Budapest Pride march: Fidesz could fall into the trap meant for TISZA leader Péter Magyar

The interesting situation with the Budapest Pride march is that it poses more risks for the ruling Fidesz party than for Péter Magyar or for Budapest Mayor Gergely Karácsony.

The plan

With the restrictions of the right of assembly in March the original intent of Fidesz was to create as much outrage as possible (see “let the libs scream”), to make it impossible to organise the Pride march, and to replace the discourse themes of economic and livelihood issues popularized by TISZA with once again political conflicts in a symbolic, culture war instead. Besides its proven ability to unite the Fidesz camp, this topic also benefits from the fact that, as long as the discourse focuses on the Pride ban, less attention is given to the increasing discontent with the government’s performance. The main target would have been Péter Magyar and his party: he is the one Fidesz wants to “liberalise,” force him into metropolitan/Budapest/civil liberties issues. They might have assumed that Péter Magyar can’t avoid one of two traps: if he does not show support for Pride, then the majority of the capital’s left-wing and the liberal voters will turn against him, but if he does support it, then everyone else will turn on him.

Spontaneous division of labour

The opposition leader did nothing but choose to follow his own path, and this proved to be enough to avoid the traps. He did not engage in the symbolic issues that Fidesz threw his way, for which he received no small amount of criticism. Nevertheless, rather than declining, his support has actually increased in the past months. A division of labour has spontaneously emerged between Péter Magyar and other opposition and civil society actors. The latter continue to hold identity politics and civil liberties issues significant on their agendas (e.g.: Pride, the so-called “transparency” law), often mobilising large crowds. Nevertheless, they consider Péter Magyar and TISZA to be the most capable political force to replace the government. In fact, some parties and politicians who are protesting the restriction of the right of assembly have announced that they will not run in the 2026 general election in order to avoid weakening TISZA’s chances (e.g., Momentum and András Jámbor).

Gergely Karácsony, mayor of Budapest, has also found his role. As he can allow himself to address the capital’s voters, without fear of major losses, he could take over the organisation of the Pride march. In doing so, he could score points with opposition voters who might have felt that Péter Magyar abandoned them.

The horror of violence

So, the topic of Pride may have become an issue for Fidesz. A successful Pride march would suggest that the government is unable to enforce its own laws, making it appear weak and ridiculous. The government could try to crack down on the march, but there is no guarantee that it can control the situation. It would also risk a repeat of the violent riots in 2006 that followed a political scandal. The Orbán regime has been trying to consciously avoid this situation and seems to prefer preventing it. This is why the government is doing everything in its power to stop the event from happening. It is trying to scare away the organizers and potential participants. This is also evident in the increased police activity and activism around the march.

What happens on June 28 and its subsequent political impact largely depends on how many people attend the Pride march. If many people attend, especially if numerous prominent international participants are present, it will be more difficult for the police to intervene or impose retrospective punishments. Such measures are becoming increasingly risky for Fidesz as their support declines because the governing party is no longer acting from a position of strength. It no longer represents a majority and instead acts arbitrarily out of arrogance of power. Thus, it could be seen as aggressive and/or violent, but not powerful.