There is a better choice

Key findings

• No one knows when the next opportunity for comprehensive electoral reform will arise, but when that time comes, it will be necessary to start from a completely different position than the one Fidesz did between 2011 and 2013. The most important thing we can expect from a future electoral reform process is that it is ought to be accompanied by a broad social, professional, and political consultation. If possible, this is even more important than the final outcome itself. Political Capital's package of proposals intends to facilitate this process.
• International electoral standards must be upheld both in theory and in practice. For example, universal suffrage excludes any form of voting census.
• When designing a new electoral system, comprehensibility must be a key guiding principle. A more transparent and understandable electoral system can strengthen confidence in elections and, at the same time, in Hungarian democracy.
• We must resist allowing electoral reform to fall victim to demagoguery. We cannot put the cart before the horse; in other words, we must not fall into the trap of allowing the size of the parliament to determine the outcome of electoral reform. This also means that democracy is an expensive genre, but fair elections are worth much more: if we expect any change in electoral rules to improve the conditions for democratic competition, the costs involved are secondary. So, let us not reject any idea just because it involves extra costs.
• We cannot say that a purely proportional electoral system would be the only acceptable option for Hungary’s next elections, but we can say that it would be desirable for the system to be more proportional than both the current one and the one in force between 1990 and 2010. There are several ways to move in this direction.
• If the mixed system with individual constituencies is to remain in place at all, the process of redrawing the map must be transparent. Constituency borders must be reviewed periodically. It would be fortunate to take this task out of the hands of politicians and entrust it to an independent border demarcation commission.
• Multiple cases verify that postal voting is vulnerable to countless abuses, while online voting does not guarantee both secrecy and verifiability. Consequently, one needs an alternative way to ensure a fair absentee voting system. If at least a hundred Hungarian citizens living in a foreign city indicate their intention to vote, the Hungarian state should be obliged to establish a local polling station, and the electoral authorities would ensure a properly conducted voting.
• The system of nationality mandates must be freed from its current framework, which lacks genuine electoral competition and strongly incentivizes abuse. The first question to address is whether it is truly justified to grant full parliamentary mandates to national minorities in Hungary, or providing spokesperson mandates would be sufficient. A political decision is due, preceded by broad social consultation. Regardless of full mandates or spokesperson mandates, the conditions for genuine electoral competition must be established.
• The possibility of multiple nominations, which encourages illegal data copying, must be eliminated in any case. However, it would be even more forward-looking to replace the candidate nomination system based on signature collection with a deposit system.

Background

The Hungarian electoral system is known to be fraught with anomalies, but even among experts, there is no consensus on how it should be reformed if the opportunity arises.

The majority elements of the system are most often questioned. Many point to issues such as the manipulated constituency map and problems related to voting from abroad, while the ordeal of ethnic minority mandates receives undeservedly little attention.

Political Capital set out to develop a guiding framework that could assist decision-makers in designing a fair electoral system – one that complies with international electoral principles and guidelines – when the time comes for electoral reform. This does not amount to a fully elaborated electoral system; we are convinced that creating such a system is the task of the Parliament. It should be carried out based on appropriate political and social consultations and informed by political interests and values.

However, it is possible to lay down basic principles, formulate recommendations, and, in certain areas, compile a menu of options that both ensure the creation of fair electoral rules and leave sufficient room for maneuver for political decision-makers.

Important: this package of proposals is not intended to encourage the current parliament to reform the electoral system before the 2026 elections. This would be impossible, if only because the number one prerequisite for fair electoral reform is a broad professional, social, and political debate, which requires significantly more time than what is available before the parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2026.

Fundamental principle: Electoral systems are always created along political values and interests

While the public’s desire for a “neutral” or “fair” electoral system is understandable, it must be acknowledged that no such system truly exists. Every electoral system has its advantages and disadvantages, while political interest and values always shape the decisions about electoral system design. It is enough to consider that both promoting governmental stability and ensuring a proportional parliamentary reflection of the voters’ will are equally legitimate expectations of an electoral system. Yet it is hardly possible to design one that fulfils both at the same time. And even if such a system was theoretically achievable, it would likely be overly complex, thereby failing to meet a third legitimate criterion: public comprehensibility.

