Has the peace fight won? - Weekly analysis of the domestic spread of pro-Kremlin war narratives

Political Capital is part of the Ukraine War Disinfo Group, an international collaboration that monitors the spread of pro-Kremlin disinformation about the war against Ukraine in traditional and social media in 12 Central and Eastern European countries. The cooperation is coordinated by the Open Information Partnership (OIP). The project monitors the main platforms spreading pro-Kremlin messages on a weekly basis for nine weeks, analyse narratives and trends, and report on the results of each week. 

Both in terms of reach and impact on public discourse, government media is the primary disseminator of pro-Kremlin narratives in Hungary. Still, far-right actors and pro-Kremlin sites are also active communicators on the issue, sometimes with exceptionally high reach. The main narratives studied are: 

• Anti-Western Narratives  
• Narratives Discrediting Ukraine
• Battlefield Events 
• (Negative) Economic Consequences of Sanctions 
• Ukrainian Refugees 
• Conditions of Russians and Russian-speaking Minorities 
• The Threat of the War Expanding Beyond Ukraine 
• Aid to Ukraine 
• Conspiracy Theories 

Lessons from the weekly reports

The main lessons from the monitoring between 22-28 April: 

The most popular narratives included those claiming that Russia is achieving victories on the battlefield, that aid to Ukraine prolongs or escalates the war, and that the West is using Ukraine as a pawn against Russia. Pro-Kremlin actors have lost their agenda-setting capacity and are now only following and reflecting on the news cycle. Meanwhile, the narrative of an imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive is starting to feature more and more in Russian disinformation, with some voices already claiming that Ukraine will be unable to do anything and that Russia's final victory is inevitable.  Pro-Kremlin media has only shown a high degree of flexibility in interpreting statements made by Western leaders to support their own agenda, as well as the combination of racism and xenophobia in certain narratives. 

An English-language analysis summarising the results of the monitoring carried out between 22-28 April in the twelve participating countries can be found here.

The main lessons from the monitoring between 15-21 April: 

There are no significant changes this week, the recurring narratives were spread, similar to previous weeks. The biggest change is the increase in articles alleging an inevitable Russian victory and the hopelessness of Ukraine succeeding in recapturing its lost territories. Narratives discrediting Ukraine were once again the most popular this week. These included Ukraine not wanting peace/fighting a war for the sake of fighting, being an autocratic regime led by Nazis, Ukrainians being demanding and ungrateful regarding military aid, and that Ukraine is oppressing its Hungarian minority. These narratives all served to paint Ukraine as undeserving of Western support.  

An English-language analysis summarising the results of the monitoring carried out between 15-21 April in the twelve participating countries can be found here.

The main lessons from the monitoring between 8-14 April: 

Narratives discrediting Ukraine were once again the most popular this week. These included denying the sovereignty of Ukraine or even its existence as a nation, calling them nazis, a few claims about religious persecution, equivocating on war crimes, and painting Ukraine as warmongers who don’t want peace. Narratives about battle events were also quite prominent, including defeating the Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut for the sixth week in a row, uncritically quoting Prigozhin saying Russia has achieved its objective and denial denying and relativisation of the beheading video. 

An English-language analysis summarising the results of the monitoring carried out between 8-14 April in the twelve participating countries can be found here.

The main lessons from the monitoring between 1-7 April

Narratives discrediting Ukraine were again the most popular this week. The three themes on which this narrative was most frequently used were alleged war crimes committed by Ukraine, action against the leaders of the pro-Kremlin Moscow Patriarchate Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP), and Ukraine's refusal to seek peace. Anti-Western narratives have also been popular, blaming Western countries for the escalation of the war and undermining confidence in the effectiveness of military support. In addition, narratives of the fall of Bakhmut and the defeat of Ukraine have been published for the fifth week in a row.  

An English-language analysis summarising the results of the monitoring carried out between 1-7 April in the twelve participating countries can be found here.

The main lessons from the monitoring from 25 March to 1 April

Interestingly, the number of disinformation messages decreased this week compared to previous weeks, but it is not likely to become a long-term trend change. Disinformation narratives continued to mainly reflect on emerging news stories and repeat previous narratives about the war. A new form of a previously existing sub-narrative submerged after Lukashenko’s statement that while Russia is ready for peace, the West isn’t. This is part of the so-called “peace narrative” that the West is a warmongering party to the conflict, not interested in peace. In contrast, a ceasefire and immediate peace negotiations are the only viable solution to the war. 

An English-language analysis summarising the results of the monitoring carried out between 25 March and 1 April in the twelve participating countries can be found here.

The main lessons from the monitoring between 20-25 March

Negative messages about Western military aid and Ukraine continued to dominate the media space. Although the exact sub-narratives differed from Week 3, the underlying narratives remained the same. This week’s popular sub-narratives reacted to the news related to the UN report about war crimes in Ukraine and events about NATO. Additionally, Western support, especially the news that Western tanks were arriving in Ukraine, was frequently attacked as provocations and warmongering efforts.    

An English-language analysis summarising the results of the monitoring carried out between 20-25 March in the twelve participating countries can be found here.

The main lessons from the monitoring between 13-19 March

Anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian narratives dominated during the examined period, but the sub-narratives were diverse. The lack of a strong pro-government presence is interesting, but we estimate it is temporary. News about the shot-down US drone, the protests about the pension reforms in France, and the transfer of Polish and Slovak fighter jets to Ukraine divided the attention of the sources. Interestingly, the speeches around Hungary's 15 March national holiday did not reflect actual political messages. Thus, the expected surge in the pro-Kremlin and pro-government peace narratives remained scarce.   

An English-language analysis summarising the results of the monitoring carried out between 13-19 March in the twelve participating countries can be found here.

The main lessons from the monitoring between 6-12 March

Most articles and posts disseminating disinformation narratives this week were also centred around three narratives (narratives discrediting Ukraine, narratives about aid to Ukraine and events on the battlefield). Of these, narratives discrediting Ukraine were also relatively prominent during the period under review. These included 'life is better in Russia than in Ukraine because there is no same-sex marriage'. Another important narrative originated from László Toroczkai, who claimed that Ukraine should hand over territory to end the war and that Ukraine was committing ethnic cleansing by conscripting the Hungarian population. A new version of a previously sporadic narrative has re-emerged, according to which Ukrainian soldiers shoot their own comrades if they try to surrender.  

An English-language analysis summarising the results of the monitoring carried out between 6-12 March in the twelve participating countries can be found here.

The main lessons from the monitoring from 20 February to 5 March

In Hungary this week, most of the disinformation narratives clustered around three narratives (Anti-Western narratives, Narratives discrediting Ukraine and Battlefield events). During the two weeks, we monitored, a relatively strong focus was on anti-Western narratives and narratives discrediting Ukraine. This was partly because the anniversary was "commemorated" by several disinformation sites, which used the occasion to point to the positive portrayal of Ukraine's alleged overreach. On the other hand, there was also a relatively high level of attention around the events in Bahmut, with disinformation actors attempting to present the events as if the fighting there was evidence of the extreme weakness of the Ukrainian army. More than a third of these disinformation narratives were spread by far-right influencer Zsolt Bede on Telegram followed by three government-affiliated actors – including a media outlet, an influencer and a fringe site. Thus 75% of all disinformation came from these four actors. 

An English-language analysis summarising the results of the monitoring carried out between 20 February and t March in the twelve participating countries can be found here.