with others. In the rapid pace of news consumption and the overwhelming flow of information, there is neither the time nor the motivation to explore further.
• While young people try to convince themselves that they are effectively defending themselves against disinformation, the 2023-2024 research does not support this claim. There is a high level of acceptance among young respondents of several statements that are part of disinformation narratives.

1. The evolution of political interest in Hungary

The low level of political interest among young Hungarian people has long been known. Our 2013 study "Active Youth or Apathetic Youth?" already concluded that the vast majority of young people are not particularly interested in politics. This picture has been further supported by Youth surveys conducted between 2000 and 2012, as well as by data from the European Social Survey (ESS) between 2002 and 2010. (See all mentioned sources under the section “List of public opinion surveys used”.)

According to later waves of the ESS, political interest reached its lowest point around 2021, as illustrated in the graph below. However, the most recent data from 2023 already show a noticeable increase, especially among young people. This suggests that the rise in civic interest began before the key political events of 2024, such as the clemency scandal and the emergence of new opposition figure, Péter Magyar.

While the political interest of young adults still lags behind that of older age groups, the 2023 survey shows that this gap has narrowed. At 12 percentage points, the difference between the two groups is one of the lowest in the last two decades – a similar gap was only observed in 2002 and 2006. Young people are therefore clearly catching up with their older counterparts. Even more striking is the fact that by 2023, young people's political interest had suddenly returned to the level last seen in the autumn of 2010, while the interest of older groups had not even come close to the level measured back then.

The results of a 2023 study conducted by Mérték Media Monitor as part of the Hungarian Digital Media Observatory (HDMO) confirm this trend. According to the study, 48% of 18-35 year olds said they had spent more time on political and civic engagement in recent years, while only 24% said they had spent less time. These retrospective self-assessments also suggest a growing interest in politics. Members of older age groups reported a more modest increase.

Among the studies focusing on the politically transformative year 2024, the fifth wave Lof the more narrowly focused Active Youth Research found that after a significant and somewhat unexpected spike in 2019, the political interest of full-time university students had returned to previous levels by spring 2024. Over the same period, however, their political activism – such as signing protest petitions or attending demonstrations – increased significantly and consistently.

Similar trends are highlighted by a survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in the summer of 2024. Political interest among 18-29 year olds rose steadily and significantly compared to data from 2017 and 2020. An increase in civic engagement was also measured: young people proved to be more active than before in both online and offline forms of political participation.

2. News consumption habits and the role of social media

Social media is known to play a crucial role in young people's consumption of political and public news. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in the autumn of 2024, 38% of young Hungarians aged 16-30 rely mainly on social media for information. Online news sites ranked second, cited by 32% of respondents.

The NDI research from late summer 2024 also confirms the importance of online platforms: 57% of 18-29 year olds frequently use online news portals. In this survey, social media was not treated as a single category, but was analyzed by specific platforms. The most commonly cited channels were Facebook (52%) and YouTube (46%).

Due to the unique logic of social media, political content often reaches young people even when they are not specifically looking for political information. According to a 2023 study by Mérték and HDMO, 95% of 18-35 year olds – virtually everyone – use some form of social media. Of these, 63% come across political or public affairs content almost every day, and a further 16% do so several times a week.

The popularity of different platforms varies among young adults. Facebook remains the leading platform, but this is mainly true for older young adults. As age decreases, Facebook use also decreases – a trend found in both the NMHH and NDI studies. In addition to Facebook, three other social media platforms play an important role in the consumption of political news: YouTube, TikTok and Instagram – which are particularly popular among the youngest users.

There are also gender differences in platform use, with men more likely to use YouTube and women more likely to use TikTok. For Instagram, the studies reviewed did not find significant gender differences.

The role of traditional media in political and public news consumption has declined. Of the traditional media, television remains the most frequently cited, but its reach lags significantly behind online channels – this was confirmed by both the Eurobarometer and NDI studies.

3. The rise of distrust and factual relativism

In the information cacophony of the 21st century, no one is capable of hammering the one and indivisible truth into the heads of the masses. But it is much easier to sow doubt, create confusion and ultimately ensure that a significant proportion of the population cannot distinguish between fact and opinion, between credible and unreliable sources. The nature of modern disinformation is therefore not to convince, but to create doubt.

This kind of uncertainty is the breeding ground for belief in fake news and conspiracy theories; it is palpably present in domestic online and offline public discourse, as well as in public opinion. We examined this phenomenon, which we call 'factual relativism', in public opinion surveys conducted in the spring of 2023 and 2024.

Our findings among young people do not differ significantly from the responses of older age groups. Factual relativism and uncertainty about news sources are widespread not only among young people and young adults, but also in Hungarian society as a whole. In our spring 2024 survey, 28% of 18-35 year olds showed strong and a further 45% moderate factual relativist attitudes. These people typically agreed with the five statements used in our survey:

1. "The truth is actually the position you choose for yourself."
2. "Objective reality doesn't really exist, there are just different opinions."
3. "Anyone who claims to know what the facts are is actually lying."
4. "A lot of things that are called facts in the press are really just opinions."
5. "We can't be sure that what is presented as fact is true."