There is therefore no election system based on expert consensus and "ideally" designed in every detail. It is up to parliament to create one, where parties naturally make their decisions (also) on the basis of political considerations. At the same time, politicians' room for maneuver cannot be unlimited; the electoral system of a democratic country must comply with certain international electoral principles and guidelines.

Principles that serve as a compass during electoral reform

Keeping international electoral principles in mind

In principle, this is not subject to debate; however, when establishing the practical framework for implementation, the international electoral standards that must be followed under all circumstances, and should be consistently kept in mind.

• Voters exercise their right to vote freely and on a voluntary basis. Voters cannot be compelled either to make use of this right or to refrain from doing so, nor can they be pressured to support the candidate or list of any particular political force. While compulsory voting is not entirely unknown in some European countries, it has never resulted in turnout rates approaching 100%. Such an institution – already entirely alien to Hungarian political tradition – would certainly be unfeasible and more importantly, undesirable.
• Legislation must ensure the universality and secrecy of the right to vote. It cannot be violated at any stage of the electoral process. The principle of universality excludes, for example, linking the right to vote to any kind of census or qualification, while the principle of secrecy prohibits, among other things, compelling voters to cast their ballots openly for any reason. Moreover, the principles of universality and secrecy must also be upheld when designing practical rules – such as those needed to ensure fair remote voting.
• Equality of suffrage is also an important principle, with the proviso that this criterion cannot be applied 100% in all circumstances. It is therefore worth noting that equality of suffrage should be strived for, and that only reasonable, minimal deviations from this principle are permissible. For example, due to ongoing demographic changes, it cannot be expected that there will be no differences at all in the population of electoral districts. There may be some special cases that constitute more significant exceptions, such as the partial suffrage of Hungarian citizens living abroad or granting preferential mandates to nationalities in Hungary.
• The guidelines set out in the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters must be kept in mind throughout the reform process. Among these, it is particularly important that no significant changes be made to the electoral system in (at least) the year preceding an election. There are even stronger guarantees to prevent manipulation of the electoral system. According to one such measure, amendments to election-related laws should only come into force one cycle after their adoption. However, this is often an unrealistic requirement and may even have undesirable effects, such as the loss of the ability to respond quickly to a changing environment or the possibility of self-correction.

The indispensability of social and political debate

The process itself is perhaps even more important than the end result.

The creation of the current electoral system was not preceded by social consensus, and political consultation was limited to the establishment of a parliamentary subcommittee. Even though there was some debate in the subcommittee in 2011, it had no impact on the text of the electoral law submitted to parliament on November 20, 2011, and adopted under scandalous circumstances on December 23. The countless electoral system manipulations in the following years were also carried out exclusively at the will of the government, without any meaningful consultation, and with only pro-government votes. These facts certainly contributed to the widespread rejection of the current system.

Whichever electoral system Hungary ultimately adopts, decision-makers cannot avoid substantive professional, social, and political consultations. If a new system is created unilaterally – by a single party and without any consultation – its legitimacy and public acceptance will inevitably fall short of even the current system’s. The goal should be the exact opposite: Hungary should have an electoral system that enjoys broad public trust. A minimum requirement for this is that it must not be designed in the backroom of a single political party.

The need for clarity

Both the electoral system created in 1989/1990, and the one created in 2011-2013 (and amended several times since then) are extremely complicated, which has not helped their legitimacy. Quite simply, when the vast majority of citizens do not understand how their votes are converted into mandates, and when the multitude of detailed rules creates near-total confusion, people become far more susceptible to election-related conspiracy theories and allegations of fraud.

• For this reason, comprehensibility must be a key guiding principle in any future electoral reform process. This applies not only to the mechanism for allocating seats, but also to all detailed rules that affect voter awareness and activity.
• It is also important to bear in mind that voters need time to understand the effects of new rules, so efforts should be made to ensure that the most significant electoral rules do not change from election to election.

Rejection of demagoguery

It is largely forgotten today, but in the years before 2010, the public discourse on electoral reform had sunk to a remarkably low level: the government and the opposition of the time were essentially engaged in a contest to propose ever-smaller numbers for the future size of parliament. Although it soon became clear that reducing the number of MPs would not, in itself, lead to any meaningful cost savings, the room for maneuver of Fidesz after 2010 was also limited by the decision to set a maximum of 200 members in law.

