Political campaigning on social media in the “post-reality” and post-advertisement era

Lessons from Hungary’s 2026 election campaign - Summary

The 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election may have been the first post-reality campaign. The Orbán regime has transformed Hungary into an informational autocracy, dominating the information space and developing methods, manipulations, and a communication style that consolidated its power and served as a blueprint for illiberal leaders seeking to manipulate elections. Consequently, the regime became a trend-setter in using innovative legal tricks and political techniques in campaigns to secure parliamentary victories. The 2026 elections served once again as a laboratory for information manipulation, setting new precedents and revealing techniques that could reappear in other countries.

Hungary’s experience illustrates how political actors can adapt to social media ad bans by relying on manipulative and rule-breaking methods. These methods include organic amplification through coordinated supporter networks; synthetic amplification through inauthentic account networks; circumvention of the ad ban; the mass production of content, especially short videos; the creation of proxy actors to multiply the number of messengers; and the strategic use of emotionally charged generative AI visuals.

These developments should serve as a warning to democratic actors in other countries. The Hungarian case can help policymakers, state institutions, researchers, and civil society organisations to anticipate similar tactics elsewhere, particularly in situations where political actors seek to maintain informational dominance despite the existence of formal restrictions on political advertising.

Hungary’s experience also demonstrates that current platform regulation and enforcement remain imperfect. Although most ads disappeared after the ban, serious weaknesses in platform filtering systems still allowed political ads to pass through and reach substantial audiences.

This points to a clear need to strengthen social media regulation and amend it where necessary. The Hungarian case highlights persistent problems of misclassification, inconsistent review, weak detection of AI-generated political content, and the continued use of coordinated and inauthentic amplification techniques.

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