Today's information environment is particularly conducive to doubting the facts. This phenomenon is not unrelated to increasing political polarization and a propagandistic media environment dominated by government campaign narratives. Crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have also reinforced factual relativism. In these cases, the public has repeatedly experienced how conflicting news and opinions can confuse the information process.

4. Confidence and uncertainty in the world of news

The majority of young people feel confident in recognizing disinformation. According to the Flash Eurobarometer survey conducted in autumn 2024, 71% of young Hungarians aged 16-30 believe they are at least somewhat able to recognize false or misleading information when they come across it. In the spring 2024 Eurobarometer, 61% of 15-30 year olds also said that they had acquired digital skills during their studies to help them recognize disinformation.

Awareness of the prevalence of disinformation is also quite high. According to the Flash Eurobarometer survey mentioned above, 22% of respondents reported coming across fake news or disinformation very often, while another 36% said they encountered it frequently in the week before the survey. Only 10% stated they rarely or never saw such content. The results of the NMHH survey conducted in the summer of 2014 show a similar picture: almost all internet users aged 16-35 have come across fake news. According to the autumn 2024 wave of the Standard Eurobarometer, 77% of 15-34 year olds regularly encounter information that may be misleading or explicitly false.

Of course, we cannot be sure how much of the content that respondents identify as disinformation is actually false. Nor can we determine the proportion of disinformation that goes undetected. This self-reported survey does not answer the question of what proportion of false content actually gets through the filters. It does, however, provide insight into how aware users are of the phenomenon and how easily they label information as disinformation or false.

5. Handling fake news

In the digital age, young people express a strong desire to verify the credibility of information, but many do not use the tools available to do so. According to a 2023 survey by HDMO, 84% of 18-35 year olds believe it would be beneficial to have a reliable tool for verifying information. However, only about one-third actually check questionable information, according to both the 2023 HDMO survey and a 2024 National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH) research.

When in doubt about the credibility of content, most people tend to move on without further investigation. For example, the NMHH research shows that only 13% of people discuss uncertain information with others. This behavior is hardly surprising in an age of rapid news consumption and information overload, where there is neither the time nor the inclination for in-depth analysis.

6. Susceptibility to conspiracy theories and disinformation

Over the past few years, Political Capital has conducted several public opinion surveys examining receptivity to conspiracy theories and disinformation. The surveys measured not only general attitudes indicative of conspiratorial thinking, but also the acceptance of specific claims that are integral parts of disinformation narratives related to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, as well as other narratives unrelated to the war.

Based on our 2023 and 2024 surveys, the responses of young adults aged 18-35 are generally not significantly different from those of older age groups. Statistically, there is no significant difference in susceptibility to conspiracy theories and disinformation between the two groups.

The responses to individual questions show that conspiracy theories are popular among many young people. For example, 37% strongly agreed with the vague statement that secret organizations influence political decisions, while 19% believed the debunked disinformation that the United States runs secret laboratories in Ukraine to develop biological weapons. War-related disinformation also found an audience: only 35% of young people are aware that Russian propaganda falsely describes the Ukrainian leadership as Nazis.

List of public opinion surveys used

• EC Youth and Democracy 2024 (FL545)
• Age group examined: 15–30 years.
• Data collection occurred in April 2024, with 1,017 participants surveyed online.
• The research is available here.
• EP Youth Survey 2024 (FL013EP)
• Age group examined: 16–30 years.
• Data collection took place between September and October 2024, with 1,006 participants surveyed online.
• The research is available here.
• European Social Survey – Waves 1-11
• Data collection occurred between 2002-2023.
• Further details are available here.
• HDMO-Mérték: Information Islands in a Polarized Media System 2023
• Age group examined: adult population.
• Data collection took place in March 2023, with 1,200 participants surveyed by phone (sample size for the 18–35-year-olds was 297).
• The research is available here.
• HDMO-Political Capital: Conspiracy Theories, Disinformation, and Factual Relativism in Public Opinion – Comparative Research 2024
• Age group examined: adult population.
• Data collection occurred between May and June 2024, with 1,000 participants surveyed in person (sample size for the 18–35-year-olds was 287).
• The research is available here.
• National Democratic Institute (NDI): Youth Attitudes on Politics and Democracy in Central Europe (2024)
• Age group examined: 18–29 years.
• Data collection took place between August and September 2024, with 954 participants surveyed online and by phone (50-50%).
• The research is available here.
• National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH): TikTok and YouTube as the Primary Mobile Platforms for Teenagers and Young Adults
• Age group examined: 16–35 years.
• Data collection occurred between June and August 2024, with 1,113 participants surveyed online.
• The research is available here.
• Political Capital: Susceptibility vs. Immunity – Disinformation and Conspiracy Theories in Hungary 2023
• Age group examined: adult population.
• Data collection took place between March and April 2023, with 1,000 participants surveyed in person (sample size for the 18–35-year-olds was 244).
• The research focusing on disinformation is available here. The analysis on factual relativism is available here.
• Andrea SZABÓ – Dániel OROSS: Political Thinking and Integration of Hungarian University Students in 2024
• Age group examined: Hungarian full-time university students.
• Data collection took place between February and March 2024, with 805 participants surveyed in person.
• The research is available here.

 

This research was supported by the British Council.