Since the party insisted on retaining the mixed electoral system and its winner-strengthening elements, it opted to create 106 single-member constituencies. This effectively hollowed out constituency representation - which had not functioned particularly well even before - as the average number of voters per district rose from roughly 45,000 to about 75,000 (and has since declined only slightly, to around 72,000 over the past decade). In addition, several constituencies were drawn to encompass an exceptionally large number of settlements - sometimes more than one hundred.

• The size of the National Assembly cannot, therefore, be the guiding principle of the reform. Of course, no one is suggesting that the current number of 199 members should be multiplied, but it would not be a problem if a new electoral system, based on criteria more important than the number of members, resulted in a parliament with a slightly higher number of members than at present. Nor would it be a problem if the number of seats to be allocated were ultimately lower.
• Another frequently raised, extremely demagogic argument is cost reduction. Democracy is notoriously expensive, and elections are one of, if not the most important pillars of democracy, on which it makes no sense to skimp. If we expect any changes in electoral rules to improve the conditions for democratic competition, the costs involved become secondary. Cost cutting was also a frequently heard argument in favor of reducing the number of members of parliament. On the one hand, it always sounded false and, on the other hand, it quickly turned out to be untrue, as reducing the number of members does not necessarily lead to significant savings. Similarly, there are many arguments for and against reinstating the second round, but the argument that it would entail significant costs can be disregarded.

Variations for creating a more proportional distribution of seats

The problem

Hungary lacks a centuries-old, unquestioned tradition in this area. As a result, the decision between an electoral system designed to represent voters’ preferences as proportionally as possible and one that prioritizes governmental stability ultimately depends on political values, as well as political interests. For this reason, only limited professional guidance can be given, for example, on whether the mixed system should be retained and, if so, under what conditions.

However, there are legitimate arguments that go beyond the political interests of the parties in favor of a more proportional electoral system than the current one. It is now common knowledge that the Orbán regime could never have come into being if the Hungarian electoral system, established in 1989/1990, had been more proportional, without giving any political force the theoretical chance of obtaining a two-thirds majority in parliament. This is true with the caveat that, at the time of the regime change, other safeguards could have been put in place to prevent a two-thirds majority from essentially gaining absolute power.

Many have also argued that proportional electoral systems encourage parties to cooperate with their political rivals rather than seek to eliminate them. Opponents of proportional systems, emphasize that although a parliament that more accurately reflects the will of the voters may appear fairer, such systems often produce coalitions that are difficult to form and highly fragile, leading to early elections and, at times, political chaos. A less frequently mentioned argument against proportional systems is that, on election day, voters themselves may not know which coalition their vote will ultimately support since parties' willingness to cooperate can change significantly once the election results are known.

Proposals related to possible scenarios

Taking all this into account, we cannot say that it would be only acceptable for Hungary's next electoral system to be purely proportional, but we can say that it would be desirable for it to be more proportional than both the current system and the one in force between 1990 and 2010. There are several ways to move in this direction. Below, we outline various options, presenting the arguments for and against each.

