Challenges of Strategic Communication in Hungary

The Russian aggression of Ukraine in February 2022 has made it painfully clear that strategic communication of countries or states is essential in defending their informational sovereignty against hostile foreign influence operations aimed at destabilizing political leadership and manipulating the wider public on key foreign policy events. Consequently, our research examined the strength of the Hungarian government’s strategic communication capabilities, especially in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war. According to our findings, the Hungarian government or state actors are mostly unable to mount a strong defense in the information realm for four main reasons. There is a lack of specialized state institutions to deal with foreign information threats, and the state is unable or unwilling to integrate civic anti-disinformation capabilities into its communication system. More crucially, the highly politicized and monopolized Hungarian media space predominantly serves as a source of propaganda. Finally, the Hungarian government’s “multi-vector” foreign policy facilitates the presence of Russian disinformation narratives in the public sphere.

Strategic communication in the context of war

In an era defined by rapid globalization, emerging disruptive technologies, and shifting geopolitical dynamics, the realm of strategic communication – per definition, a course of communication action designed to achieve specific goals by influencing target audiences on specific policy areas or objectives – has become crucial. Strategic communication has become especially under scrutiny after the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 since the war was legitimized by the Kremlin’s deceitful communication campaigns. These falsely claimed, among others, that Ukraine is a “Fascist” state deserving its fate. The European Union and NATO, with most of their member states, have responded to the unprecedented wave of Russian disinformation by banning the presence of the Kremlin’s official mouthpieces, such as RT, in the Union’s media space and establishing or reinforcing specialized anti-disinformation centers, such as country-specific EDMO hubs, the  East StratCom Task Force (ESTF) or The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE).

The case of Hungary

The Hungarian regime had pursued a “multi-vector” foreign policy before the war that tried to rip the benefits of both Western and Eastern – political, economic, or other – support. In the new geopolitical environment, however, Hungary’s distinct foreign policy position became untenable as it stayed bound to a “set course” of foreign policy favoring political or economic alignment with its Eastern partners. A stance that has ultimately isolated the Hungarian government among regional or Euro-Atlantic allies who viewed Russia’s aggression as a direct threat to their national security and sovereignty. Hungarian strategic communication has mirrored the government's “multi-vector” foreign policy, which involves maintaining open communication channels toward the Kremlin while voting for punitive measures against Russia in the EU.

• The highly centralized governmental communication under the leadership of the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister and the government-controlled media’s monopoly over 80% of the Hungarian media space provide the Hungarian government ample leverage to take steps against foreign hostile influence. However, there is currently no political will to do so.
• Instead, governmental communication mainly produces its own propaganda and disinformation campaigns to go against domestic or foreign political enemies, more precisely to protect the Hungarian regime against Western democratic criticism and prevent any criticism of Russia or China. Moreover, the government-controlled media lead the way in spreading anti-Ukrainian or pro-Kremlin narratives on the war. For example, they tend to accept the legitimacy of the Russian “sphere of interest” as a basis for the conflict or detail Ukraine’s hostility towards minority groups, including discrimination of ethnic Hungarians living in Transcarpathia – all key Russian arguments used to legitimize the unlawful invasion of Ukraine.
• The institutional or legal frameworks also reflect the political situation, as there is no dedicated StratCom institution to fight foreign influence. Instead, the Fidesz-loyalist bureaucrats of the National Media and Communications Authority (NMHH) and the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) have been supporting all the government’s decisions on media issues. Key legal frameworks, such as the Hungarian National Infocommunication Strategy or the National Security Strategy of Hungary, do not address Russian and Chinese influence and information operations as clear military or national security risks.

The lack of political will and institutional frameworks also means that the Hungarian state is unable or unwilling to incorporate non-state actors’ and independent NGOs’ anti-disinformation organizational capabilities, know-how, and anti-disinformation activities into its communication system. Instead, they are perceived as enemies for their occasional critique of the Hungarian regime.

NATO in the crosshairs

Although Hungarians have consistently shown strong support for NATO membership, the Alliance’s standing may have been questioned in the eyes of the Hungarian public due to the strong presence of anti-West, anti-Ukraine, and pro-Russian communication in the Hungarian media space. Our previous examination of NATO’s perception based on “trustworthy information sources” and “questionable sources” (pages, politicians, influencers) on Facebook proved that these are generally spread by mainstream government-aligned media. Data has revealed that NATO has been increasingly portrayed negatively in governmental media due to the Hungarian parliament’s long reluctance to support the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance on the grounds of Hungarian “sovereignty.”  Hungarian far-right actors and media used the governmental lines of communication to go even further by claiming that NATO’s alleged aggressive stance prompted the war and/or contributed to its “escalation.” A representative survey conducted by Political Capital in November 2022 found early signs of negative views on the Alliance. Around 30% of Hungarian respondents considered NATO responsible for the war, after Russia, the United States, and Ukraine, but before the European Union.

The Kremlin’s strategy of piggybacking

The foreign hostile influence in Hungary is, therefore, “piggybacking” on the Hungarian government’s strategic communication, which is compounded by the absence of appropriate countermeasures. The Kremlin's strategic communication has observed and leveraged these Hungarian narratives. It exploits them to propagate claims that (1) there is a lack of Western unity against Russia, (2) Russian interests or spheres of interests should be recognized, and (3) Poland, Hungary, and Romania are covertly plotting to dismember Ukraine and annex territories populated by ethnic minorities.

Recommendations

Given the Hungarian government’s foreign policy position and reluctance to fundamentally alter its communication, meaningful suggestions for improving Hungarian strategic communication can be effectively directed primarily to non-state actors. These efforts may include focusing on community engagement by empowering local groups and supporting grassroots movements to build resilience. Counter-narrative campaigns should be developed to provide positive alternatives to hostile messaging, and organizational strategies need to be adaptable to changing threats. Training in crisis communication for disinformation experts and media is crucial, as is conducting regular preparedness drills. Building trust with the public through transparency about sources and funding is also key. Finally, collaborating with democratic political actors to advocate for policy changes that combat misinformation is essential for a comprehensive approach to safeguarding the integrity of information dissemination.

The full English version of the study is available here (pdf, 885KB).

Methodology

The research employed a desktop research approach, complemented by data collection on Facebook using CrowdTangle to comprehensively investigate the challenges and workings of strategic communication in Hungary. We analyzed the legal framework, official documents, the functioning and communication of media authorities, and other information sources to assess the structures and actors of strategic communication while collecting data on the reach of messaging for core StratCom units, other state communications, and hostile actors with regard to NATO on Facebook.

Disclaimer

This report has been prepared with support from IRI's Beacon Project. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of IRI. Political Capital is part of the Hungarian HDMO hub.