Illiberal advance, but no breakthrough – yet?
Political Capital's latest study on the state of the populist radical right and Hungarian influence building, in cooperation with the Heinrich-Böll Foundation, aims to take stock of the "super election year" of 2024: how it has reshaped the scene for illiberal populist actors, and what it has brought to the Orbán regime in its efforts to build international influence and promote itself as a model of populism on the international stage.
The study is available here.
- Our infographic on Fidesz's allies and partners in the EU is available here.
- Our 2023 study on the state of populist alliance-building across the EU and Hungarian influence-building before the European election campaign is available here.
- Our 2022 study on the political influence-building of the Hungarian government, which underpins the current research, can be found here.
Summary
The populist radical right and far-right parties made significant gains in the European elections, but their performance varied across EU member states. These parties were able to capitalize on economic uncertainty, social and cultural tensions, and political instability in some countries. As a result, they won in France, Austria, Hungary, Italy and made significant gains in Belgium, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Romania, and Estonia. In Italy, the success of Giorgia Meloni's party highlights the ongoing shifts within the radical populist bloc and the waning influence of Matteo Salvini. His party has lost most of its support compared to 2019, in part due to Meloni's rise. Radical populist right parties had limited success in Sweden and Spain and lost ground in Finland and Portugal. Jarosław Kaczyński's party lost 12 percent and five seats in Poland and faces competition from the far-right Confederation Alliance.
In addition to the European elections, the most consequential events in 2024 were the elections in Austria, France, Slovakia, and Germany. In Austria, the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) failed to form a government despite winning the parliamentary elections, as other parties ruled out a partnership with the FPÖ under Kickl's leadership. In France, President Emmanuel Macron called for a snap election after the National Rally (RN) won the European elections by a large margin over Macron's centrist alliance. However, tactical voting between the centrist and left-wing New Popular Front alliances prevented the RN from winning the election. In Slovakia, Peter Pellegrini, an ally of Robert Fico and former leader of Hlas-SD, won the presidential election, giving SMER-SD a strategic advantage by reducing the likelihood of presidential vetoes of some of SMER's controversial policies. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won the regional elections in Thuringia and came in second in Saxony.
The populist radical right and far-right parties made significant gains in the European elections but remained divided. These forces are represented in three political families, and their ideological and political differences are evident. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the Patriots for Europe, and the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN). Together, they account for 25% of the mandates in the European Parliament, a significant increase from 17% in the last legislature. The Patriots for Europe is a largely rebranded successor to the Identity and Democracy group, and the Europe of Sovereign Nations includes the most extreme far-right parties, such as the AfD.
The European People's Party (EPP) seeks to expand its political influence by creating flexible alliances through its dominant position in the European Parliament. This approach allows the EPP to form a centrist mainstream majority and a right-wing majority with radical and far-right groups. The EPP can achieve its political goals without depending on either side of the political spectrum. As part of this strategy, the EPP occasionally adopts positions in line with the radical and far-right groups in order to reduce their appeal and ensure that they do not represent these views alone. This right-wing cooperation, dubbed the "Venezuela majority," highlights a right-wing shift driven by the EPP's willingness to align itself with radical right-wing groups rather than the independent strength of these groups.
The Orbán regime’s influence-building efforts aim to ensure its long-term survival by creating a favorable foreign policy environment and changing the existing power structures in the Euro-Atlantic area. To achieve a change of cultural and political hegemony, the regime aims to deepen cooperation with radical and far-right parties, support them, and facilitate their collaboration. The main tools for building influence and alliance have been the export of illiberal ideas, policies, and narratives through meetings, events, publications, and providing practical support.
Viktor Orbán has joined forces with mostly far-right parties to create the Patriots of Europe, which envisions a "Europe of nation-states." The creation of the Patriots group, which has become the third largest political group and the largest far-right bloc in the European Parliament, is a major achievement for Viktor Orbán, as Fidesz is the second largest force in a group of powerful European parties. Viktor Orbán has formalized his alliance with major far-right parties from France, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, and Spain. Their influence in the European Parliament will be limited in the short term, as the mainstream parties have denied them significant representation in parliamentary leadership bodies. Their position in the European Council and the Council of the European Union may increase in the coming years. In the Czech Republic, for example, nationalist Andrej Babiš's ANO is leading the polls ahead of national elections.