• The threshold for entry could be lowered. If, instead of the current 5 percent, it was possible to enter parliament with 3 or even 2 percent of the vote, it would quickly increase the political choice on offer and also remove the barrier for voters who are afraid to vote for a small party for fear that their vote will ultimately be wasted. The reduction in lost votes is also expected to improve proportionality. However, with the fragmentation of the party system, the pendulum could swing in the other direction. It could ensure the survival of parties with marginal support, and too many parliamentary parties could make it difficult to form workable coalitions. It is also a matter of values to what extent the decision-maker wishes to promote the parliamentary representation of smaller political forces or those that focus only on one or a few issues.
• The element known as "winner compensation" should be removed from the system for the sake of clarity alone, which would also improve the expected proportionality of election results. (In the interest of simplification, the entire compensation mechanism could be abolished, but if this were to be done without changing the number of individual and party list mandates, it would make the system even more unproportional.)
• The ratio of constituencies to party list mandates could be strengthened in favor of the latter. The larger the share of list mandates, the greater the chance of more proportional election results. This would inevitably lead to an increase in the size of parliament, which should not be a problem within reasonable limits (see the section entitled "Rejection of demagoguery").
• Although only indirectly related to the issue of proportionality, the restoration of the two-round system is also a popular idea. The main argument in favor of this is that in the second round, with the main balance of power already known, voters have a second opportunity to refine their choice. They can confirm their favorite party or candidate, express their secondary preference, and decide how to vote in the second round based on a whole range of factors, including changes in circumstances since the first round. In the period between the two rounds, it becomes clear, if not necessarily, then at least with a good chance, what coalition scenarios are realistic, the outcome of which may depend on the voters' second-round votes.
  • An alternative to a second round could be to allow voters to express their secondary preferences in a single round, for example, by ranking candidates in order of preference.
• A more radical shift towards proportionality would be the abolition of individual constituencies and a switch to a party-list system. There are several options within this framework.
  • The simplest solution would be to introduce a Dutch-style electoral system, where seats are allocated among parties in proportion to the votes cast for a single national list. A common criticism of this model is that party headquarters decide who gets a seat, so many representatives are not actually tested. Similarly, regional representation is also left out of the equation, which carries the risk that many regions of the country will essentially disappear from the decision-makers' field of vision. Both problems could be mitigated if, in addition to voting for the national list, there were also the option of preferential voting, as is used in Slovakia, among other countries. There are countless ways to do this, but the essence of each is that voters have a say in the order of the candidates of their chosen party. In this way, they can express their personal sympathies and antipathies as well as regional representation considerations.
  • Instead of national lists, regional lists could be created, which could be either regional or county-level. This solution better preserves the principle of regional representation, but it could also be combined with the introduction of preferential voting. However, this solution may bring another problem with it. If county-level lists are introduced, there is a risk – similar to the situation before 2010 – that counties with smaller populations would receive only a few mandates. As a result, they would only appear to follow the principle of proportional seat allocation, while in practice, they disproportionately strengthen the larger parties. On the other hand, if even the smallest counties were to receive at least ten seats (which is the minimum number required to ensure that not only the larger parties can obtain county list seats), it would result in the unrealistic increase in the number of seats in parliament. Therefore, the introduction of regional lists is the more fortunate option.
• A hybrid system based on the German model could also be considered, where the main rule for allocating seats is based on lists, but the seats allocated to parties are filled partly from individual constituencies and partly from lists. The German model – which cannot be transposed wholesale, if only because of the difference in size between the two countries – has caused a number of technical and constitutional tensions that are not discussed here, which should caution decision-makers if they wish to move in this direction.

The design and regular review of the electoral district map

The problem

The design and continuous review of the electoral map pose a serious challenge even for the most advanced democracies. Manipulation of the electoral map can give a political force a significant advantage, to the extent that a map can produce a parliamentary majority even from a disadvantage of a few percentage points. Although it is not yet clear exactly how much of a disadvantage, the current Hungarian electoral district map can reverse in favor of its creators in a tight race. A series of model calculations have already confirmed that even with a 1-2, or possibly 3 percentage point opposition advantage, it could still produce a victory for Fidesz.

The practice of 2011 must not be repeated. The draft electoral law was posted on the website of the Hungarian Parliament without any prior notice, appearing from one moment to the next together with the new constituency map. The proposal bypassed all social and professional consultation, and it has never been clarified who exactly designed the new map or according to which criteria. (The same lack of transparency characterized the 2024 modification of constituency boundaries.)

Proposal

• If the decision is made to retain individual constituencies in the Hungarian electoral system, the first and most important criterion is that the map-drawing process must be transparent. This means, in part, that it must be made clear what constraints, rules, mathematical formulas, and geographical criteria are used to determine the boundaries. It also means that there should be no skimping on a broader social consensus. Although, unlike in the United Kingdom, this is not a tradition in Hungary, a forum must be created for voters to express their opinion on which city or district their small town, village, or district is more closely connected to, and this must be considered by the legislator when drawing boundaries.
• The electoral district map must be reviewed periodically. This can be tied to a specific period of time (e.g., ten years), or it can be stipulated that district boundaries must be reviewed after every second or third election. However, the current regulation may also be legitimate: if the deviation of at least one electoral district from the average population exceeds a certain value, the boundaries must be adjusted. In its aforementioned code, the Venice Commission recommends, for example, that the population of constituencies should not deviate from the average by more than 10% (or 15% in very special cases). In contrast, under the current law, the legislature is only required to intervene if the deviation exceeds 20%. It is worth moving towards stricter criteria, as this reduces the scope for manipulation of constituency numbers, known as malapportionment. (To put it simply, the essence of this is that a malicious mapmaker will try to assign their opponents' voters to the largest possible districts, while assigning their own to the smallest possible districts.)
• Although the electoral system is designed according to political values and interests, it is advisable to remove the task of drawing constituency boundaries from politicians. An independent border demarcation commission, similar to the British Boundary Commission, could be responsible for ensuring equal voting rights by drawing up constituency borders and modifying them at regular intervals. If this is not feasible for any reason and we entrust the drawing of boundaries to members of parliament, then detailed transparency guarantees are even more important. In this way, it is possible to minimize, if not eliminate, the scope for both malapportionment and gerrymandering. (Gerrymandering refers to the manipulation of electoral districts in such a way that the district boundaries do not follow administrative units, major roads, or natural boundaries, resulting in districts that are generally irregular in shape.)
• The electoral district map must remain intact for at least one year prior to the election, but this moratorium may be extended.

Establishing a fair absentee voting system

The problem

The Hungarian state discriminates between Hungarians living abroad and Hungarians living in Hungary. Those who do not have a Hungarian address can vote by mail, while those who do have to go to a diplomatic mission. Few dispute that this is not right, but there is no consensus on how to resolve the situation.

Political Capital, therefore, initiated a professional debate in the fall of 2025, in which five authors expressed their views on the subject on the Hungarian news portal Telex (here, here, here, here, and here). As a result, a solution acceptable to all parties involved seems to be emerging.

Proposal

Should we vote online? No.

For decades, many have believed that this is the inevitable future, but in recent years, there has been a reversal of this trend, with several European countries quickly abandoning e-voting after a few failed attempts. According to current scientific knowledge, an e-voting system can either be secret or verifiable, but not both. Even if the two contradictory criteria were to be reconciled in the foreseeable future, Hungary would hardly gain the cross-party trust necessary for the transition. So, we should not look for a solution here.

Should we expand postal voting? No.

It sounds simple: if people without a registered address can vote by mail, then those with a registered address should also be able to vote by mail, and discrimination would be eliminated. This is true, but expanding postal voting would pave the way for a tsunami of electoral fraud. It would be impossible to verify whether voters who registered to vote by mail weeks before the election are actually abroad. And if virtually anyone could vote by mail, party activists would approach large numbers of voters, asking them to sign up, request a mail-in ballot package, and, once they hand it over to the party activist, receive a modest payment in return. Extending mail-in voting does not seem to be a good idea.

Let us expand voting at foreign missions!

We rarely take inspiration from our eastern neighbor, but sometimes it is worth doing so. In Romania, a law has been in force since 2016, which stipulates that if at least a hundred Romanian citizens in a foreign city indicate their intention to vote, the Romanian state must designate a polling station in that city and conduct the election. This could be transposed into Hungarian law as it stands, as Mátyás Bódi suggested in the aforementioned professional debate.

Those who wish to vote at foreign missions are still required to register, so the expanded institution would not place an extra administrative burden on them, but it would reverse the logic of the system. It should not be up to voters to choose a polling station from a limited list, but rather the electoral office should satisfy the needs of registered voters.

It is not really clear what arguments could be raised against the transfer of the system, which works well in Romania, to Hungary, as it would not entail any serious loss of rights even for Hungarian citizens living in neighboring countries who do not have a Hungarian address. Undoubtedly, they would lose the option of voting by mail, but temporary polling stations would have to be set up close to their places of residence, just as they are in Western European cities. Discrimination among Hungarians living abroad could therefore be eliminated, with the added benefit of eliminating the risk of abuse associated with postal voting from the system.

The system could be criticized at most for the increased costs, but the additional cost of 1-2 billion forints, which would be incurred by setting up and operating a few hundred temporary polling stations, is not a significant item in the budget (see also the section entitled "Rejection of demagoguery").

If postal voting is retained: dealing with the problem of deceased people on the electoral roll

The problem

It is well known that postal voting creates numerous opportunities for abuse, the vast majority of which cannot be eliminated. Since the ballot package may remain in the possession of the voter for days, it is impossible to verify whether it was actually the voter, a relative, a neighbor, or a party activist who actually voted. This risk is accepted by every country that uses postal voting.

However, it is a Hungarian peculiarity that a large number of deceased people may also appear on the list of postal voters. This is due to the fact that the Hungarian state is not necessarily aware of the possible death of Hungarian citizens living abroad. Since, according to the current rules, registration is valid for ten years (and the clock is reset after each election), the National Election Office (NVI) sends out the postal voting package to all citizens with active registration before each election and referendum without question. This includes those who are no longer alive, provided that the NVI is not aware of this fact, which is the case in the overwhelming majority of instances. It is impossible to verify what happens to the letters sent to the addresses of deceased persons, but there is no practical obstacle to anyone else voting in their name.

Proposal

This potential for abuse, which seriously undermines confidence in the election, must be eliminated from the system. The solution is simple: registration must be confirmed before each election and referendum. The NVI should ask citizens living abroad to return a form, which, once completed, will reactivate their registration until the next election.

Democratization of ethnic representation

The problem

Establishing representation for ethnic minorities in Hungary may be a noble goal, but in its current form, it is one of the most scandalous elements of the electoral system.

The main problem is that there is no competition. Even under the Kádár regime, officials took care to ensure that when "elections" were held, at least two names appeared on the ballot. In contrast, there is not even the appearance of electoral competition in the election of ethnic minority representatives. If a voter wishes to vote as a member of a national minority, they receive a ballot paper (instead of a list of party candidates) containing a single list drawn up by the national minority self-government and can only decide whether or not to mark an X in the single circle next to it.

Another problem is that, in theory, all 13 national minorities are eligible for the preferential mandate, but in reality, only the Roma and German nationality lists have a realistic chance of collecting the 20-30,000 votes required for this, simply because fewer people identify themselves as belonging to the other eleven nationalities. It is no exaggeration to say that the current regulations cheat the nationalities: the letter of the law ostensibly creates the possibility of obtaining a full parliamentary mandate, but the preferential quota has been designed in such a way that eleven of the 13 nationalities have no chance of obtaining a mandate.

The third, but by no means insignificant, problem is that the system is coded to allow for the possibility of capturing preferential mandates – which, since 2018, is no longer just a theoretical threat. The monopoly position of the nationality list naturally attracts political interests that are stronger than nationality representation: anyone who can influence the decision-makers of the nationality self-government that is likely to win a mandate in the list-making process can get their hands on one or even two nationality parliamentary mandates. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent a party from organizing a sufficient number of its supporters to register as members of a national minority. Therefore, using their votes to obtain, at a lower cost, a seat that is de jure a national minority seat but de facto strengthens the party's faction.

Proposal

First of all, we must ask whether it is really justified to grant full, preferential seats to nationalities in Hungary, or whether it would be sufficient to grant them representative seats. This requires a political decision, which must be preceded by broad social consultation. It is not only the representatives of nationalities who need to be involved in the process, as this is a matter that affects the entire political community. To this end, it would be worth examining the results achieved since 2018 by the only nationality representative with a full mandate and the 11-13 nationality spokespersons in the various cycles.

• If, at the end of the process, it is decided that a full-fledged national minority mandate is necessary, then it must be made possible for all 13 national minorities to elect their eligible national minority parliamentary representatives on the basis of accessible criteria and actual electoral competition. At this point, at the latest, the amendment would also be significant for the parties, as they would no longer have zero, one or two, but 13 fewer list mandates. There is only one way to compensate for this: by drastically increasing the size of the National Assembly (at least doubling it), which would undoubtedly be unjustified in a country with a population of less than ten million. Therefore, there does not seem to be a realistic solution that would allow 13 ethnic minority representatives to obtain full mandates – presumably, the ethnic minorities concerned would also agree with this.
• The other option is to give up the full preferential mandate, but create a real election situation for obtaining the spokesperson mandate. The monopoly on list-making would cease to exist, and nationalities would be able to elect their spokesperson in a genuine election. The parties would not be opposed to this solution, as the number of seats in parliament would remain unchanged, the issue of nationality mandates would be removed from the government-opposition relationship, and this part of the electoral competition could thus be about the actual creation of nationality representation. Discrimination against smaller nationalities would also cease, as all 13 nationalities would be able to elect their representatives under the same conditions.
  • With this solution, the national minority mandate could also escape the trap of political abuse: if it has no effect on the composition of parliament, there would be much less interest in any malicious influence.
  • A further advantage is that in this case there would be no obstacle to nationalities having a third vote (in addition to those cast for individual district candidates and party lists), as the latter would not influence the composition of parliament.

Cleaning up the nomination process

The problem

In Hungary, candidate selection has always been a hotbed of abuse. Even before 2010, a secondary black market had developed around the system based on recommendation slips, and the recommendation form system introduced after 2010 could have been a step forward in comparison. Initially, the government introduced a system of multiple nominations that led to "legally stealable" central campaign support, followed by regulations to make it slightly stricter. Therefore, the nomination process has been reduced to copying recommendation forms: with minimal risk of getting caught, parties can easily copy each other's recommendation forms. Other than being a serious data protection concern, it completely undermines the function of candidate nomination, which is supposed to measure social embeddedness.

Recommendation

• If the candidate nomination system based on voter recommendations is retained, the possibility of multiple recommendations must be eliminated. This would at least prevent copying recommendation forms.
• However, eliminating multiple recommendations is only a partial solution. In fact, there is a way to completely remove voters from this process and thus prevent parties from misusing their data: instead of a recommendation-based system, a deposit system could be introduced. In this system, candidates would be placed on the ballot by depositing a certain amount of money, which they would get back if they achieved a certain percentage of the vote. This procedure would minimize the possibility of abuse and would not involve handling voters' personal data. The only problem with deposits is that it is difficult to determine the optimal amount: if it is too low, it will not deter frivolous candidates, and if it is too high, it may put smaller political forces in a difficult position. An amount equivalent to half a month's average salary per candidate could strike the delicate balance. Contrary to popular belief, the deposit would not make the nomination process more expensive, but cheaper, as the majority would get it back after a poor performance (so it would be practically free for them). It is also clear that the loss of a relatively small amount would not exceed the cost of collecting the current 500 signatures. Black money would be eliminated from the system, data protection concerns would disappear in the absence of personal data, and there would be no opportunity for related abuses.

Rethinking campaign and campaign finance regulations

The problems

Most of the criticism expressed in the OSCE reports can be traced back to the fact that in Hungary, the party and the state are intertwined, their campaign activities are practically inseparable, and the state is almost constantly campaigning for the party's re-election. The incumbent government has unlimited resources and has shown no restraint over the past decade and a half, spending public money recklessly to promote itself and discredit its opponents. One of the ways it does this is by outsourcing part of its campaign to pseudo-civil society organizations.

Although certain restrictions are in place for the 50-day campaign period, the period outside the official campaign (which accounts for 96.5% of the four-year cycle) is essentially completely unregulated.

Although campaign financing rules have been tightened somewhat in recent years, they have not closed the door to abuse, so the phenomenon of fake parties that proliferated in 2014 and 2018 may gain new momentum in the future.

Recommendations

It would be naive to assume that state propaganda can be eliminated. Information and political communication will never be completely separable. It is primarily a question of political culture how much resources the incumbent government mobilizes to promote itself under the guise of "social advertising." It is clear that the current government knows no bounds in this regard. This is unlikely to change on its own, and although this is perhaps the most difficult task for well-intentioned decision-makers, there are measures that could be taken to curb state campaigning to some extent.

In terms of content, it is almost impossible to separate state information from government propaganda. When a section of motorway is completed, it cannot be expected that a minister or state secretary will not hand it over, and when they do, they will say a few inspiring words, which may even increase their party's chances of re-election. Perhaps no one would object to this, but in terms of content, there seems to be no clear distinction between the handover of the road and the constant government propaganda that floods every forum 24 hours a day.

• The first and most important thing is to increase transparency. For example, introducing campaign accounts could make the functioning of political parties much more transparent. Instead of one annual report, it would be possible to track parties' campaign spending in real time. The same transparency should be required of the state: it should immediately account for all spending related to state communications. This would also make political activity outside the campaign period much clearer.
• In 2025, the campaign spending limit was abolished. In a sense, this is not very significant, as the government spends unlimited amounts on campaigns anyway, and the limit only applies to the activities of parties and their candidates in the 50 days prior to the election, not to the spending of the state and pseudo-civil society organizations. Nevertheless, it would be good to reinstate the spending limit because of its equalizing effect. However, the spending limit must be set at a much higher, realistic, and enforceable level than before, otherwise the unworkably low limit will encourage parties to resort to tricks. (The introduction of a high spending limit could come under fire from cheap attacks; at this point, it is important to remember the basic requirement of rejecting demagoguery.)
• Campaign activities outsourced to third parties are also a gray area. It would certainly be wrong to restrict the right of any civil society organization to express its opinion, so those who sympathize with the incumbent government should not be subject to such restrictions. However, restrictions could be placed on the transfer of budgetary resources to pseudo-civil society organizations which echo messages agreed upon with the government's communications center. It is therefore not the content but the source that should be addressed in order to tackle this phenomenon. Of course, the key to this is not primarily prohibitive rules, but rather an institutional system (independent public prosecutor's office, State Audit Office) that enforces and investigates such rules.
• There is a passage in the electoral procedure law that could be removed. According to Section 142, "The activities of electoral bodies and personal communication between citizens as private individuals, regardless of its content and form, or the activities of the Constitutional Court, the courts, local governments, and other state bodies in the performance of their duties as defined by law." According to the highlighted text, state bodies can communicate virtually anything, and it is not officially considered campaign activity. Repealing this provision is already a step in the right direction.
• The Fundamental Law could be amended to prohibit the state from engaging in propaganda activities. There is no doubt that the line between information and propaganda is blurred, but if we were to elevate the prohibition of state propaganda to the level of the Fundamental Law, it could lead to much better practices than at present.
• Central campaign financing should be maintained, but new restrictions are needed in addition to the existing ones:
  • Similar to individual candidates, support for party lists should only be accessible via a treasury card.
  • Central funding should be accounted for in the same detail as that for individual candidates.
  • More severe sanctions should be imposed on candidates and parties who fail to meet their legal obligations and do not fulfil their repayment obligations.

Efforts to curb vote buying

The problem

There is no doubt that abuse has always occurred at polling stations, but since most cases remain hidden by their very nature, we can only estimate how many people can be swayed in this way during an election. Its impact on the final results of parliamentary elections is much smaller than on municipal elections, where a few dozen votes can be decisive, especially in small towns.

The phenomenon of vote buying is difficult to define in legal terms, but it can, in fact, be traced back to social problems. As long as poverty, vulnerability, and hopelessness determine the daily lives of the masses, there will always be a political force that will force those affected to sell their voting rights.

The methods used – from chain voting and photographing ballot papers to forcing people to vote openly – vary greatly, and the incentives range from a sack of potatoes to a few thousand forints in cash to the threat of exclusion from public work programs.

Although this is not exclusively a Hungarian phenomenon, and it did not emerge in Hungary after 2010, it has become increasingly organized from election to election under the Orbán regime.

Recommendations

It is almost hopeless to combat this phenomenon with law enforcement tools, but some basic steps still need to be taken.

• One such step is to criminalize not (primarily) the vulnerable citizen, but the political actor who buys votes and influences the vote. If voters remain punishable, they should be given the opportunity to have their punishment waived if they lead law enforcement agencies to the fraud organizer.
• According to current practice, the police have neither the will nor the capacity to expose and prevent vote buying. The police must be equipped with this knowledge, and platforms for cooperation must be created with election offices and civil society organizations with relevant experience in this area.
• At the same time, education and awareness campaigns are needed to ensure that vulnerable citizens are aware that their right to vote is not for sale and that they know where to turn if they are approached. Civil society has been trying to do this so far, but it is time for the state to realize that preventing election fraud and raising voter awareness is actually its job.
• The best results could, of course, be achieved through a relentless fight against poverty, but this goes far beyond the issue of electoral reform.